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CHRISTOS A. ZAFIROPOULOS

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BY

CHRISTOS A. ZAFIROPOULOS

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Στοὺς γονεῖς μου, Ἀνδρέα καὶ Παναγιῶτα,
μὲ σεβασμὸ κι εὐγνωμοσύνη.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations for ancient authors and works are those in *LSJ* (Greek) and *Oxford Latin Dictionary* (Oxford, 1982) (Latin).

Chambry	fable in Chambry, E. (1927) (ed. and tr.), *Ésope, Fables.* (Paris).
CPG	von Leutsch, E.L. and Schneidewin, F.G. (1839–1951) (eds.), *Corpus Paroemiographorum Graecorum* vols. 1–2 (Göttingen).
DGE	Adrados, F.R. (1980–) (ed.), *Diccionario Griego-Español* (Madrid).
DK	Diels, H. and Kranz, W. (1951–2^{6}) (eds.), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* vols. 1–2 (Berlin).
FGrH	Jacoby, F. (1923–) (ed.), *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin).
(G)	*Life of Aesop*, the version first edited by Perry, B.E. (1952), *Aesopica. A Series of Texts Relating to Aesop or Ascribed to Him or Closely Connected with the Literary Tradition that Bears His Name. Collected and Critically Edited, in Part Translated from Oriental Languages, with a Commentary and Historical Essay.* Volume 1: *Greek and Latin Texts* (Illinois), 35–77.
Hausrath	fable in Hausrath, A., Hass, H. and Hunger, H. (1959–70^{2}) (eds.), *Corpus Fabularum Aesopicarum, I: Fabulae Aesopicae soluta oratione conscriptae, vols. 1–2* (Leipzig).
LS	Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N. (1987) (eds.), *The Hellenistic Philosophers.* Volume 2: *Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography* (Cambridge).
LSJ	Liddell, H.G., Scott, R., and Jones, H.S. (1996^{9}) (eds.), *A Greek-English Lexicon, With A Revised Supplement* (Oxford).
P	fable in Perry (1952), 301–711.
Pfeiffer	Pfeiffer, R. (1949–53), *Callimachus*, vols. I–II (Oxford).
PG	Migne, J.-P. (1857–66) (ed.), *Patrologiae Graecae*, vol. 102 (Turnholt).
PLF	Lobel, E. and Page, D. (1955) (eds.), *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta* (Oxford).
PLG	Bergk, T. (1853) (ed.), *Poetae Lyrici Graeci* (Leipzig).
PMG	Page, D.L. (1962) (ed.), *Poetae Melici Graeci* (Oxford).

Pr.	Aesopic proverb(s) in Perry (1952), 265–91.
Radt	Radt, S. (1985) (ed.), *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta. Vol. 3: Aeschylys* (Göttingen).
RE	Pauly, A., Wissowa, G., and Kroll, W. (1893–) (eds.), *Real—Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart).
S	Aesopic maxims in Perry (1952), 245–58.
T	testimonies in Perry (1952), 211–41.
VD	textual supplement in Van Dijk, G.-J. (1997), *AINOI, ΛΟΓΟΙ, ΜΥΘΟΙ. Fables in Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic Greek Literature. With a Study of the Theory and Terminology of the Genre* (Leiden), 400–568.
West	West, M.L. (1971–2) (ed.), *Iambi et Elegi Graeci* vols. 1–2 (Oxford).

CHAPTER I

THE GREEK FABLE

I.1 *Definition and Characteristics of the Greek Fable*

The Greek fable is a brief and simple fictitious story with a constant structure, generally with animal protagonists (but also humans, gods, and inanimate objects, e.g. trees), which gives an exemplary and popular message on practical ethics and which comments, usually in a cautionary way, on the course of action to be followed or avoided in a particular situation.

The above definition covers most Greek fables and all those of the *Augustana* collection. The majority of Greek and modern definitions of fable can be summed up in the definition given by Theon, a Greek rhetorician of the second century A.D. In his *Progymnasmata* (see p. 22 below) he discusses the Aesopic fable (which he terms μῦθος)[1] *in extenso* as a useful kind of story to be used in a speech. In his words μῦθός ἐστι λόγος ψευδὴς εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν, that is, a fable is a fictitious narration that portrays reality.[2] Most of the modern definitions of Greek fable expand Theon's. For example, a fable is "a fictitious statement wherein one or more animals or inanimate objects are introduced as speaking or acting, or both, in the manner of types, to illustrate either a parallel set of circumstances or a general principle . . .";[3] or a fable is an exemplary narration which illustrates, in prose or verse, a particular situation and draws a lesson from it.[4]

---

[1] Theon *Prog.* 3 in Spengel *Rhet.* II.72 f. Cf. T103. On the various terms for 'fable' see pp. 2–3 below.

[2] A "perfect and complete definition" according to Perry (1965), xx. Cf. Blackham (1985), xi, 236–9; Perry (1959), 22. However, Theon's definition is remarkably similar to Plutarch's definition for 'myth' in *Mor.* 348a (ὁ δὲ μῦθος εἶναι βούλεται λόγος ψευδὴς ἐοικὼς ἀληθινῷ). See Van Dijk (1997), 48 n. 58. The two writers lived at roughly the same period (first–second centuries A.D.); the similarity between their definitions has not been studied. On the translation of ἀλήθεια see Van Dijk (1997), 48 n. 59.

[3] Archibald (1902), 88.

[4] Rodríguez Adrados (1984a), 137. For a survey of modern definitions see Van

The word λόγος is one of the three terms used to denote fable in Greece, the other two being αἶνος and μῦθος. None of them became the exclusive term for fable throughout antiquity and there does not seem to be any major differentiation drawn between them by the writers who use them; each writer seems to choose one or more of these terms to signify a fable, without explaining his reasons for doing so.

The term αἶνος seems to be the easiest to characterize; it implies a fictitious story in verse with a message that refers to real circumstances but is hidden behind a metaphorical narration. Theon offers an etymological interpretation for the word. He notes that the term indicates an exhortation (παραίνεσις, T103). However, it is not this metaphorical and instructive aspect that differentiates αἶνος from the other two terms; it is, rather, the limitation of its use to the Archaic period. The first three fables that are attested in Greek literature are called αἶνος.[5] Thus, αἶνος stands at the beginning of the history of the fable.[6]

The other terms, λόγος and μῦθος, are the most frequent markers for 'fable'. They can also be distinguished chronologically, although in certain periods they are used as alternatives. Λόγος appears mainly through the Classical and Hellenistic periods, while μῦθος dominates the terminology for fable in Late Antiquity and the Byzantine period.[7]

Sometimes, a writer may use both these terms, as in Plato's *Phaedo* 60b–61b. There, Socrates first uses the term μῦθος for fable and he seems to suggest a fictitious story that illustrates an observation from

---

Dijk (1997), ch. 1. The extent of Theon's influence on modern definitions is evident even in the latest one, that of Van Dijk (1997), 113. After a thorough discussion of ancient and modern definitions (ibid., chs. 1–2), he concludes in his own definition that a fable is "a fictitious, metaphorical narrative".

[5] Hes. *Op.* 202–12; Archil. frs. 172–81, 185–7 West.

[6] On αἶνος see Chambry (1927), xxii–iv; Van Dijk (1993a), 171–3; id. (1997) 79–82; Fraenkel (1924); Hausrath (1909), 1704–5; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 306–18; Josifović (1974), 17–19; Karadagli (1981); Lasserre (1984); Nagy (1990), 314–15, 322–9 (= αἶνος derives from the verb αἰνίσσομαι, "to utter riddles"); Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.122–4; Parassoglou (1993), 26–7, 32–3; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.19–22; West (1984), 107–8, 113.

[7] Λόγος: Ar. *Av.* 651; id. *Pax* 129; id. *V.* 566, 1258–60, 1399–405; Arist. *Rh.* 1393a27–30; Hdt. I.141; Plu. *Mor.* 156a; X. *Mem.* II.7.13. Cf. T1a, 3, 56. Aesop as a writer of λόγοι, a λογοποιός: Hdt. II.134 and T1a, 3, 5, 8, 35, 43. The first collection of Aesopic fables, the one attributed to Demetrius of Phalerum (see I.2.3, pp. 19–21 below), was entitled λόγων Αἰσωπείων συναγωγαί, see T174. Μῦθος: T1b, 2, 21, 23, 40, 45, 50–2, 58–9, 62, 101–3. But also in A. fr. 139 Radt (on Λιβυστικοὶ μῦθοι); Arist. *Mete.* 356b11; Pl. *Alc.1* 122e–123a; id. *R.* 272d. Aesop as a μυθοποιός: T1b, 37, 43, 65.

reality (that pleasure and pain are inseparably linked, 60b–c). Cebes' reply introduces the term λόγοι for fables (60d). He might be referring to fables in prose, for he asks Socrates to tell him more about the poems that he composed by setting to music the Aesopic λόγοι (περὶ . . . τῶν ποιημάτων ὧν πεποίηκας ἐντείνας τοὺς τοῦ Αἰσώπου λόγους).[8] Then (61b) Socrates contrasts λόγοι with μῦθοι; he says that the poet, if he is to be a poet, must compose *muthoi* and not *logoi.* Because he himself was not a composer of *muthoi,* he took those Aesopic *muthoi* that he had at hand and knew well and gave his version. If *muthoi* indicate fables in verse, as opposed to *logoi* in prose, then Socrates' intervention was either a metrical change or a change of content. He could not have versified fables that were already in verse! If, on the other hand, *muthoi* stress the fictitious character of a story, Socrates seems to correct Cebes' terminology by reminding him of the fables' fictitious aspect. The terminology of this passage, then, implies that: a) in the first half of the fourth century B.C. both terms were used for 'fable'. b) The distinction between *muthos* and *logos,* as regards 'fable', indicates a difference in form (verse or prose) or in truth-status (more or less fictitious).[9]

This distinction does not appear in the *Augustana,* where fables are called λόγοι, but it underlies the various theories on fable by rhetoricians in the Imperial period. In these theories, μῦθος comes to mean the fictitious narration, while λόγος indicates the succinct ethical conclusion that the compiler(s) of a collection adds at the end of each fable, the *epimythium.*[10]

However, the Aesopic λόγος in the *Augustana* is a narration, a story

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[8] On ἐντείνω as meaning "setting to music", see the scholia in Burnet (1911), 15.

[9] Schanz (1894) gives the most detailed discussion of the *Phaedo* as regards its importance for both the history of Greek fable and Plato's use of fables.

[10] For the distinction between μῦθος and λόγος in the Greek terminology for fable see Van Dijk (1993a), 173–4; id. (1997), 82–8; Holzberg (1993a), 22; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 290–4; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.122–8; Perry (1962), 336–7; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.23–8. Cf. Pi. *O.* 1.28–9; Pl. *R.* 376e–7d; id. *Grg.* 523a; See also Buxton (1994), ch. 1; Detienne (1986), 45–51, 85–6, 120–5. For the rhetoricians' arguments see T85, 100, 103. Theon notes that Plato in *Phaedo* uses both terms simultaneously (T103). Aristophanes offers another interesting criterion for the differentiation of the Aesopic λόγοι from μῦθοι: the first contain an entertaining and amusing element, the Αἰσώπου γέλοιον (*V.* 566–7; cf. 1179–85, 1256–62). On fables in Aristophanes see Rothwell (1995); Vaio (1971). It should be noted that as regards the anonymous fable collections (see pp. 22 f. below) there is the theoretical possibility of a variety of anonymous compilers. This point should be kept in mind every time the "anonymous compiler" is referred to in this book.

which is simple in style. It is not adorned with detailed descriptions of the space where the story takes place or of the protagonists, by contrast, for example, with the Latin fables of Phaedrus. The scope of the Aesopic fable is to extract a clear message for its reader. In this respect, the style must be plain enough to render the idea clear.[11]

Following the fable's stylistic demands, the language is economical, without any rhetorical elaboration. The fable is an "unaffected narration", a λόγος ἀφελής.[12] It is also brief, usually no more than a few lines.[13] It often includes a dialogue, but not an extended one. The story is as long as is needed for the message to be illustrated. The brevity and simplicity of the fable enables it to be more easily memorized and narrated on a given occasion.[14] Grammatically, the narrative is in past tenses. There is often a time marker which states that the story happened *once* (ποτέ) in an unspecified time in the past. There is no chronological connection between the different fables of a collection such as the *Augustana*.[15] Each tale is independent from the others and it is totally irrelevant if, for instance, the fable of the raven and the fox (P124) happened before or after that of the fox and the old lion (P142).[16]

In sum, an Aesopic fable is a brief and simple narration in the past tense with a clear message. Its protagonists are mostly animals, but the *Augustana* fables are also populated by gods, mythological figures (e.g. Hercules), common people pictured in their occupations and daily troubles, inanimate nature, such as trees, and natural forces (e.g. the North Wind).[17] Certain repeated fable themes provide us with a basis to differentiate between various types of fables. These types include 'agonistic' fables or "fables of dispute", in which a conflict between two fable figures and its outcome are described and

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[11] E.g. Beattie (1783), 506; Bewick (1878), 40; Hansen (1982), 101–5. The need for the fable's style to be simple is attested in the ancient sources see VD G18a, 20c, 41, 64a, 70.

[12] E.g. Blackham (1985), 211; Korais (1810), 113; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.113; Perry (1962), 343–6; T104. For the language of the *Augustana* see Rodríguez Adrados (1948).

[13] There are, however, some exceptions. See, for example, P1, 3, 9, 105, 173, 336, 419, 421, 432, 437a, 439, 452, 466.

[14] E.g. Van Dijk (1997), 35 nn. 223–5; García Gual (1976), 313; Korais (1810), 113; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.112–13; Perry (1959), 18, 33; id. (1962), 343–6.

[15] Van Dijk (1997), 36 nn. 230–2; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.141, 211–30.

[16] This point runs counter to the idea that the animals in the collection have fixed patterns of behaviour. See I.3.1, pp. 28–30 below.

[17] Perry (1962), 301, 336–7.

discussed (see II.1.2, p. 48 below). The 'aetiological' fables (P3, 8, 25, 39, 50, 102–3, 105–6, 108–9, 117, 163, 166, 171, 240) give the cause (the αἴτιον) for an animal's specific biological or behavioural characteristic (e.g. why swallows build their nests in the cities, P39; why turtles have a carapace, P106) or the cause of certain aspects of human behaviour (e.g. why a man's behaviour changes in different stages of his life, P105). There are also "fables on friendship", which touch upon issues of friendship and enmity (see III.2.1, III.2.4 below). However, the problem with a typology of the *Augustana* fables, as far as the research of its ethics is concerned, is that, despite their thematic homogeneity, none of these groups of fables is also characterized by a homogeneity of messages. For example, one 'agonistic' fable might conclude that the weak should not confront the strong (e.g. P104), while another might carry the opposite message (e.g. P46). Or the fables of a certain type might contain a variety of messages. For example, one 'agonistic' fable shows that the physically strong should not fight against each other (P147), another one that the liar is revealed and rebuked (P20), while a third teaches the importance of cunning in comparison to physical appearance (P12). Therefore, the types of the *Augustana* fables mentioned earlier are used in this book only as a way of organizing the fable material thematically, without suggesting that the fables of each type have a uniform message. The idea that the fables could be defined by stylistic criteria alone was heavily criticized by Morten Nøjgaard in 1964. He argued that there is no discernible and firm 'style' of Greek fable. Narrative features such as brevity and simplicity of style vary from one fabulist to the other or from one writer who uses fables to another. The Greek fables in the *Augustana* collection are completely different in style from those of Babrius or Aphthonius, just as the Hesiodic αἶνος differs stylistically from the Archilochean. Nøjgaard also pointed out stylistic affinities between fable and other literary genres. Although he argued against the idea that style was the sole distinguishing mark of Greek fable, he acknowledged that there are certain stylistic patterns in fables: the *Augustana* fables are indeed simple and brief and the Greek fables of Babrius and the Latin ones of Phaedrus have their plots adorned with many details.[18] Literary

[18] Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.48–54, 87–92, 111–14, 397–400, 410–13. On the relations between fable and other categories of stories: Beavis (1990), 474–80; Chambry (1927), xxiv; Coats (1981); Gardner (1962), 25–7; Perry (1965), xxvi–viii (fable and

differences between the *Augustana* and the collections of Phaedrus and Babrius do, in fact, exist. The collections of Phaedrus and Babrius are in verse and their fables are often lengthy and adorned with narrative details; their authors also often intervene in the narrative to signify their presence behind the story (e.g. Phaedrus 1.9.1–2, 3.10; Babrius 1.57.12). Their collections are the products of individual authors who feel the need to inform the reader about their use of sources, about their high position in fable tradition as skillful artists who turned the old brief and simple stories into delicate and highly-artistic poems (e.g. Phaedrus 1.Prologue; 2.Prologue; 3.Epilogue.10–19; Babrius 1.Prologue.17–19; 2.Prologue.6–16).[19]

Nøjgaard also rightly challenged the view that a definition of fable must include the element of entertainment. According to this view, the aim was not only to educate its audience, but also to amuse it by employing parody and comic scenes. This view is based on the description of fable as a 'jest' by Aristophanes and the Latin fabulist Phaedrus.[20] Nevertheless, as regards the *Augustana* fables, their scenes and messages are rather violent and solemn instead of comic or mocking. If a fable is occasionally used as a tool for mockery (as in the Archilochean αἶνοι), this mockery contains a didactic element, for it censures a particular type of behaviour.[21]

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parable). Beavis (1990), 477 n. 23; Giangrande (1972), 22–4; Perry (1959), 19; Trenker (1958), 10 (fable and *chreia*). Blackham (1985), 212; Carnes (1988b), 11–36; Della Corte (1971–2), 15–18; Van Dijk (1993a), 178–9; Kindstrand (1978), 74–9; Perry (1936), 156–7, 233; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.218–21; Van Thiel (1971) (fable and proverb). Buxton (1994), 193–6; Della Corte (1971–2), 8; Kirk (1970), 36–8; Koep (1969); Pugliarello (1973), 20–2; Rodríguez Adrados (1978a), 227–8; id. (1979–87), I.231–45; id. (1993), 1–7 (fable and myth). Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.216–18 (fable and riddle). On theoretical models about the transformation of fable into an acknowledged category of story see Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.16–21, 24–129; Perry (1959), 17–18; Schaeffer (1985), 345–6.

[19] On these issues see e.g. Della Corte (1971–2), 19–22; Perry (1965), xi–ii; Schaeffer (1985), 349–53. See also VD G12–15b, 19a–b.

[20] γέλοιον in Ar. *V.* 566, 1259 and Hsch. *Lexicon* 2159, p. 78 in Latte (1953); 'iocus' Phaed. 3. *Prol.* 37, 4.7.2. Cf. p. 3 n. 10 above. See also Van Dijk (1993a), 183; Holzberg (1993a), 20. Ancient sources on the charming and entertaining aspects of fable: VD G10, 12, 15b, 17, 31, 41, 45, 47, 52, 59–60, 64a, 70, 74a, 75. On its comic aspect: VD G10, 32, 69a, 74a. Against the view that fables were told simply as entertainment, without any exemplary use, Perry (1959), 21.

[21] Blackham (1985), 251; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.106–8, 111, 333–6; Perry (1962), 344–5; Wiedemann (1989), 146. Contra: Brewer (1983), 5; Carnes (1981); Josifović (1974), 37–9; Leibfried (1982), 35–9; Rodríguez Adrados (1948), 180 f.; id. (1978a), 225 f.; id. (1979–87), I.177–9, 224–30. On Greek parody: Giangrande (1972), 27–31; Householder (1944); Lelièvre (1954); Rose (1993).

Nøjgaard proposed, instead, a structural analysis of fable. The narrative chain of a Greek fable—and *par excellence* of the fables in the *Augustana*—exhibits the following scheme: *la donnée*, which is a brief presentation of the time and space in which the story takes place and of the situation of the protagonist; *l'action de choix*, where the protagonist has to make a choice that will promote a particular course of action; *l'action finale*, which gives the outcome of the action and, thus, the fable's message. In *l'action finale* the message of the fable is often underlined by criticism or self-criticism.[22]

The last element of a Greek fable, although outside the narrative chain, is the *epimythium* (Nøjgaard calls it *la moralité*). The *epimythium* (ἐπιμύθιον) follows the story (the μῦθος) and stands outside the plot.[23] In the *Augustana* it usually consists of a single phrase which is often introduced with the formulae "this fable states (refers to) . . ." (ὁ λόγος δηλοῖ . . ., ὁ λόγος ἁρμόζει (εἴρηται) πρός . . .), followed by the kind of behaviour condemned (e.g. "this fable demonstrates that lust is punished"). In the *epimythium* the unknown compiler of the collection has singled out the point that he wanted to draw from the fable. In this sense, the *epimythium* is a later addition to the fable and sometimes an abrupt one. In many fables there is a contradiction between the message (or messages) that the reader draws from the plot and the one that the *epimythium* points to.[24] This is so because the message of the *epimythium* is the product of a single reader's (i.e. the compiler's) interpretation of the fable and therefore reflects his ethical views.[25] It is also the main framework for the articulation of the compiler's moralizing interventions in the fable's messages (see pp. 33–4 below). However, this book will show that the fable has ethics of its own which can be placed in the general framework of Greek thought. The *epimythium* is an element that is alien to the fables in both narrative and notional terms. Because a detailed study of the

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[22] Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.74–82, 141–70. For an outline of his structural analysis see id. (1984), 228–9. For similar structural analysis of the collection's narrative see also García Gual (1976), 315; Gasparov (1968), 127; Holzberg (1993a), 95–102; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 219–94, esp. 241–53; Lindner (1978), 27–8; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.49–50.

[23] The word itself is a technical term introduced by the rhetorician Aphthonius (fourth–fifth century A.D.). See VD G54. See also the more detailed definition by the rhetorician Nicolaus in VD G64a. The earlier rhetoricians, Theon and Hermogenes, refer to *epimythium* as λόγος or ἐπίλογος. See VD G20c, 41.

[24] See Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.370–4 and p. 8 n. 26 below.

[25] Ibid., I.516.

ethical messages which are stated in the *epimythia* would require a book in its own right and would reflect the ideas of the compiler himself but not those of the fables, this study will be limited to the ethical ideas that can be drawn from the fables themselves, i.e. the plots of the *Augustana* fables.[26]

There still remains to be discussed the part of Theon's definition that refers to the fable's "depiction of reality" (λόγος ψευδὴς *εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν*). The question is this: how does the fable depict reality and what is the content of its depiction. Nøjgaard demonstrated the structural homogeneity of the *Augustana* fables. His complete definition of an Aesopic fable is that it is "a fictitious story of mechanically allegorical persons with a moral action directed at evaluation".[27] He explains the production of ethical messages in a fable as the outcome of a narrative structure in which two antithetical forces are put in conflict (mainly physical force against mental strength, or violence against cunning). The result of this conflict generates the message of the fable (for example, "do or do not fight against a physically or mentally stronger opponent").[28] Nøjgaard's work has been the most elaborate on the narrative side of the Aesopic fables. He has managed to display the importance of the narrative sequence in the production of a fable's message, and how this is used to create "mechanically allegorical persons".

However, he has done little more than to expand Theon's definition from a structuralistic point of view. From Aristotle onwards, the fable has been seen as a kind of metaphor of reality, as a fictitious tale which, however, has an allegorical reference to social reality.[29] Its fiction (the λόγος ψευδὴς) derives from the use of figures which are unreal (talking animals, trees etc.) or stereotypical (e.g. "the traveller" P67, 175, 177), which think and act as humans, find themselves in

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[26] On the *epimythium* and its often contradictory message in relation to the fable's see Beavis (1990), 476–7; Cascajero (1991), 42–3; García Gual (1976), 312; Hegel (1832–45), 495; Karadagli (1981), 113–16; Korais (1810), 114; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.359–77; id. (1984), 225–8; Perry (1940); id. (1959), 35 f.; id. (1965), xv–i; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.44–6; Skillen (1992), 179. Cf. T104; VD G20c, 67a.

[27] "Un récit fictif de personnages mécaniquement allégoriques avec une action morale à évaluation", Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.82. On the term 'allegorical' see pp. 8–9 above and n. 29 below. For a critical discussion of Nøjgaard's definition see Van Dijk (1997), 8–9; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.40–2.

[28] Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.246–72.

[29] Fable, however, is not an allegory. See Van Dijk (1997), 36 nn. 242–3. The term 'allegorical' is used in this book in a broad sense.

situations of human interaction (e.g. friendship, war, debate), and exhibit their views on the course of action that humans should follow in similar situations. However, the Greeks tended to regard fiction as a useful means of conveying generally accepted ethical principles and values. The key question for them was that of the moral use of fictitious statements. Therefore, a fable is "a story invented to tell the truth, not a true story".[30]

The fable is thus defined as an exemplary story, which illustrates reality (ἀλήθεια) through a fictitious and allegorical narration, which has practical application; its message refers either generally to the nature of life or to appropriate behaviour in a particular situation. The fable's examples are usually negative ones.[31] In this sense, the definition of Sopater, a Greek rhetorician of the fourth century A.D., seems more complete than Theon's: "a fable (μῦθος) is a fictitious but possible story that is composed in order to give the semblance of the things that happen in reality, which gives people some advice or somehow illustrates reality".[32]

However, although scholars have defined fable as an allegorical story with an ethical function (see I.3.1 below), no scholar has studied in detail the content of the fable's ethical messages, and thus of the kind of ἀλήθεια that an Aesopic fable portrayed. Without such an examination, the Greek fable's ethical function will remain an empty part of the fable's definition. It could be argued that all fictitious stories have a symbolic or allegorical reference to reality and carry a message with ethical implications. For example, parables,

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[30] Blackham (1985), ix. Cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1393a27–1394a5; Hor. *Epist.* 1.7.34; id. *S.* 2.3.320; Isid. *Etym.* I.40; Pl. *R.* 376e–392b, 595a–608b; T100–4 (for the Greek rhetoricians' theories). Greek sources on fable as a 'fictitious' narrative: VD G3, 5, 12, 14, 18b, 20a, 20c, 21, 24b, 31, 38, 41, 45, 54, 58, 63, 64a, 69c, 70, 75. On its 'metaphorical' aspect: VD G20a, 20c, 54, 58, 63–4a, 69c, 70, 75. See also Bewick (1878), 37; Blackham (1985), 8, 210; Chesterton (1929), 86–7; Van Dijk (1993a), 176; Freytag (1986); Janssens (1955); Jedrkiewicz (1989), 219–20; Korais (1810), 112; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.82; Perry (1959), 18; id. (1965), xx; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.38; Vandenberghe (1950), 17. Greek thought on fiction: Gill (1993), 43–6, 52–3, 74–8; Gill and Wiseman (1993); Wood (1993). On metaphor see Stanford (1936).

[31] Beavis (1990), 476–7; Van Dijk (1993a), 176; Perry (1965), xxi–ii; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.39.

[32] Sopat. Rh. *Prog.* 1 μῦθός ἐστι πλάσμα πιθανῶς πρὸς εἰκόνα τῶν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ συμβαινόντων πραγμάτων συγκείμενον, συμβουλήν τινα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ὑπογραφήν τινα τῶν πραγμάτων ποιούμενον. See Van Dijk (1993a), 177 and VD G58.

novels, even fairy-tales, all portray ethically appropriate or inappropriate behaviour and comment on it. So what distinguishes fable from them?

The intention of this book is to show that the fable's ethics, at least in the *Augustana*, are class-oriented and promote specific types of behaviour. The study focuses both on the content of these messages, and on the way in which they are designed to be received by their reader. Nevertheless, the ethical aspect must be related to the other characteristics of the Greek fable (e.g. structure, style), in order to make full sense. For this purpose, some more general characteristics of the *Augustana* fables need to be analysed.

I.2 *History and Function of the Greek Fable*

I.2.1 *The Term 'Aesopic'*

The term 'Aesopic' that often accompanies the Greek fable is mainly a convention in Greek literary history. From the Archaic period onwards, there have been various terms used to describe this sort of short, allegorical tale, namely the αἶνος, the λόγοι or μῦθοι from Sybaris, Libya, Cyprus etc.[33] However, the accompanying adjective 'Aesopic' (Αἰσώπειος or Αἰσωπικός) prevailed in Greek literature next to the various terms that denoted 'fable' (i.e. αἶνος, λόγος, μῦθος, pp. 2–3 above).

The adjective refers to Aesop, the legendary slave from Phrygia or Thrace who is reputed to have lived in the sixth century B.C. The existence of a historical Aesop has been disputed by scholars. It has been argued that Aesop was invented as a literary figure, some time in the early fifth century B.C., to provide an inventor of fables (see pp. 11–12 below). His existence, it is claimed, was then accepted as a historical fact by later Greek writers (e.g. Aristophanes, Plato, Aristotle). Aesop's historicity is also disputed on the grounds of the spuriousness of the first Greek testimonies about him.[34] However, most scholars accept his historicity, although they admit that we can-

[33] On the Λιβυστικοί, Συβαριτικοί, Καρικοί, Λυδικοί, Κύπριοι, Κυβισσοί fables see T42, 63, 85–93. See also Van Dijk (1997), 105–7; Hausrath (1909), 1719–22; Holzberg (1993a), 18; Nagy (1990), 334; Parassoglou (1993), 34–6; Trenker (1958), 8–9; West (1984), 114–15.

[34] See Josifović (1974), 21; West (1984).

not be categorical about the truth of the details of his life and about whether he actually told all or even any of the fables ascribed to him by the ancient sources. The number and variety of Greek sources on his existence are such that his historicity seems plausible, even though his role in the history of fable might have been less important and decisive than the ancient sources suggest, and although it is difficult to distinguish between fiction and reality as regards the biographical information about him.[35] Besides, Aesop's case is not exceptional as regards the problem of fictitious material infiltrating the biographical data of a figure from Greek literature, the biographical material about Homer being the most characteristic example.

Aesop was renowned for his witty use of animal and other tales as a means of indirect criticism and ethical admonition and, we are told, he was unfairly condemned and killed by Apollo's priests at Delphi. His adventurous life, together with a set of fables that he narrated in various circumstances, became the subject of the novel-like *Life of Aesop*, the composition of which is dated by scholars between the first century B.C. and the third century A.D. (most of them agreeing on a time in the first century B.C. or the first century A.D.).[36] The broad characterization of the Greek fable as 'Aesopic' should be interpreted in line with the Greek tendency to single out an inventor for each literary genre, a εὑρετὴς εἴδους. That is, Aesop was thought to be the user of fables *par excellence* and the historical figure who established their form, style and function. On the other hand, his being the inventor of fable does not imply that he was the first to compose and use fables. This was already done by Hesiod and Archilochus (see pp. 13–15 below).[37] Aesop was

[35] E.g. Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.454–5; Perry (1965), xxxv–xlvi; Baker (1969); Luzzatto (1988); Papathomopoulos (1990), 13–14. For ancient testimonies on Aesop see Perry (1952), 211–41.

[36] On the *Life of Aesop*, its chronology, content, and structure, and on the various aspects of Aesop's portrayal there (e.g. his origin, his slavery, his witticism, and his ritual death as a *pharmakos* at Delphi) see Baker (1969), 562–73; Birch (1955); Brodersen (1992); Chambry (1927), ix–xix; Van Dijk (1995b); Hausrath (1909), 1707–16; id. (1940), 114–40; Holbek (1977); Holzberg (1992); id. (1993a), 17–18, 84–93; id. (1993b); id. (1996), 633–9; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 41–215; Josifović (1974), 21–4; La Penna (1962); Melella (1945–6), 311 f.; Papademetriou (1997), ch. 1; Papathomopoulos (1989); id. (1990); Parassoglou (1993), 17–23; Perry (1952), 211–29; id. (1965), xxxv–xlvi; Rodríguez Adrados (1978a), 225, 230–1; id. (1979–87), I.286–98, 661–97; id. (1979b); West (1984), 117–18; Wiechers (1961); Zeitz (1936). See also T1–32, 53–73, 76–76d. For a detailed bibliography see Beschorner and Holzberg (1992). Cf. Fraser (1987), 22 for Aesop as a Greek name.

[37] In fact, in the first century A.D., Quintilian mentioned Hesiod as the historical

selected—conventionally or because of his eminence in the narration of fables and his contribution to the evolution of this category of story—to be the patriarch of fable. Thus, a category was formed under his name for the classification of stories which lacked a unified and generally accepted framework until then.[38]

The first mention of Aesop is by Herodotus (II.134–5), who spoke of Aesop as a Thracian slave contemporary with Sappho and a creator of fables (λογοποιός). In the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., the attribution of fables to Aesop seems to have been broadly accepted. This can be seen, for instance, in Aristophanes, Plato, and Aristotle. They all speak of 'Aesopic' fables (Αἰσώπου γέλοιον, Αἰσώπου λόγοι, Αἰσώπου μῦθοι).[39]

Nevertheless, fables were not always attributed to Aesop. They could also be introduced simply as 'fables' without any further categorization. Some of them might have been widely known under the name of their protagonists. So, for example, Xenophon speaks of "the fable of the dog" (ὁ τοῦ κυνὸς λόγος), which indicates a story so well known that it does not need to be placed under Aesop's name in order to gain a traditionally guaranteed existence.[40] It was the rhetoricians' treatises on fable as a category of story and the collections of fables in Late Antiquity that established the general use of the adjective 'Aesopic' as the common denominator of 'fable' as a category of story.[41] Thus, the frequent use of the term "Aesopic fable" in the present book will be in accordance with Greek conventional use.

I.2.2 *History and Function of the Greek Fable: The Archaic and Classical Periods*[42]

The history of Greek fable includes three stages. In the first, which includes the Archaic and Classical periods, the fable is used as an

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figure who introduced fables into Western literature. Quint. *Inst.* V.11.19. See VD G18b. Cf. Plu. *Mor.* 158b (VD G25b).

[38] Chambry (1927), ix; Van Dijk (1997), 98–104; García Gual (1976), 309–10; Hausrath (1909), 1718–19; Parassoglou (1993), 23, 48–9; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.154; West (1984), 115. Cf. Diogenianus *Praefatio* 9–11 *CPG*; VD 1T5.

[39] Ar. *Av.* 651; id. *Pax* 129; id. *V.* 566, 1258–60; Arist. *Mete.* 356b11; id. *Rh.* 1393a29–30; Pl. *Alc.1* 123a; id. *Phd.* 60c–61b. Cf. Holzberg (1993a), 17.

[40] X. *Mem.* II.7.13–14 (P356a). Cf. Van Dijk (1997), 336–40; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.460–1.

[41] See T101–3 and Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.154.

[42] For a list of fables in Greek literature see Van Dijk (1997); Holzberg (1993a), ch. 1; Karadagli (1981).

exemplum in other literary contexts and is also narrated in contexts of social interaction, such as speeches (e.g. deliberative) and symposia. The second stage covers the Hellenistic period, during which the fable maintains the uses mentioned above, but there are also collections of fables, starting from the third century B.C. The third stage ranges from the Imperial period to Late Antiquity. In this stage, the fable retains its previous form (i.e. in other literary contexts, in social gatherings and in collections), but it also gains literary value and is accepted and established as a category of story in its own right, due to the fable collections of Phaedrus (Latin fables, first century B.C.–first century A.D.) and Babrius (Greek fables, first–second century A.D.).

The history of Greek fables starts with the αἶνος in Hesiod and Archilochus.[43] The term indicates a short fictitious story in verse, with animal protagonists, which is used to illustrate ethical advice; or it may be used as a means of indirect criticism, which avoids being offensive by not referring to specific persons and situations. It may also be a useful means of persuasion, by strengthening an argument through a fictitious tale.

Hesiod narrates the fable of the hawk and the nightingale (*Op.* 202–12). His αἶνος gives the message that it is the law of the stronger that rules in life. The hawk was holding the nightingale in its claws and she begged him to show mercy on her. The hawk's reply is that he is the strong one and, therefore, he will act in whatsoever way pleases him. It depends on his own will (ἐθέλω), the will of the stronger, whether the nightingale is eaten or not and, therefore, her pleas cannot influence him. Only equals can argue against each

[43] See p. 2 n. 6 above. On fable in epic and lyric poetry see Van Dijk (1997), 124–68. For the most important views on the origins of Greek fable see Burkert (1984), 110–14; Diels (1910); Della Corte (1971–2), 5–7, 11–12; Falkowitz (1984); Hausrath (1909), 1723–31 (on the originality of the Greek fable); Josifović (1974), 29–32; Koep (1969), 136–8; La Penna (1964); Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.425–38; Parassoglou (1993), 25, 31–2; Perry (1959), 25–8; id. (1965), xxviii–xxxiv; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.201–52; Thite (1984). For the use of animal metaphors in Homer see Duchemin (1960). The absence of fables in Homer might be explained by the non-heroic ethos of the fable (e.g. in favour of conformity and submission to the will of the stronger). See Davies and Kathirithamby (1986), 7; Van Dijk (1997), 124–6; Perry (1959), 23 n. 28; Rothwell (1995), 236 n. 14. Rodríguez Adrados has proposed a theory that the Greek fable originates from the agrarian festivals and the animal dances in them. His theory has not so far been followed by any other scholar. See Rodríguez Adrados (1975), 283–324; id. (1978c); id. (1979–87), I.268–98. For criticism of his argument on the links between drama and ritual festivals see Seaford (1979).

other; the inferior should yield their fate to the will of the superior. If they do not, and try to argue, as the nightingale did, they are foolish (ἄφρων), because, in the end, they will suffer physically and be humiliated. These are the hawk's last phrases in the Hesiodic fable (ibid. 210–11).

The Hesiodic fable is similar to its version in the *Augustana*. They both give the message that might is right and that social inequality, based on power, must be respected (see pp. 58–9 below). The first attested fable from Greek literature is used as an *exemplum*, that is, a metaphorical illustration which forms part of Hesiod's argument. The Hesiodic fable, however, deviates from the ordinary use of fables as *exempla*, which is that the writer agrees with the fable's conclusion; the message from his *exemplum* is in agreement with his general argument. Hesiod, instead, uses his fable as a negative illustration of his argument. He opposes the fable's message to what he sees as the right course of action in interpersonal relationships. His brother, Perses, must not act like the fable's hawk, but instead he must seek reconciliation with Hesiod (ibid. 213). In Hesiod's world, where necessity and the injustice of the powerful prevail, reconciliation between ordinary people is more fruitful than conflict. Besides, justice is sought by the poet as a concept that promotes social stability and prosperity. The motto "might is right" is appropriate to the powerful, but Perses is not one of them. Thus, Perses should not follow the hawk's example and should correct his previous unjust behaviour towards Hesiod by seeking reconciliation with him. The Hesiodic αἶνος, then, functions indirectly, through the criticism of its message by its user (which differentiates it from the ordinary use of fables as *exempla*, in which the user agrees with the fable's message). It serves as a vehicle of criticism of wrong conduct and as a means of advocating proper behaviour both in a specific situation (the argument between Perses and Hesiod) and in general (arguing for social justice), as in fables in other literary frameworks.[44]

Archilochus uses fables as a means of attacking an opponent, namely Lycambes. However, this attack is not direct, because the opponent's character is masked under the animal protagonist of the

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[44] Dalfen (1994–5); Daly (1961b); Van Dijk (1997), 127–34; Ford (1965); Hubbard (1995); Karadagli (1981), 11–13; Lasserre (1984), 82–3; Leclerc (1992); Livrea (1970); Lonsdale (1989); MacKay (1962); Schmidt (1983); West (1978), 3–15, 204–9; id. (1984), 106–7. Cf. VD 2T1–45. See also p. 58 n. 40 below.

fable. The poet too is represented by the second animal protagonist of the story. So Archilochus is the fox in both fables and his opponent is the eagle and the ape (frs. 174–81 and 185–7 West respectively). The phrase αἶνός τις ἀνθρώπων ὅδε ("this is a certain popular fable") that Archilochus uses to introduce the fable (fr. 174) indicates a popular story that people were familiar with and were using to draw a specific argument on human behaviour.[45]

In Archaic literature the fable is never told as a story *per se*, that is for the sake of its narration, but it is always told in a context as an illustrative *exemplum* of a specific moral attitude that the user of fables wants to promote or censure. It is always inserted in a broader literary text and used to complement an idea that is expounded in the text. Its popularity, being a story that people are aware of or are supposed to know, endows a guarantee of truth to the fable's fictitious story and to the message that is drawn from it.[46]

In the Classical period the fable is diffused orally, it is a λεγόμενον δή τι (Ar. *Av.* 652), something that is said. This is also testified in Plato's *Phaedo*, where Socrates versifies those Aesopic fables that he 'knew' (οὓς . . . ἠπιστάμην μύθους τοὺς Αἰσώπου, *Phd.* 61b).[47] The use of fables does not differ from the Archaic period. The fable remains an *exemplum*, a story narrated in order to illustrate an ethical message through a particular fictitious plot and, thus, it precedes or follows the corresponding broader argument in a literary text. It still has not been recognized as an autonomous category of story. As B.E. Perry has noted "the written fable in Classical times exists only in a context and is not told as an end in itself".[48] It must also be noted that in the Classical sources for fable its application is nearly

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[45] On fable in Archilochus: Archibald (1902), 89; Baldi (1961), 81–3; Bowra (1940); Van Dijk (1997), 138–48; García Gual (1970), 419; Janko (1980); Lasserre (1984), 63–4, 75–9; Rodríguez Adrados (1964), 275–9; West (1974), 132–4; id. (1982). Some scholars did not include fr. 178 West in their reconstruction of Archilochus' fable. On this see Van Dijk (1997), 140–1 nn. 24–5.

[46] On fable in Archaic Greek literature see Baker (1969), 579–81; Van Dijk (1997), 124 f.; Lasserre (1984); Perry (1959), 21; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.382–91; West (1984), 108, 112–13.

[47] The oral diffusion of fables during the Archaic and Classical periods is generally accepted by scholars. See Blackham (1985), 212–13; Chambry (1926), 27; Detienne (1986), 39–40; Falkowitz (1984), 31; Havelock (1978), 28, 35–6; Jedrkiewicz (1987); Parassoglou (1993), 48–9; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.391–3; Steiner (1994), 4–7. On the continuing importance of orality in Greek culture after the fifth century B.C. see Buxton (1994), ch. 3; Thomas (1989), ch. 1.

[48] Perry (1940), 392. Cf. Holzberg (1993a), 1.

always specific.[49] The fable is inserted in a literary context to illustrate the sort of conduct that the person to whom the fable is addressed in the particular text should pursue or avoid in a given situation, and not in any situation.[50]

The following is an example from Classical literature. In Herodotus (I.141), Cyrus tells the Ionian and Aeolian envoys—who had arrived at his court offering to become his subjects—the fable of "the fisherman who played the pipe" (P11a). The plot is simple: a fisherman was playing the pipe in order to make the fish dance and come out of the sea. When his attempts failed, he threw a fishing net and caught a lot of them. As the fish were on the ground flopping about, he told them to stop dancing to amuse him, for they refused to do so when he was playing the pipe for them.

Herodotus points out the exemplary function of this fable. He says that Cyrus used this fable because he wanted to point out to the envoys that they had arrived too late to offer him their support; they had refused to do so when he had asked them in the past. So Cyrus uses a fictitious tale in an allegorical way (he is the fisherman and the Ionians and Aeolians are the fish) to illustrate the proper behaviour the envoys should have performed in a specific situation (to offer him support when they were first asked) and to offer them a set of ethical messages that can be drawn from this story. The messages are that times and balances of power change, that the Greeks are desperate, that necessity is a harsh motivation, that one should be prudent enough to foresee the course of events, that help between allies should be offered when it is needed etc.

Furthermore, as the exemplary use of the aforementioned Herodotean passage points to, the fable in Classical Greece seems to have been used as a means of persuasion in a particular situation. A number of ancient sources attest the use of fables in speeches in the courts and in political debates (e.g. in deliberative speeches).[51] So scholars often speak of the importance of fable in Greece as a rhetorical means of persuasion.[52] Caution is needed, however, when these

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[49] See Van Dijk (1997), 376.

[50] Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.27–9, 468; Perry (1957), 430; id. (1959), 29; Rodríguez Adrados (1978a), 228–9; id. (1978b), 9; id. (1979–87), I.259, 382.

[51] Ar. *V.* 566–7, 1427–49; Arist. *Rh.* 1393b8–22, 1393b22–4a1. See also VD G56–7, 67, 69a–b. Fables in courts: Meuli (1954), 27–8; Rothwell (1995), 239, 246–7; Vaio (1971).

[52] Adamik (1982); Blackham (1985), 11; Buxton (1994), 11; Van Dijk (1993a),

views refer to the Classical period, because there are no fables in the extant corpus of speeches of the Attic orators.[53] Yet there is enough material in the oratorical handbooks from Greek and Latin antiquity to support the idea of the use of fables by the Greek orators; there, the use of fables is strongly recommended as an *exemplum* in a speech. This evaluation of fable in rhetorical theory started with Aristotle, who was the first to mention the Aesopic fables (λόγοι) as one of the two kinds of proofs (πίστεις) that the orator should use to illustrate his arguments. The first kind is the example (παράδειγμα), the other advice (ἐνθύμημα). The examples are divided in two categories, invented ones and those that have happened in reality. Fables and *parabolai* represent the fictitious type. Aristotle recommends the use of fables in public speeches (εἰσὶ δ' οἱ λόγοι δημηγορικοὶ), and he finds them more useful in deliberation than true examples from the past, because it is easier to invent a fable than to find a true event that is similar to the situation that the orator refers to. This approach was maintained in rhetorical treatises after Aristotle. It is reasonable to suppose either that Aristotle drew his analysis from the rhetorical practice of his time or that his approach set a precedent for future orators, which explains the repeated use of fable in later rhetorical treatises.[54]

The following fable on Demades (P63), a fourth century B.C. orator, presents some other aspects of the Greek fable:[55]

> Demades the orator was once giving a speech to the Athenian demos, but as they were not paying much attention to him, he asked them to permit him to narrate an Aesopic fable. They agreed and so he started saying: "Demeter and a swallow and an eel were walking on the same road. When they arrived at a river the swallow flew up, while the eel dived." And after he said this he remained silent. So,

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183; id. (1997), 285–310; Jedrkiewicz (1983), 12; id. (1989), 387–8; Kovacs (1950); Perry (1959), 22, 25; Vaio (1971), 342.

[53] Perry (1959), 22. There are, however, some allusions to use of fables by Demosthenes and Antisthenes in a political context. Antisthenes: Arist. *Pol.* 1284a15–18; Demosthenes: Aristobul. fr. 76 *FGrH*; Plu. *Mor.* 848a–b. See VD 40T1–14 and Van Dijk (1997), 323.

[54] Arist. *Rh.* 1393a23–30. Cf. Aphth. *Prog.* 1; Cic. *Inv.* I.17.25; Fortunat. *Rh.* 2.23; Hermog. *Prog.* 1; Nicol. *Prog.* 1; Quint. *Inst.* I.9.1–3, V.11.19–21; Theon *Prog.* 1. An account of the use of fables in rhetoric can be found in Jedrkiewicz (1987). See also VD G7, 9–10, 18c, 20b–c, 30, 47, 49–51, 53, 55–7, 61–2, 70.

[55] The translations of fables throughout the book are mine. For English translations of the Aesopic fables see Daly (1961a), Handford (1964), and Temple (1998).

> when they asked "and what happened to Demeter?", he replied, "she is angry with you, who having given up the affairs of the city bear listening to an Aesopic fable".[56]

First, this anecdote attests to the popularity of fables in the Classical period. The listener is shown the power of fable as an entertaining fictitious tale. This fable was, we suppose, employed by the orators as an auxiliary means of persuading their audience. However, Demades' fable was not used to illustrate a specific situation, but came during a break in his speech. The link with reality is made by interrupting the story and criticizing the audience for its decision to be carried away by a fictitious story instead of dealing seriously with the affairs of the city.

Another function of the fable that is continued from the Archaic into the Classical period is as a means of criticizing specific behaviour. This criticism may range from a simple sermon to a severe stricture and sometimes mockery.[57] The fable's capacity for admonition, criticism and ethical didacticism may explain its presence in contexts such as ethical philosophy and the symposium. In Plutarch's "Symposium of the Seven Wise Men", the uses of fable in philosophy and in the symposium are combined, for Aesop participates both in the symposium of the Seven Wise Men and in their discussion, using fables as part of his argument.[58]

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[56] See Karadagli (1981), 49–50. A similar anecdote on Demosthenes is found in P460, from which the expression "about the shadow of an ass" became proverbial, meaning occupying oneself with trivial matters. See Apul. *Met.* IX.42; Ar. *V.* 191; Pl. *Phdr.* 260c; Zen. VI.28 *CPG.* Cf. Van Dijk (1997), 296–305; Karadagli (1981), 50–2.

[57] E.g. Ar. *V.* 1399–406, 1427–32, 1435–41. Ancient sources on fable's didactic and advising function: VD G13, 15b, 19c, 22–3, 40a, 41–3, 57, 64c, 70, 73–5. See also Van Dijk (1997), 74. On fable's moral function (it moulds the character): VD G19c, 20c, 31, 34, 47, 50, 54, 58, 65. See also Van Dijk (1997), 74–5.

[58] Fables in philosophical texts: Antipho Soph. fr. 54 DK; Pl. *Alc.1* 123a; id. *Phd.* 60b–61b; id. *Phdr.* 259b–c; id. *Tht.* 174a; X. *Mem.* II.7.13–14. On the importance of fables in philosophical argumentation see T33–8; VD G25c–d, 31, 71–2. Cf. Van Dijk (1997), 311–50; Holzberg (1993a), 20; Jedrkiewicz (1983); id. (1989), 60–8, 111–27, 135–43, 365–78; Josifović (1936); Korais (1810), 104; Luzzatto (1988); Pannwitz (1967); Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.259; Schauer and Merkle (1992). Fables in symposia: Ar. *V.* 1181–5, 1258–60; Carmina Convivalia fr. 9 *PMG*; Plu. *Quaest. Conv.* 614e. See Plu. *Mor.* 150a–b, 155c, 156a, 157b, 162c, 164b–c. Cf. Van Dijk (1997), 151–2; García Gual (1978), 179; Jedrkiewicz 346–51; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.259–60; Vaio (1971), 342. Contra: Rothwell (1995), 250–1, who argues (on the grounds of the Aristophanic evidence in the *Wasps*) that the aristocratic status of the symposiasts would not allow them to use a fable, which was the cultural

Plato also uses fables to illustrate his arguments. Not only does he not regard them as inferior compared to philosophical deliberation, but, on the contrary, he even describes Socrates—at the most dramatic moments of his life, the night before his death—versifying some Aesopic fables (*Phd.* 60b–61b). The very fact that Socrates (at the beginning of a dialogue that describes his last moments) starts his thoughts on life, death, and the soul's immortality, through a fable that he composes, is significant of the respect with which Plato regarded the fable. Plato presents Socrates imagining Aesop telling a fable to illustrate the inseparable link between pleasure and pain, that is, composing a fable, the one about "pleasure and pain" (P445, *Phd.* 60b–c), to illustrate the general message that pain and pleasure follow each other in life (an issue that appears in the *Augustana*, see p. 139 below).[59]

To sum up, the Archaic and Classical sources indicate that fables were used in various literary and social contexts, such as public speeches, philosophical texts, the courts, the symposia. The fable is used as an *exemplum* or παράδειγμα, which illustrates and reinforces an argument. At this date, the moral value of the fable has been recognized, but the fable has not yet achieved literary autonomy; it remains an oral story that most people know and reproduce in their discourses, but do not feel the need to record in written form. This might explain the comparative scarcity of our sources, which are, nevertheless, enough to establish these general claims.

I.2.3 *History and Function of the Greek Fable: From the Hellenistic Period to Late Antiquity*

The function of fable from the Hellenistic period onwards remains the same as before; it is used as an exemplary story. What is new is the grouping of fables into collections and the subsequent evolution of the fable into a category of story, such as the collection of Demetrius of Phalerum.[60] Demetrius of Phalerum (ca. 350–280 B.C.)

property of the lower classes. On the usefulness of the fable's message for ethical tuition see Isid. *Etym.* I.40; Phot. *Ep.* II.49 in *PG* 102, pp. 865–7; Them. *Or.* 22.278c. Cf. T100–3.

59 See Van Dijk (1997), 324–6 for a discussion of the fable in its Platonic context.

60 Holzberg (1993a), 1; Perry (1940), 392–3; Rodríguez Adrados (1978a), 223; id. (1979–87), I.158–61; id. (1984), 137–9.

was an orator and ruler of Athens from 317 to 307 B.C. Diogenes Laertius notes that, before or during his rule at Athens, Demetrius wrote a book which was a compilation of Aesopic fables (Αἰσωπείων λόγων συναγωγαί). He also informs us that this compilation, which he calls 'Aesopics' (Αἰσώπεια), was contained in one book-roll, as indicated by the phrase Αἰσωπείων α′ which Diogenes used as the title of the work. Unfortunately, Demetrius' work does not exist any-more. Scholars generally agree that it must not have contained more than a hundred fables, for there would be no more space in one book-roll, and that it might have also contained a preface in which there was a brief account of Aesop's life. The scope of this edition might have followed Aristotle's theory on the use of fables as παραδείγματα; it may have constituted a collection of material for future use by orators and writers who wished to illustrate their arguments with a fable.[61]

There is much discussion in modern scholarship about whether Demetrius' edition was the first, or there had existed another written collection before him from which he drew his material. The latter theory was formulated by the German scholars August Hausrath and Otto Crusius at the beginning of this century.[62] They presented the hypothesis that there existed in the early fifth century B.C. an anonymous prose popular book, a *Volksbuch*, that contained a biography of Aesop with a few fables and apophthegms under his name. Evidence for the assumption that a book with Aesopic fables existed at such an early period is drawn from Aristophanes and Plato. Aristophanes uses the expressions ἐν Αἰσώπου λόγοις ("in Aesop's fables") and οὐδ' Αἴσωπον πεπάτηκας ("neither have you walked over Aesop"), which are sometimes seen as indicating the existence of a written collection of fables; Socrates in the *Phaedo* says that he used those fables that he had "at hand" (οὓς προχείρους εἶχον).[63] These expressions are interpreted as indicating the existence of a book that

[61] D.L. V.80–2. Cf. Van Dijk (1997), xiv; Hausrath (1909), 1732–4; Holzberg (1993a), 24–6; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 26; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.467 f.; Perry (1953); id. (1962); id. (1965), xiii–iv; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.421–508. It is Holzberg (1993a), 24–5 who correctly points out that Demetrius' collection *might* have been compiled as a repertory for orators, but this remains a scholars' hypothesis and is not attested by our existing sources. Against this hypothesis see Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.479.

[62] Crusius (1913); Hausrath (1909), 1731–2.

[63] Ar. *Av.* 471, 651; id. *Pax* 129; Pl. *Phd.* 61b.

one could have at hand, step upon and *in* which he could have found fables.[64] Nevertheless, the phrase "in Aesop's fables" may as well indicate an oral group of fables that people were familiar with.[65] The greatest puzzlement lies with the verb πατέω in Aristophanes. It seems to hint at a text, although we do not know what sort of text.[66]

However, most scholars deny the existence of an anonymous prose book of fables as early as in the fifth century. The only prose books that were edited at that period were historical, scientific or philosophical and never anonymous, but always under the name of their author. If Aesop himself had written such a book, there would have been some information in the ancient sources. However, our sources from Antiquity always mention Demetrius' edition as the first one.[67] His Αἰσώπεια, whatever their content and sources, inaugurated the second stage of the history of Greek fable, its establishment as a category of story, and the appearance of collections of fables which appear later on and were based on Demetrius' work. These collections combined Demetrius' edition with the Aristotelian theory, for they were patchworks of fable material to be used by writers and orators as *exempla* and by the rhetoricians as part of their lessons in their schools of rhetoric. This last topic opens up the other new aspect of fable's history, the use of fable in education.

It is thought that the Aristophanic phrase οὐδ' Αἴσωπον πεπάτηκας (*Av.* 651) discussed above, though it does not imply a collection of prose fables, might, however, hint at the existence of a handbook or text-book of Aesopic fables used for elementary education in the

[64] See Van Dijk (1997), 100; Dunbar (1995), 325–6. It has also been claimed that the Platonic text (*Phd.* 60d–1b) reports a true event and that Socrates had indeed composed a collection of fables. For bibliography on Socrates as a fabulist see Van Dijk (1997), 40 n. 13, 319 n. 39. This view has now been rejected by scholars. See ibid., 317–19.

[65] See entry for πρόχειρος in *LSJ*. Cf. Van Dijk (1997), 40; Dunbar (1995), 325–6. Socrates' full phrase is: "those Aesopic fables that I had at hand and knew (ἠπιστάμην)". This knowledge may well have been an oral one.

[66] See entry for πατέω in *LSJ*. There are scholars who claim that this phrase refers to oral tradition and should be translated as "you have not made yourself familiar with Aesop". See Dunbar (1995), 326 and West (1984), 121–2.

[67] Crusius (1913); Hausrath (1909), 1731–2; Holzberg (1993a), 25; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 25; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.473; Parassoglou (1993), 15, 40–1, 46–8; Perry (1959), 30–1; id. (1962), 293 n. 8, 340; id. (1965), xxxvi; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.392–3; West (1984), 120–2.

Classical period.[68] However, apart from this passage (if interpreted in this way), there are no testimonies on the use of fable in education in the Classical and Hellenistic periods.[69] But, we do know that fables in book-form were used in children's education and were part of the lessons in the rhetorical schools from the first to the fifth centuries A.D. This is proved both by the rhetorical treatises and by school papyri. In their *Progymnasmata*, manuals of preparatory exercises in the rhetorical schools, the rhetoricians Theon, Hermogenes, Aphthonius and Nicolaus strongly recommend the use of fables as part of the exercises on composition and style (T101–4). The fable is generally seen, by Greek and Latin writers, as a useful means of elementary stylistic, linguistic and ethical education. Its language and style were simple and its messages useful for the moral thinking of the pupils. The use of fables in education during the Imperial period is well attested.[70] Anonymous collections of fables, compiled to be used either as part of their lessons or as material for orators and writers, were the sources of the numerous prose and verse collec-

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[68] Hausrath (1909), 1731; Holzberg (1993a), 33.

[69] On fable collections as material for use by orators and writers see Perry (1940), 392–3; id. (1962); id. (1965), xi. On fable in Greek education see Adamik (1982); Hausrath (1898), 312–14; Kovacs (1950); Marrou (1956), 154; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.550–1.

[70] Fables used in schools of rhetoric: VD G18a, 20a–c, 30, 41, 54, 58, 61, 64a, 70. Cf. Archibald (1912); Van Dijk (1993a), 182; Holzberg (1993a), 33–5; Marrou (1956), 173; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.552–3; Rodríguez Adrados (1978b), 10; id. (1979–87), I.80–1, 142, 161; Wiedemann (1989), 145–6. On the usefulness of fable for education purposes, because of its simple style and language and its readily intelligible ethical point see Aus. *Ep.* 12.74.93; Plu. *Mor.* 14e; Quint. *Inst.* I.9.2. Cf. VD G18b, 20b–c, 31, 41–3, 46, 52, 58, 64a, 73. In Late Antiquity there existed handbooks in Greek and Latin, the Ἑρμηνεύματα, which contained selected readings, glossaries and indices of words. One of these was written by pseudo-Dositheus (fourth century A.D.) in twelve books, the fourth of which was titled *Fabulae Aesopicae* and from which we have twelve fables in Hausrath (1940–56), I.120–9. These handbooks were used for the learning of Latin by the Greek speaking people of the Eastern parts of the Empire. See Holzberg (1993a), 34–5; Kaczynski (1982), 34; Nøjgaard (1964–7), II.402 f.; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), II.213–25; Wiedemann (1989), 166. Other fables that were produced in schools of rhetoric are those of the rhetorician Aphthonius (fourth–fifth centuries A.D.). For the text see Hausrath (1940–56), I.133–51. Cf. Holzberg (1993a), 35; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), II.227–42. The school papyri that contain fables are the Pap. Oxy 1404 (third century A.D.) in Grenfell and Hunt (1915), 247, the Pap. Grenf. II.84 (fifth–sixth centuries A.D.) in Grenfell and Hunt (1897), 133–4, the Pap. Amh. II.26 (third–fourth centuries A.D.) in Grenfell and Hunt (1901), 26–9 and, the Pap. Mich. 457 (first–second centuries A.D.) in Sanders (1947). See Holzberg (1993a), 33–4, 41.

tions of fables that have come to our hands.[71] I give now a brief presentation of these extant collections of fables.[72]

The oldest of these collections is the prose *Collectio Augustana*. To be more precise, the *Augustana* is the oldest collection that we have in a full form (there is an even older collection but in fragmentary form, the one in Pap. Rylands 493, see p. 24 below). Scholars have proposed many different dates for it, but it is generally placed in the first or second centuries A.D.[73] Unfortunately, there are no external testimonies about its compiler or the date of its compilation. Nor do the internal testimonies from the fables themselves (elements such as language or references to historical events) guarantee a secure dating of the collection.[74] The *Augustana* is written in the Hellenistic *koine* and its vocabulary belongs to the Alexandrian period.[75] However, none of its words is obsolete or strange-looking as regards the Hellenistic *koine*.[76] Some of the fables included in the collection are known from their older versions or from allusions to them in Greek literature (e.g. P1, 3–4, 11, 40, 225).[77] Nevertheless, although this leads us to the conclusion that the *Augustana* echoes some older fable material, it does not inform us about the dating of its compilation. The same can be said about those fables that probably had non-Greek origins (e.g. P20, see pp. 167–8 below). Their non-Greek origin does

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[71] Rodríguez Adrados (1978a), 216.

[72] For a more detailed description of the Aesopic corpus see Holzberg (1993a), 2–4, 26–29, 43–83, 105–16; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 16–35; Josifović (1974), 15–16; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.134–9, 480–505; Perry (1959), 36–7; id. (1965), xvi–xix, xlvii–xcvi; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.61–150, 514–31. This corpus also includes a number of proverbs and apopthegms attributed to Aesop in antiquity and the novel-like *Life of Aesop*. For the proverbs and apopthegms see Perry (1952), 248–58, 165–91. On the *Life of Aesop* see p. 11 n. 36 above.

[73] First–second centuries A.D.: Chambry (1927); García Gual (1976), 311; id. (1978), 182; Holzberg (1996), 633; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.36; Perry (1936); id. (1965), xvi–xvii; Rodríguez Adrados (1952), 337 f. Second century A.D.: Della Corte (1971–2), 5; Perry (1956), xii. Second–third centuries A.D.: Holzberg (1993a), 3; Kaczynski (1982), 31. Fourth–fifth centuries A.D.: Rodríguez Adrados (1948); id. (1978a), 218; id. (1992). Ninth–tenth centuries A.D.: Luzzatto (1983), 173–7; Marc (1910).

[74] Nøjgaard (1964–7), 136–9.

[75] Rodríguez Adrados (1948).

[76] Perry (1962), 345. Cf. Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.137–8. Contra: Rodríguez Adrados (1948), 180 f.

[77] For a detailed presentation of all fable versions and allusions in Greek literature see Van Dijk (1997).

not inform us about the dating of the *Augustana*.[78] In general, it is acknowledged that the collection cannot be dated on the basis of external or internal elements.[79] The *Augustana* is named from the manuscript Augustanus Monacensis 564, also known as "recensio I" in Perry's *Aesopica*. This manuscript is kept in the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in Munich and dates from the thirteenth century A.D. It contains 231 prose fables in alphabetical order, according to the first letter of the fable. Each fable is followed by an epimythium. It is thought to have been used as a manual for orators or for the rhetorical schools. Scholars have concluded that it bears no relation to Demetrius' edition.[80]

In 1938 C.H. Roberts published the catalogue of the Greek and Latin Papyri in the John Rylands Library; number 493 in his edition is a papyrus that contains a small number of prose fables. Since then it has been known as the Pap. Rylands 493 and it is the oldest text, though fragmentary, of a Greek fable collection that we possess. It dates from the first century A.D., but its original is supposed to have been compiled between the third and the first century B.C. It was clearly written for use by orators and writers, following the use of fable and fable collections as an *exemplum* in another literary context, and contains promythia. There is still a heated debate between scholars on its relation to Demetrius' edition. Nevertheless, it is now accepted that this papyrus is not related to the *Augustana*, which had a different origin and manuscript tradition.[81]

Two later groups of manuscripts of anonymous Greek prose fable collections that derive from the *Augustana* are the so-called *Vindobonensis* and *Accursiana* collections, or recensions II and III respectively in

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[78] See Jedrkiewicz (1989), 17–21; Parassoglou (1993), 31–2; Rodríguez Adrados (1978a), 231–5; West (1969), 115 f.; id. (1984), 110–11.

[79] See Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.519.

[80] On the *Augustana* see Chambry (1926), 29; Holzberg (1993a), 4–7, 81–3; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 16–21; Luzzatto (1983) 138–43, 173–7; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.134–9; Perry (1956), 295–311; id. (1965), xvi–ii; Rodríguez Adrados (1978a), 218; id. (1978b), 12; id. (1979–87), I.73–100; id. (1984), 156 f. On its rhetorical function: Jedrkiewicz (1989), 25; Perry (1936); Schaeffer (1985), 350. Questioning the collection's rhetorical function: Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.480, 550; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.76–7. Modern editions of the *Augustana*: Chambry (1927); Hausrath, Haas, and Hunger (1959–70²); Perry (1952).

[81] Edition of the text: Roberts (1938). For the dating, content, and origins of this papyrus see Van Dijk (1997), xiv; Holzberg (1993a), 26–9; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.492–508; Perry (1940), 397–8, 409–11; Rodríguez Adrados (1952); id. (1978a), 218–23; id. (1979–87), I.67–73, 77–8, 84.

Perry. The *Collectio Vindobonensis*, named after the codex Vindob. gr. hist. 130, is a manuscript of the thirteenth century, but its archetype is dated to the sixth century A.D. It contains 130 fables, with a late and vulgar vocabulary. The *Collectio Accursiana* is named after its first editor, Bonus Accursius (*editio princeps* 1479, Mediolanum). It derives from the *Vindobonensis*, it contains 127 fables and it is dated to the fourteenth century. Its compiler was probably Maximus Planudes, therefore the collection is sometimes called *Collectio Planudeana*.[82]

A different set of collections are the verse ones by Phaedrus and Babrius. Phaedrus wrote his *Fabulae Aesopicae* in 5 books in Latin iambic senarii in the first century B.C. or the first A.D. With him, and the later collection of Babrius, starts the third stage of the history of the Aesopic fable: for the first time fables were written with an artistic intention. From them on, fable turns from a category of story with a purely informative and auxiliary use (the stage that started with Demetrius' edition) into one with an artistic status. The Pap. Rylands 493 and Phaedrus' collection represent the point at which the two stages overlap and the movement from the one to the other starts. From Phaedrus onwards, the fable aims both at entertainment and ethical instruction. It can be read on its own and does not need to be introduced in a different literary context. This change of scope might also be explained by the use of verse, which remained of higher artistic value compared to prose.[83] Babrius' Aesopic 'mythiambs' (Μυθίαμβοι Αἰσώπειοι) were composed in Greek iambs in the first or second century A.D. He is our first extant source for such a verse collection in Greek. His aims too were to entertain and educate his readers.[84]

The sources listed are our main collections of fables from antiquity. Together with the other collections, the novel-like *Life of Aesop*, the fables cited in various literary texts throughout Greek and Roman literary history and the group of proverbs and apophthegms attrib-

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[82] Holzberg (1993a), 4; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 16; Josifović (1974), 16; Kaczynski (1982), 31; Perry (1959), 36–7; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.105–6.

[83] Blackham (1985), 212–13; Hausrath (1938); Holzberg (1993a), 43–56; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 30–1, 297–9; id. (1990); Nøjgaard (1964–7), II.17–188; Perry (1965), xi–ii, lxxiii–cii; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), II.125–71; Schaeffer (1985), 349–51. For an edition of Phaedrus with an English translation: Perry (1965).

[84] Holzberg (1993a), 57–69; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 28–30; Nøjgaard (1964–7), II.189–365; Perry (1965), xlvii–lxxiii; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), II.173–212. Edition of Babrius with English translation: Perry (1965). On the versification of fables by Socrates and him as a fabulist see p. 21 n. 64 above.

uted to Aesop, they constitute the Aesopic corpus that has come to our hands from antiquity.[85]

I.3 *The Ethics of the Greek Fable*[86]

I.3.1 *Scholarly Approaches to the Ethical Content of the Greek Fable*

From the seventeenth century, when the edition of La Fontaine's *Fables* (1668) opens up a new period of editions and scholarship on the fable, until the most recent twentieth century scholarship, the ideas about the function of fable already expressed by Greek thinkers seem to have remained intact.[87] The fable is still regarded as a fictitious tale that portrays reality and fulfils a practical purpose, according to Theon's definition. La Fontaine's edition was soon followed by Sir Robert L'Estrange's edition of Aesopic fables in 1692.[88] Both editors in their introductions mark the beginnings of Western scholarship on the ethical content and function of the Aesopic fable. For them a fable is useful for the moral education of children, because its entertaining form and plot facilitate the teaching of moral truths. The fictitious element of fable, the portrayal of animals who talk and act like human beings, is the necessary convention that renders the story entertaining and enables its lesson to be accepted.[89] The fable's easily understood message, because of its simple form, also

[85] Holzberg (1993a), 2–4. The other collections include the Latin verse fables of Avianus (fifth century A.D.), the Latin prose fables of Romulus or Aesopus Latinus (fourth–fifth centuries A.D.), the prose Greek fables of pseudo-Dositheus and Aphthonius, which are artificial products from the schools of rhetoric, and the Greek prose fables of Syntipas (eleventh century A.D.), which were translated into Greek from their Syrian edition. On pseudo-Dositheus and Aphthonius see p. 22 n. 70 above. On the other collections see Della Corte (1971–2), 13; Duff (1934) (Avianus edition with English translation); Hausrath (1938), 1482–6; Holzberg (1993a), 2–4, 69–79, 105–16; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 31–3; Küppers (1977); Nøjgaard (1964–7), II.404–31; Perry (1952), 511–50 (edition of Syntipas); id. (1965), xviii–xix; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.143–7, II.243–60; Thiele (1910) (edition of Romulus).

[86] 'Ethics' are defined as "the systematic study of reasoning about how we ought to act". They refer to "a set of rules, principles, or ways of thinking that guide, or claim authority to guide, the actions of a particular group". See Singer (1994), 4.

[87] On the influence of La Fontaine's edition see Patterson (1991), 37–40.

[88] *Fables of Aesop and Other Eminent Mythologists; With Morals and Reflexions* (London). See Patterson (1991), 139–46.

[89] Michel and Martin (1985), 3, 8–9, 33, 37–9; L'Estrange (1692), iv–xi.

makes it a useful tool for the moral education of the illiterate, those at the bottom of the social pyramid. As L'Estrange puts it:

> The fable had its origin, we are given to understand, in a germ of politeness still lingering in the breasts of the superior, or preaching, portion of humanity, who wished to avoid giving more pain than necessary when pursuing the inevitable task laid upon them by their virtues, of instructing the inferior and silent portion how to be well, just a little less inferior, if they would only listen patiently to what they were told.[90]

This last aspect of fable, its use as a metaphorical exposition of social and political issues, was not novel in England. By the end of the sixteenth century, fables were used as a metaphorical reference to, and critique of, actual events, persons and political concepts.[91] However, it is the end of the seventeenth century that marks an "Aesop craze" in England, where Aesop's fables are continuously edited and used both in the moral education of children and in political comments on current issues. It is again seen as a means of moral education of the children and the ordinary people.[92] Throughout the eighteenth century the fable was regarded as a category of story, not of such high status as poetry or philosophy, but important enough to deserve scholarly attention. Those who attempted a theoretical approach to fable underlined both its educational and political aspects, as well as its stylistic prerequisites: a fable had to be brief and simple in style; its depiction of animals had to be close to nature and to convey a clear message. Despite its use to manipulate the moral patterns of the socially inferior, the fable was occasionally seen as a means of helping the moral evolution of the masses in order for them to express their protest against social injustice and thus prepare the field for new egalitarian forms of society.[93]

The theoretical approaches of the nineteenth and twentieth century are fewer in number because the fable's literary and intellectual value diminishes in that period compared with the previous two

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[90] L' Estrange (1692), i–iii, xi–ii; Patterson (1991), 139–40.

[91] See Patterson (1991), 52–75.

[92] Ibid., 25–30.

[93] Beattie (1783), 505–7; Noel (1975), 2–9, 102–50; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.31; Patterson (1991), 111–37. See Noel (1975), 10 f. On the modern conception of fable as a social outcry of the oppressed and disfranchised against their oppressors see pp. 30–1 nn. 105–6 below.

centuries.[94] With regard to the stylistic demands and the allegorical function of fable they do not differ from the preceding theories. A fable remains above all a fictitious tale with animal protagonists, conveying an ethical message in simple form.[95] The fable's message can be either topical or general, namely when it refers to a particular situation or behavioural pattern, or when it comments on human life or the nature of things.[96] On the fable's message scholarship has been concerned with two issues. The first relates to the fable's message: is it single or diverse? The prevalent view is that a fable must have one and only message, which must be clear and easily comprehensible.[97] Nevertheless, recent scholarship has persuasively argued that a Greek fable may have a plurality of messages.[98]

The other issue relates to the character of the animal protagonists in the Greek fable in general and the *Augustana* in particular. It has been traditionally held, and is still maintained by the majority of modern scholars, that the animals in Greek fable represent 'types'.[99] Natural observation offered a corpus of behaviour stereotypes that could then be applied to human ethical agents to define their behaviour. So, for instance, a cunning person could be described as 'foxy'. This typification was thought to lie behind the Greek fable and from it derived the demand for the fable figures to be 'plausible', that is to represent the animals in accordance with the traditional image of their unique patterns of behaviour.[100] For example, the ass is always

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[94] For a discussion of the most recent theories see Van Dijk (1997), 3–37.

[95] Bewick (1878), xxxvii–xl; Chambry (1927), xxi; Chesterton (1929), 86–7; Della Corte (1945), 5; Dithmar (1971), 99–114; Doderer (1970); García Gual (1976), 313; id. (1978), 186–8, 191; Hausrath (1898), 328; Horeanthi (1987), 36; Janssens (1955); Jedrkiewicz (1989), 263–71; Josifović (1974), 32; Kirk (1970), 38; Koep (1969); Kontoleon (1987), 60; Korais (1810), 112–13; Leibfried (1982), 35–9; Liapa (1993), 22; Melella (1945–6), 291; Meraclis (1987), 27; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.57–70, 249–50; Skillen (1992), 171, 179; Trenker (1958), 5; Vandenberghe (1950).

[96] Beavis (1990), 476–7; Perry (1965), xxi–ii.

[97] See for example Bewick (1878), xxxvii; Chesterton (1929), 89; Korais (1810), 113; Skillen (1992), 179. Cf. I.1, p. 7 above, on the often contradictory relation between the fable's message and the message that the *epimythium* singles out.

[98] Carnes (1988b), 14–15; Van Dijk (1997), 379; id. (1998), 210–12; McKendry (1964), 5; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.117.

[99] Ancient testimonies: VD G20c, 34, 57–8, 64a. Cf. G41.

[100] García Gual (1976), 320–1; id. (1978); Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.170–81; id. (1988a), 418 f. On animals as stereotypes of human behaviour in Greek literature see Duchemin (1960) on Homer. The naturalistic and plausible depiction of animal characters in fables is the key theme in Duda (1948) and Scarcella (1992). They both conclude that in fables animals often deviate from their natural behaviour, a feature which they explain as the result of the adaptation to human behav-

dissatisfied with its condition and it tries to better it, but it ends up being ridiculed; it symbolizes disastrous disobedience and thoughtlessness. The lion is always strong and dominant and it personifies physical strength and power in general. The fox embodies cunning and spiritual strength. The dog's significance is ambiguous: it exemplifies both loyalty and viciousness due to its violent nature which is a result of its kinship with the wolf; it might equally lick a human hand or bite it. The wolf is the predator *par excellence*, crafty and savage. The ape typifies vanity and mimicry, while the snake embodies treason and deviousness, often with deadly results for his victims.[101]

Nøjgaard strongly disagrees with the idea that animal character within the *Augustana* is typical in this way. In his view, the fabulist selects the elements of behaviour for his characters in the light of the particular fable, and there are no constant types of behaviour for specific animals in the collection. This is supported by the following points:

a) the collection's fables are isolated and do not form a continuous narrative;

b) the fable's protagonists make their own choice about the course of action that they follow, which is often quite different from what they would be expected to do on the basis of their stereotyped behaviour. So, for example, the wolf does not necessarily devour its potential victims but may as well start a dialogue with them (e.g. P159, 187).

c) There are many fables in which an animal differentiates itself from its kin and demonstrates behaviour different from the other members of its species (II.5, pp. 75–6 below). The fabulist could choose for his characters whichever patterns of behaviour suited his messages. It is true that the traditional patterns often influenced his choices: the fox is often cunning, the lion strong etc. But we also find the opposite: deviation from the rule and from the expected outcome. So the fox is fooled or its plans fail (e.g. P41, 107, 191, 241), the lion is defeated (e.g. P140, 147–8), the dog is not trustworthy

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iour. On the need for plausibility of animal characterization in fable from the Greek sources see VD G20c, 41, 54, 57–8, 63, 64a, 69c, 70. Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.303–9, gives a concise presentation of these traditional views.

[101] Buxton (1987); Detienne and Vernant (1993), 37–67; Garbe (1988); García Gual (1970); id. (1972); id. (1978), 197–203; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 225–30; Lilja (1980), 31–2; Luria (1929); id. (1934); MacDermott (1935); Pugliarello (1973), 36–96, 111–25; Rodríguez Adrados (1965a); id. (1979–87), I.213–14, 250–1; Sancassano (1996).

(e.g. P120, 206), the laborious ant becomes a symbol of exploitation of other people's labour (P166) and so on. In sum, consistency of animal patterns of behaviour according to their traditional image is not found in the *Augustana*. Even in fables where the animal protagonists seem to follow their traditionally stereotyped qualities, the outcomes of their actions are not always those that would have been expected.[102]

A major topic of scholarship on the fable in the last two centuries is that of the practical and class content of the fable's messages. It has been argued that a fable is a sort of "case study" in practical ethics. It portrays how the ethical agent should deal with certain social situations and it incorporates messages from popular experience.[103] Scholars have also developed the analysis of the pragmatic and practical ethical content in Greek fables to a categorization of this content in terms of class. The Greek fables were seen as representing a 'popular' observation of life and, in this respect, advocated popular ethics. The term 'popular' implied both a widespread view, traditionally and generally accepted, and a product of the thought of everyday people in Greek society. The popular character of Greek fable justified the scholars' belief in the existence of a Greek *Volksbuch* of Aesop's fables and life.[104]

The next stage of scholarly analysis was the specification of the term 'popular' in terms of its *class* content. In this sense, the Greek fable was interpreted as a way for the low and oppressed Greek social strata to express their criticism of social injustice and of their oppression by the ruling groups.[105] The simplicity of its language and

[102] Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.303–19.

[103] The practical aspect of the fable's ethics was first made explicit by the German scholar Johann Gottfried Herder in 1787. Until the beginning of this century this aspect was mainly stressed and covered by German scholars (e.g. Crusius, Hausrath), although it has since then gained an almost universal approval. See Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.32–3. On this 'practical' aspect see Carnes (1988b), 14; Chambry (1927), xli; Chesterton (1929), 88; Della Corte (1945), 3; Delaunois (1992), 198; García Gual (1976), 313; id. (1978), 181; Giangrande (1972), 20; Hausrath (1898), 328; Josifović (1974), 32; Kontoleon (1987), 60; Melella (1945–6), 335; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.514–16; Rodríguez Adrados (1978a), 228.

[104] Rothwell (1995), 233–4. Cf. Chambry (1927), xl–i; Della Corte (1945), 10; id. (1971–2), 12; García Gual (1970), 417; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 208–12; Kontoleon (1987), 60; Melella (1945–6), 335; Meraclis (1987), 25–6; Noel (1975), 150–1; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.33–6; Rodríguez Adrados (1978a), 228; id. (1979–87), I.173. Cf. I.2.3, pp. 20–3 above. The popularity of the Greek fable is attested by the numerous allusions to fables in Greek literature, for which see Van Dijk (1997).

[105] See Cascajero (1991), 12–17; Crusius (1913); Dithmar (1971), 115–39; García

style made it easily accessible to the lower social groups, who were less educated and would not have been able to read a philosophical work, for example.[106] The fable's metaphorical reference to social reality enabled such people to express their discontent without being manifestly offensive. Even the supposed inventor of this category of story, Aesop, was a slave who then became a freedman (as well as the later Latin fabulist Phaedrus, see nn. 36, 83 above). In fact, Aesop belongs to the exceptional group of Greek writers who were not aristocrats by birth.[107] Besides, he represents the even more rare case of a freedman becoming a writer like Epictetus; if one considers that he lived in the sixth century B.C., his case is unique. The scholars noted earlier (n. 106 above) explained the image of Aesop the freedman as another proof of the Greek fable's *class* content and interpreted the fable's messages as representing a "slave morality", the views and complaints of the socially oppressed.

However, there is also a different view, namely that the fable reproduced and taught the ethical codes of the ruling class or the aristocrats and was thus used as a mechanism of ideological oppression.[108] In other words, the fable's messages, such as the rejection of any attempts to alter one's status, do not represent the people's complaints about their social position. In fact, the ruling class used the fable, because of its popular esteem and circulation, to inflict on the lower classes the behavioural norms that they wanted them to follow in their daily life, and which promoted, above all, the maintenance of the social hierarchy. Besides, some scholars have observed that the interpretation of the fable as a vehicle for the views of slaves was first expressed by Phaedrus (3.Prologue.33–7). Phaedrus represents

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Gual (1970), 417; id. (1976), 313; id. (1978), 197–8, 205–8; Jedrkiewicz (1983), 12–15; id. (1989), 395–406, 411–13; Josifović (1974), 36; La Penna (1961); Meuli (1954); Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.17, 39; Perry (1957), 430; id. (1959), 23 f.; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.259–69; Rothwell (1995); Sakellariou (1987); Spoerri (1942–3); Ste Croix (1981), 444–5. Cf. I.3.2, pp. 39–41 below.

106 García Gual (1978), 179; Ste Croix (1981), 444.

107 Starr (1992), 54.

108 Beattie (1783), 505; Cascajero (1992), 23–4; Chesterton (1929), 86; García Gual (1976), 316–18; id. (1978), 196–9; Gasparov (1968); Jaeger (1965), 434 n. 4; Lasserre (1984), 71–6, 80–1; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.259–69. An excellent survey of the various interpretations of the Greek fable's political aspect, from the eighteenth century onwards, can be found in Demandt (1991). Meuli (1954) had already noted that the fable, although a way for the socially oppressed to express their dissatisfaction and criticism, could also be used by the socially powerful as a means to oppress the socially inferior. See also L'Estrange's views, pp. 26–7 above.

a late period in the history of ancient fable, and his views are not attested anywhere else in our ancient sources before him.[109] These considerations have led many scholars to deny its importance as an aspect of Greek fable; they have also argued against the idea that the fable has a social function of this type and that its *class* aspect is crucial to the genre.[110]

To sum up, since the seventeenth century the Greek fable has been seen as a metaphorical representation of reality and as a fictitious means of teaching ethics. It has also been seen as an exemplary story that carries an ideological and class-oriented message, though the aim of this message has been debated.

Most of these views were epitomized by Georg Hegel in his *Aesthetics*.[111] Although his analysis is nowhere mentioned by any of the scholars who have written on the Aesopic corpus, it is interesting to discover that he pointed out, almost two centuries ago, what modern scholars have repeatedly noted on the fable's ethical function. According to him a fable offers a prudential maxim, simple and easily understood; its message is linked with reality, that is, a fable gains significance only when it relates to something that can happen in human life. Its fictitiously produced message forces the reader to apply it to his personal experience. In other words, "from its [the fable's] detailed representation there can be abstracted, in a way we can understand, an ethical maxim, a warning, a message, a prudential rule, and it is described for the sake of this reflection and displayed to contemplation".[112] The paradigmatic situation in a fable "is so recounted that there may be drawn from it a general lesson for human existence and more particularly for its practical side, concerning prudence and morality in action".[113] Even Hegel's remark on the limited scope that the fable's ethics offer to their

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[109] Holzberg (1993a), 18–19. Wiedemann (1989), 145–6 also disagreed with the idea that the fable expressed a "slave morality" and called such a view "a modern fancy".

[110] Holzberg (1993a), 18–19; Janssens (1955); Lindner (1978), 16–23; Nøjgaard (1964–7), 33–9; Perry (1959), 18.

[111] Hegel (1832–45), 494–9. He states that the style of a fable should be simple and that the depiction of animals should be close to their true nature (ibid., 494–5). He also pointed out the frequent discord between the messages of the fable and the *epimythium* and he correctly pointed out that the latter is a subsequent addition to the narrative (ibid., 495).

[112] Ibid., 494.

[113] Ibid., 494.

reader for deep contemplation, compared to contemplation through philosophy or poetry, anticipates the common modern view that fable is non-serious and children's literature.[114]

To complete this survey of the scholarship on the Greek fable's ethical content and function, here are two remaining lines of interpretation of the *Augustana* fables. The first interpretation is that of Nøjgaard: he explains how the Aesopic corpus was transformed in Late Antiquity in line with a moralizing approach.[115] This was achieved by interventions in the plot, which aimed to erase any unwanted phrases and to transform the violent world of the original fable, where instincts and violence drove the protagonists' actions, into a world where instincts are controlled and the notion of justice is dominant. The process of the purification of the Greek fable's ethical content starts with the anonymous compiler of the *Augustana.* He tried to indicate the need for a just and virtuous life indirectly, through the negative consequences that vice, violence and foolishness have for the fable characters. This effort, however, is clearly observable only in the message of the *epimythium*, where the anonymous compiler—moralizer comments on a fable on the grounds of his ethical principles. As for the narrative itself, Nøjgaard himself admits the scarcity of traces of this alleged intervention. Nevertheless, he finds four cases in which a fable from the *Augustana* must have been 'purified' of any unwanted sexual or scatological elements which he suggests were present in the fables' older versions (P81, 146, 214, 243).

Although Nøjgaard's theory remains a mere hypothesis as regards the *Augustana*, it is more convincing when he discusses the next two stages of the moralizing process, the collections of Phaedrus and Babrius (see p. 25 above). In their case, there is a manifest elaboration and alteration of the narratives of fables that appear in the *Augustana* in order to suit the authors' ethical standpoints. Phaedrus uses the distinction between physical and mental strength which is

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[114] Ibid., 497. Cf. Noel (1975), 145–58. For ancient testimonies on fable as children's literature see VD G24a, 42–3, 46, 52, 73 and Van Dijk (1997), 75 n. 210. This was not, however, the exclusive ancient view: see VD G50 (for fables as adult's literature) and Van Dijk (1997), 75 n. 209.

[115] Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.519–25; id. (1984). Contra: Cascajero (1991), 43. On the transformation of the ideas of the Aesopic fables and their use by the Christian missionaries to teach Christian ethics to the Aztecs see Brotherston and Vollmer (1987), 11–37.

a central theme in the *Augustana* fables (see II.1.2, p. 48 below) and the conflict between them (which results in victory of one over the other) as ways of expressing his disappointment because virtue and physical strength cannot be reconciled in social life, but one must prevail over the other. As a result, human life is tragic because, although it is judged by ethical standards, it is dominated by physical strength. In Babrius, the same conflict takes place in the soul of the protagonist of the fable. Babrius shows his characters' inability to control their physical superiority against weaker opponents either because they fail to follow the ethical requirements set by virtue (e.g. to pity the weak) or because the vicious ones fail to control their passions. He draws a portrait of the brutal and the vicious, but cynically observes that it is these who rule in life. Nøjgaard's theory is the most effective way to explain the discrepancies that the reader discovers between the messages of a fable and its epimythium in the *Augustana*. Nevertheless, as regards the story itself, the collection's fables do not deal at all with the issue of justice and they do not attempt to reduce their amount of violence (see III.3.1 below). The interpolation that Nøjgaard described is interesting. However, it is discernible in the epimythium but not in the collection's fables themselves.

The second line of interpretation refers to the influence of Greek philosophical schools on the ethical content of the *Augustana* fables.[116] It is represented by the work of Rodríguez Adrados. He believes that the Aesopic corpus in general and the *Augustana* in particular represent, for the most part, Cynic doctrines. This is so, he argues, because the Cynics intervened in the corpus and used it to propagandize their ideas. They altered the original content of the fables to suit their messages. The fable was a useful means for their propaganda because of its popularity. Their intervention started in the third century B.C. and was accompanied by the versification of the fables from Demetrius' collection. This was later followed by the conversion of the Cynic fables into prose by the Stoics and the interpolation of their own messages. The form and messages in the *Augustana* represent the interventions by both these philosophical schools, the Cynic influence being the most intense and discernible one.[117] As regards the Stoic influence, Rodríguez Adrados himself

[116] See also pp. 18–19 above.

[117] See Jedrkiewicz (1989), 409–11; Rodríguez Adrados (1969–70); id. (1978b),

acknowledges that his theory is speculative, for the Stoic interventions are difficult to locate.[118]

Rodríguez Adrados identifies the following themes in the fables as characteristically Cynic ones: disapproval of wealth, abuse of power, false beauty, hedonism; condemnation of ingratitude, selfishness and hypocrisy; criticism of custom, boastfulness, imprudence; related ideas are that: life is vain; life is precious; it is good to conform with one's lot and not to try to change one's status or 'nature'; fate is powerful; life is full of sudden changes.[119] In general, the *Augustana* represents both aspects of the political theory of the Cynics: on the one hand, the disapproval of conventional social life, which results in the Cynic idea of cosmopolitanism and, on the other hand, their social engagement, which leads them to satirize the powerful. The collection's world-view is a mixture of these two aspects: it criticizes the violence of the powerful, but it also advises that one should avoid any conflict with them and try to live as away as possible from social life, which is characterized by conflict and injustice.[120]

Rodríguez Adrados's views are interesting, despite the authoritative and arbitrary way in which he often presents them. He does not argue in detail nor does he substantiate his views by reference to ancient sources, but instead refers constantly to his own work. It is true that the Cynics often use animals as a metaphorical illustration of human life.[121] However, there are several clear objections to Rodríguez Adrados's claims. Although the Cynics did propagate the ideas that Rodríguez Adrados cites, they were not exclusive to them but were shared by other popular or philosophical thought. For example, the disapproval of wealth can be found throughout Greek popular or philosophical thought (see IV.1.1 below). Furthermore, the Cynics did not constitute a 'school' in Greek thought and had no systematic teaching or doctrines, contrary to what Rodríguez Adrados presupposes when he speaks of 'Cynic' influences in general.[122]

27–68; id. (1979–87), I.551–617; id. (1984a), 141–5; id. (1988a). On Stoic influence, Rodríguez Adrados (1978b), 71–5.

[118] Id. (1978b), 71.

[119] Id. (1978b), 48–68; id. (1988a), 419–25.

[120] Id. (1988a).

[121] See, for example, Anacharsis *Ep.* 8; Crates *Ep.* 24, 29; Diogenes *Ep.* 2, 45 in Malherbe (1977). See also Goulet-Cazé (1996), 61–4.

[122] Bracht Branham and Goulet-Cazé (1996a), 21–3; Dudley (1967), xi, 37–8, 110–16; Malherbe (1977), 2. Contra: Bracht Branham and Goulet-Cazé (1996a), 24–7; Moles (1995).

Even Moles, who argues that the Cynics had a common approach to politics, accepts that this did not amount to a fully worked-out political theory.[123] Also, although the Cynics did use popular forms, such as the σπουδαιογέλοιον or the diatribe, there is little specific evidence that they took over the Aesopic fable.[124] We also need to take into account our scarcity of evidence on Cynic theory, which makes scholars speculate about what the Cynics *must* have said, rather than referring to existing sources.[125] Moreover, Rodríguez Adrados builds up his theory on the basis of a few fables from the *Augustana* (P13, 30, 40, 106), which he defines as 'Cynic'. These fables might have been influenced by some branch of Cynicism, but are not definite proof of Cynic influence (especially of Cynic influence throughout the collection). Likewise, one could argue for Platonic influence on the corpus of fables because some fables can be found in Plato's works.[126] To sum up, Rodríguez Adrados's theory is not well-argumented and it neglects the broader framework of Greek philosophical or popular thought.

I.3.2 *Theoretical Perspectives and the Project of this Book*

Scholarship on the Greek fable has never dealt in detail with the ethical content of its message. The ideas of the Greek fable remain to be studied and placed in the broader framework of Greek thought. My aim here is to make a first attempt at such a study, which I discuss now in general terms and in more detail in the following chapters.[127] As regards the structure by which the fable conveyed its message, Nøjgaard's work has offered a remarkable analysis of the *Augustana* fables. In addition, I will note some points on the transmission of the fable's message to its reader or audience. As Nøjgaard observes, the fable's message becomes obvious "quand on applique la relation abstraite à une situation de la vie humaine aussi spéciale

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[123] Moles (1995), 158.

[124] On the σπουδαιογέλοιον see Giangrande (1972).

[125] Bracht Branham and Goulet-Cazé (1996a), 3; Moles (1995), 141.

[126] See pp. 18–19 n. 58 above.

[127] As Schaeffer argues, the structural analysis of Greek fable should not be done solely at the level of narrative analysis, as in Nøjgaard's work, but at the interpretative level, that is, at the level of social reality and ethics, to which the Greek fable referred allegorically. See Schaeffer (1985), 357–8.

qu'était l'action de la fable".[128] This is an assertion that resembles Hegel's claim that a fable gains significance only when it is related to human life (p. 32 above). For example, a fable may refer to the notion of friendship through the behaviour and the accompanying actions of benevolence towards a friend, assistance in times of difficulty, return of a benefaction etc. This portrayal is usually a negative one, because the *Augustana* fables prefer to demonstrate what sort of behaviour and course of action one should avoid. That is, the reader usually reads about betrayal of friendship, failure to reciprocate a benefaction and so on.

The analysis of the function of 'ideology' might help us to analyse the fable's ethical function. According to Finley's definition, 'ideology' is "the combination of beliefs and attitudes, often unformulated or subconscious and certainly neither coherent nor necessarily consistent, which underlay . . . thinking and . . . behaviour".[129] Ideology has three interrelated aspects, an imaginary, a practical, and a political. First, "it represents the imaginary relation of individuals to their real conditions of existence".[130] The individual, then, might distort and dissimulate the social reality that surrounds him in such a way to make it fit his ideological model of social life. It does so because ideology has a practical aspect; its ideas have material existence and they must be expressed through particular action. For example, the ideology of justice demands that the individual submits himself to the laws.[131] Finally, ideology is used in the political context as a normative mechanism that binds together its members in a particular group, guarantees a common framework of values, and helps the group to legitimate its interests and to impose itself over other groups with opposing interests.[132]

Ideology secures its effectiveness by giving its subjects the impression that its contents are socially real. Ideology must be recognizable. The *recognition function*, as Althusser described it, is one of ideology's basic functions.[133] Its contents and commands are accepted by the individual as obviously correct, because he has agreed to

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[128] Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.377.
[129] As in Ober (1989), 38.
[130] Althusser (1984), 36.
[131] Ibid., 39–44; Eagleton (1991), 47; Hoare (1971), 375–7.
[132] Eagleton (1991), 29–30; Giddens (1997), 571; Poulantzas (1973), ch. 3.
[133] Althusser (1984), 45–6; Eagleton (1991), 15, 58–9.

follow the behavioural norms implied by it. For instance, it is obvious to the ethical agent that he should abide by legal institutions since he has agreed to be a citizen. The *recognition function* consists in the individual translating the requirements of ideology into his personal experience and results into him accepting their general application to social life and their claims to truthfulness and correctness.

The fable's ethics and their metaphorical reference to social reality can be taken as exemplifying the *recognition function*. The fable's fiction operates at two levels of recognition. In the first level, the animal or the fable figure in general is accepted as a real human being. The fable figures behave and reason exactly as human beings do in their daily life. A necessary precondition for the fable figure being able to reflect human behaviour is that it is 'humanized': animals (but also trees, gods, fictitious people etc.) are endowed with the capacity for a (rudimentary) type of ethical reasoning and psychology and are presented as living and interacting in a society.[134] This gives, in spite of its obvious fictitiousness, a sense of familiarity to the fable's audience, which facilitates the acceptance of the fable figures as mouthpieces for human life and the acceptance of the story that the fable narrates as a story that could have easily taken place in real life with real human protagonists. The second level of recognition is when the (human) situations and problems that the Greek fable illustrates are validated as *obviously* true and correct by the reader's ethical response. The reader's acceptance of the truth of the fable was facilitated either by the 'humanized' depiction of the fable's figures, or by the stereotypical behaviour and naturalistic depiction of its human protagonists (e.g. traders who cheat, shepherds who see wolves attacking their sheep etc.).[135] The fable enabled recognition by concrete illustration. Furthermore, the messages of the fables were widespread in Greek thought as we know it from other literary contexts, and this facilitated their recognition and acceptance as obviously true. The transference from human to animal enables a kind of process of inferential recognition. The reader recognizes *this* (animal) story as a representation of *that* (human) truth, and the process of recognition somehow validates the message. For example, the story of the flies who drowned as their feet got stuck

[134] García Gual (1978), 188.
[135] See Depew (1995); Dierauer (1977); Moutsopoulos (1997), ch. 9.

in honey (P80), inferentially confirms the general condemnation of greed. Thinking about human behaviour is assisted by attributing human qualities to animals (and fictitious characters in general) and by using them as metaphorical exemplifications of appropriate or inappropriate human behaviour.[136] This feature of Greek thought was not restricted to fables. Animals were often used in Greek thought as ways of moralizing human behaviour. For example, in Plato's *Gorgias* (483a–4a) Callicles uses the lion's behaviour to prove his argument that it is naturally right for the stronger or the better to have advantage of the weaker and the worse.[137] Even if we chain and enslave a lion and thus apparently bring it to our control, one day it will break its chains and prove its superiority over its human captors through its natural strength, because its natural status is that of a master and not of a slave. So too with the naturally stronger of us, Callicles argues, even if we keep inflicting on them the idea that it is right for all men to be equal, one day they will find their natural superiority and impose it on the weaker by stamping on their laws that teach equality among men. The use of animals as metaphorical examples for human conduct is present throughout Greek thought, and continues even in our day (e.g. George Orwell's *Animal Farm* or Walt Disney's *The Lion King*).

Some scholars have made similar observations about the fable's ethical function. They have argued that the fable "embodies the general in an invented particular which, when it is recognized, informs the general notion with more perceptive recognitions";[138] it functions by showing "what the general means in practice, and in this way bring[s] to notice a matter that demands attention, and leave[s] it to reflection in the light of what has been shown . . .".[139] In sum, the fable "locates certain aspects of behaviour and generalizes on them".[140] The collection's ethical messages have also a pragmatic and practical scope. Their metaphorical messages belong to the category of "applied ethics".[141] The *Augustana* aims to illustrate and exemplify as many sides of ethical experience as possible and to offer a series

[136] Blackham (1985), 203.
[137] This passage is considered by some scholars to be only a simile, while others consider it to be an allusion to a fable. See Van Dijk (1997), 668.
[138] Ibid., 9.
[139] Ibid., 175.
[140] Buxton (1994), 164.
[141] See Singer (1994), 13.

of case studies on ethical behaviour. It is through practices, that every ethical theory comes into existence and is evaluated, similarly to ideology.[142]

The fable's ethics are 'popular', first because they represent widespread views from Greek thought; every citizen could recognize them and reflect upon them. A fable's audience included potentially everybody, without any class differentiation.[143] Yet it is likely that the lower social strata formed the majority of its audience, both because of the fable's simplicity of style and content and because the dominant and better educated social strata had a variety of literary forms that were available and intelligible to them (e.g. philosophy, lyric poetry) instead of fables. This class-oriented character of the fable's popularity is also attested by the fable's use in various communal frameworks in the *polis* (e.g. speeches, comedy) where *hoi polloi* formed a great part of the audience. Fables were used there to persuade and they could persuade precisely because the audience was familiar with them and their messages represented the beliefs and values of the common people. However, the Greek fable's 'readership' most possibly included the higher social groups, who could read and afford buying a collection of fables. Nevertheless, our information and research on the extent of the written fables' circulation is too limited to enable any conclusions on its 'readership'.

The scholarly debate on the class basis of the fable's messages (whether that of the dominant social groups or the dominated, see pp. 30–2 above) is a false dilemma that diverts us from the function of fable as a vehicle for ideas that are addressed to the common people. The fact that certain intellectuals (for instance, Aristophanes), who belonged to the higher groups in social hierarchy, used and collected fables (Demetrius of Phalerum) does not contradict, but rather substantiates, the class-orientation of Greek fable. They found it a useful way, because of its 'popularity' (in both senses), to gain public approval (and win, for example, a comic contest), to illustrate their arguments (e.g. in speeches), and to influence ordinary people's morality. The study of the ethical content of the *Augustana* in the

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[142] See Althusser (1984), 41–4; Dover (1974), 3–4; Gill (1996), 68; Havelock (1978), 36. The term 'practice' refers to "any coherent and complex form of socially established co-operative activity through which human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended", MacIntyre's definition in (1985), 187.

[143] See Van Dijk (1997), 33 n. 208; Hasubek (1996).

next chapters will argue that they represent views that were 'popular' in Greek thought, in both these senses, the widespread and the class-oriented.[144] The class-orientation (but not necessarily class origins, keeping in mind the objections in pp. 31–2 above) of the collection's messages and their popular and practical aspects are so evident that they need to be included in our definition.

Furthermore, the views of Antonio Gramsci on the class-content of ideology might explain why one should not feel obliged to rule out influences by various social groups on popular ethics. Gramsci notes that "the social consciousness of the oppressed is a contradictory amalgam of values [that derive] from the rulers and notions [that derive] from practical experience". The empirical consciousness of the people ["common sense"] is "a chaotic aggregate of disparate conceptions" and usually conservative in its political context.[145] One, then, should not be surprised to discover that the collection's ethics promote conformity with one's social position; or that they contain examples in which the physically strong prevails over the weak (e.g. P4, pp. 58–9 below), alongside examples from other fables where the weak animal manages to punish the strong (e.g. P3, pp. 130–2 below).

The ethics of the *Augustana* are not the product of philosophical speculation; they do not locate the actions and behaviour of their protagonists in a coherent system, but are casuistic and practical. They do not preach which action or type of behaviour is ethically correct (e.g. inherently virtuous), but rather they advise on what should be done in a particular situation.[146] The collection's messages are also characterized by fragmentation. The fables, grouped simply in alphabetical order, are independent from each other and there is no continuous narrative. Every story is a new one, and even if a fox appears in two fables, it is a different fox in each case. This means that the reader does not observe the protagonist's ethical life as a whole; he does not see, for example, if the protagonist learned from his mistakes, because he does not repeat them in his life. Any

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[144] On the class-oriented function of the fable's ethics, note the views of Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987), ch. 10, on how the state through its intellectual mechanisms manipulated animal characteristics in order to categorize and repudiate behaviour that it disapproved of. So, for example, a thief is 'foxy', revolutionary groups are hungry 'wolves', the citizens are the king's 'flock' and so on.

[145] See Eagleton (1991), 36, 119–20.

[146] Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.514–15; id. (1984), 243.

more reflective or "second-order" reasoning (see II.1.2, pp. 48 f. below) falls to the reader himself.

The *Augustana* has no systematic or analytical philosophy. Its ethics are constituted by the sum of the messages of its fables, which constitute an unsystematic network of illustrated examples of practical behaviour. As this book will try to argue, the collection's ethics cannot be limited to a specific period of Greek thought or a particular philosophical school but are recognizable throughout the history of Greek ethics.[147] Therefore, although the collection has no philosophy, it reflects common views from Greek ethical thought, both 'popular' and 'philosophical'. It would also be interesting to see how more or less 'philosophical' or class-oriented the collection's fables are compared to other fable material (e.g. the Latin fable, Babrius, La Fontaine), but such a study goes beyond the limits of this book.

To conclude this chapter, from the seventeenth century onwards, the study of the messages of Greek fable has been content either with the assertion that Greek fable was a means of transmitting ethical messages or with a general characterization of its messages, namely as popular, didactic, class-oriented; it has also often dealt with the stylistic and structural preconditions for their production. The present study aims to present and analyse the content of these messages, the sort of behaviour they promote or condemn, to compare them with the corresponding behaviour from Greek ethical theory and to place them in the history of Greek ethics. This is a novel move in the study of fables. The hypothesis to be pursued in this study is that the fables reflect Greek ethics generally, and in particular Greek popular ethical thought, and that they contain a type of ethical reasoning. The questions that this study will raise and try to answer are what type of ethical reasoning fables contained and what type of norms they promoted. I will show that, as regards ethical reasoning, the fables do have a conceptual structure, although not one that coincides precisely with the conceptual structure of ethical reasoning as expressed by Greek philosophers. Furthermore, I will not examine every type of link between fable and philosophy. That is, I will not discuss physiognomics, the use of animal typology in Greek thought as a means of codifying and interpreting human character. I will not also study the use of animal types in philosophical

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[147] Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.557; Vournas (1984), I.11, II.9.

texts (see, for example, the passage from *Gorgias* p. 39 above). Nor do I examine the issue of animal mind and ethics, that is the Greek philosophers' views on the mental capacities, ethical reasoning and responsibility of animals, which is a huge topic on its own in Greek philosophy.[148]

In this context, the fable material in the *Augustana* collection has been chosen as a field for study, because, as scholars generally agree, it represents the oldest compilation of Greek prose fables that we possess and it is seen as the apex of a long tradition and the most secure testimony of the ideas of Greek fable.[149] It is also the principal source for the *Vindobonensis* and the *Accursiana* (see pp. 24–5 above).[150] A collection and interpretation of the pre-*Augustana* fables, from the Archaic, Classical and Hellenistic literature, is correctly seen by scholars as an impossible task at the moment, because of the fragmentary character of the fable material and its complicated appearance in a variety of literary contexts, each of which demands a separate study.[151] This gap in fable scholarship has started being covered thanks to Van Dijk's recent work (1997). Furthermore, compared to the collections of Phaedrus and Babrius, the *Augustana* has the advantage of not being the product of a single author, and thus serving as a vehicle for his ideas as is the case for Phaedrus and Babrius (see p. 25 above). Instead, the collection's ethics represent general and widespread views from Greek thought, which the anonymous compiler has not altered, although he often criticizes them in the *epimythium* (see pp. 7–8 above), which is placed outside the narrative and does not affect it. These points do not deny the need for a study of the ethics in other collections, but rather indicate the importance of the *Augustana* as a starting point in the study of the ethics of the fable.

Due to the lack of any previous work of this kind, this study of ethics in the *Augustana* lacks any methodological precedent. The method that has been chosen is the following: the various messages and behavioural patterns from the collection's fables are allocated to thematic groups. Some of the most prominent thematic groups relate to behaviour towards friends and enemies; the treatment of suppliants;

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148 On this issue see Sorabji (1993).
149 Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.516; Perry (1936); Rodríguez Adrados (1978a), 217–23.
150 Perry (1936).
151 Holzberg (1993a), 1–2; Rodríguez Adrados (1978a), 225; id. (1979–87), I.517–18.

the attitude to work, toil and custom; the evaluation of physical and mental qualities; the treatment of the defeated; and the respect of the limits for action set by nature or by the social group; the treatment of interpersonal relationships; and, more generally, of religion and politics. These and other thematic groups are discussed in separate chapters, each of which focuses on a particular category of ethical discourse. In each chapter I present the views of scholars on the theme in Greek thought, the collection's presentation of this theme and the conclusions that we can draw from a comparison of the fable's messages with the broader framework of Greek thought.

The establishment of the Greek fable as a category of story to be studied thoroughly by Classicists goes beyond the scope of this book. However, it will be more than enough if the present book indicates the value of Greek fable, as represented in the *Augustana*, as another source that can be used in the study of Greek ethical thought in general and Greek popular ethics in particular.

CHAPTER II

CONFLICT IN THE *AUGUSTANA* FABLES

II.1 *The* Agon *in the* Augustana

II.1.1 *The Theme of the* Agon *in Greece*

Modern works on Greek fable note the central position that the theme of conflict has in it, both in narrative and ideological frameworks. The key word in these approaches is *agon*, the Greek term for 'competition'.[1] Until recently, Classical scholars explained this term as associated with a view of life as a field for competition (a view they thought was characteristic of Greek thought), in which victory was sought and the result of which determined the participant's honour and social status. The space for competitive action included every occasion for public distinction: the battlefield, athletic, musical, dancing, and dramatic competitions, debates in a court or in public speeches.[2]

The *Augustana* fables often comment on the results of a conflict, on the success or failure of their figures in episodes of strife. Thus, it could be said that the collection's ethics promote success and are in line with the Greek competitive ethos. However, before examining the function of conflict in the *Augustana*, we need to determine how to locate the agonistic ethos in the history of Greek ethics.

Certain scholars have charted a socio-historical process of development of the *agonistic* ethos in Greek culture.[3] They have traced its beginnings to the ideal of the Archaic hero, especially as described in Homer and in lyric poetry, namely that of winning glory.[4]

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[1] See entry for 'ἀγών' in *LSJ* and *DGE*. For related bibliography see p. 47 n. 5 below.

[2] The most influential works on this view have been Adkins (1960) and Snell (1960).

[3] For the following views see Adkins (1960), 30–57, 61–79, 86–108, 153–68, 172–89; id. (1972), 1–55; Snell (1960), ch. 8; Dover (1974), 226 f.; Donlan (1980); Gallant (1991), 143–8; Murray (1993), 208 f.; Bryant (1996), 28–32, 67–87, 95–111.

[4] Epitomized in Peleus' renowned phrase to Achilles: αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔμμεναι ἄλλων ("always be the best and excel above the others", Hom. *Il.* 11.784).

During the Archaic period, excellence through competition remained a task for noblemen, who had the means and the free time to prepare themselves for conflict in war and peace. Excellence was inscribed in a man's pursuit of individual glory (τιμή). The value of Archaic man was estimated by the results of his actions rather than his intentions. Co-operative institutions and activities were viewed simply as means to achieve personal status and success.

In this view of the history of Greek ethics, the progress towards the formation of the Classical Greek *polis* marked a shift towards an institutional framework for controlling competition. As certain social groups, such as the farmers and the merchants, demanded a greater share in political and economic power, co-operative ethics became more important. Social cohesion became the goal of the Classical *polis* and competition took place within civic institutions, such as the city's religious festivals, the courts, the Assembly. The city still promoted individual excellence, but incorporated this within its institutions and with a view to communal interest. Tensions remained in the Classical *polis* because of the continuous conflict between the traditional competitive ethos, represented in the aristocratic ideology, and the new co-operative ethos of the *polis*. Yet, the frameworks for individual excellence (e.g., political, economic, religious, military) were controlled by the civic institutions. The core social roles were attached to citizenship. The dominant ideology was that of devotion to communal interest and of self-fulfilment through public service. As a result, the aristocratic ideology had to come to terms with the belief that individual interest and excellence were acceptable only if they promoted the communal interest and it had to accede to the supremacy of civic institutions and interest.

The next stage, according to this approach, starts with the gradual decline of the *polis* as an autonomous political formation and the malfunction of its institutions; this decline coincided with the reappearance of more individualistic ethical views, which promoted prosperity on a personal level, as described by thinkers from Aristotle to the Hellenistic philosophers. Overall, scholars have argued that Greek man tended to see himself in competition with his fellow-men and that the *agonistic* ethos remained strong throughout Greek history, although manifested in different social contexts.

However, in recent years certain scholars have argued against this view of the historical development of the competitive frame-

work.[5] They argue against a distinction between a competitive ethos, characteristic of the Homeric hero and the aristocrats, that left no space for co-operative ethics, and a co-operative ethos that was promoted and adopted by the *polis* in order to replace the former agonistic one. They argue, instead, that ethical demands for both co-operative (or "other-benefiting") behaviour and competitive behaviour formed the framework for Greek ethics throughout Greek history, from the Homeric period onwards. For example, A.A. Long argued that, contrary to Adkins's view, Homeric terminology signifying the approval or disapproval of the hero's actions often praises other-benefiting behaviour and censors non-co-operative actions.[6]

If we accept these views, there is no clear distinction between Archaic or noble competitive behaviour and a subsequent civic co-operative behaviour. There is, rather, dialectical co-existence between competitive and co-operative practices and moral claims throughout Greek history. This co-existence, though, may differ gradually in the course of time, that is the competitive ethos may prevail over the co-operative or vice versa. In the same way, scholars have argued against the traditional view that Greek ethical philosophy was an 'egoistic' one, in promoting the pursuit of individual happiness and interest. By contrast, Greek ethical theories estimated other-benefiting motivation highly, whether this resulted from the application of certain recommended virtues or from the reciprocation of obligations.[7] The modern debate described above, then, should be kept in mind when one considers the *agonistic* ethos of the *Augustana*. This debate also puts into question any attempt to date the collection's ethics on the basis of their agonistic content.

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[5] See Long (1970); MacIntyre (1985), 132–9; Blundell (1989), 26–31; Rowe (1993), 125–6; Williams (1993); Gill (1996), chs. 1–2.

[6] A. MacIntyre similarly argued that Homeric competition for glory is located within, and gains significance from, the co-operative framework of Homeric society. See Long (1970); MacIntyre (1985), ch. 10. Cf. Gagarin (1987).

[7] See Long (1970); MacIntyre (1985), chs. 10–11, 14; Williams (1985), chs. 3, 8; Gagarin (1987); Annas (1993), ch. 11; Williams (1993), ch. 2; Annas (1995); Gill (1995), 20–30, 43–52; Irwin (1995a), 233–45; Gill (1996), 1–18, 29–60, 94–9, 455–69; id. (1998) 303–5, 314 f.

II.1.2 *The* Agon *in the* Augustana

The theme of the *agon* in the *Augustana* fables needs to be studied in two contexts, the narrative and the ideological one. The first refers to fable as a narrative structure. The second applies to the fable's message and to its placing in the context of Greek views on competition.

The narrative framework of the *Augustana* has been adequately studied (see I.1, pp. 4 f. above). Most scholars discern a type of fables which they generally call 'agonistic' or "fables of dispute".[8] At their very beginning, these fables state that there is a conflict between a protagonist and an antagonist. The introductory formula used to denote this situation of conflict is "X and Y had a dispute about issue Z".[9]

The form of the conflict can be either physical or mental. The fable's figures may compete in the field of physical strength, in which case it is the stronger who usually wins (e.g. P46, 70, 90), or they may enter a mental conflict by starting a debate, in which case it is the more clever who usually wins (e.g. P12, 14, 20). A necessary precondition is that a figure cannot be strong in both fields, otherwise the result of the conflict would have been determined before the enactment of the plot.[10] The pivotal role of conflict in the fable's structure has generally been accepted.[11]

This structural approach describes the formal basis of the fable's messages: the protagonist enters a conflict, the result of which brings approval or criticism for his actions, which constitutes the fable's message. Nevertheless, this approach does not deal with the ideological content and the function of the fable's message. It does not help us to study the collection's views on conflict and to place them in the framework of Greek thought. To pursue such a study, I use the interpretative model of the person that Christopher Gill describes.[12]

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[8] Cascajero (1991), 57–8; id. (1992), 63; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.262; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.49.

[9] περὶ . . . ἤριζον or ἐφιλονείκουν (also ἐμάχοντο or διεφέροντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους): P12, 14, 20, 46, 62, 70, 90, 104, 130, 147, 165, 197, 213, 220, 222–3, 226, 229. West (1969), 119–20 traces the Near Eastern origins of these fables of dispute, in particular P70, 130, 213.

[10] See in particular Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.142–8, 231–2.

[11] Cascajero (1991), 57–8; García Gual (1976), 315–16; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 244 f.; Rodríguez Adrados (1978b), 50; id. (1979–87), I.49–51, 165–6; id. (1993), 11–12.

[12] Gill (1996), 1–18, 41–78, 131–54.

Gill's model is designed to encapsulate a conception of human personality, which is prevalent in Greek culture, by contrast with that dominant in modern culture. If this model is valid, it applies to Greek culture in general, and not just the fable; but it can be used to define specific features of the fable. In particular, it can be used to define the type of ethical reasoning found in the fable (by contrast with that in more complex genres) and also to define the social function of this reasoning.

Gill proposes an "objective-participant conception" of the person in Greek thought, in which the agent acts according to reasons, which may or may not be fully conscious to him, and participates "in shared forms of human life and 'discourse' about the nature and significance of those shared forms of life". As a result, he can, in principle, gain "objective knowledge of what constitutes the best human life" and a "character and way of life" that corresponds to this knowledge. The "action-guiding discourse of interpersonal and communal engagement" and the "reflective debate about the proper goals of a human life" constitute the basis for full ethical reasoning. There is a systematic contrast with the "subjective-individualist" conception of the person (centred on ideas such as self-consciousness, subjectivity, and individuality) which Gill sees as characteristic of modern Western culture.[13]

As an example of the above, Gill cites the reasoning in the Homeric monologues, in which "the speakers work out the likely consequences of available courses of action . . . and evaluate them in the light of explicit or implied goals", which are dependent on culturally localized ethical values.[14] The discourse employed in these monologues follows a two-stage reasoning, a "first-order" and a "second-order" one. The former "provides the basis for determining the course of action to be adopted in a specific case", while the latter is the "reflection *about* the goals or rules which are operative in first-order reasoning".[15]

So in Odysseus' monologue (*Il.* 11.403–10) the hero begins with first-order reasoning on what he should do under the present circumstances. The Trojans outdo the Greeks in numbers, who have fled away, and he is left on his own. Should he flee and show that

[13] Ibid., 11–12.
[14] Ibid., 54, 62–3.
[15] Ibid., 133.

he is scared, or should he stay and risk his life, because he is outnumbered (ibid., 404–6)? He then defines flight from battle as something that cowards do and he chooses to stay and fight, which is what should be done by those who are the best (ἀριστεύειν) (ibid., 408–9). This is his second-order reasoning, in which he reflects about his options for actions, by inscribing them in an ethical code (what brings blame or praise). This characterization of his options determines his consequent choice of action.[16]

Gill's model does not apply in quite the same way to the fables of the *Augustana*, although it can still be used to analyse the type of ethical reasoning found there. One difficulty lies in the brevity of the narrative of the fables and the lack of an explicit vocabulary expressing the protagonist's choice of a course of action and its implications. Besides, the collection's presents isolated stories and not the full ethical life of a protagonist, or even episodes from such a life. Furthermore, the *epimythium* represents a form of second-order reasoning, albeit outside the narrative. See, for example, P24:

> When a starving fox saw some bread and meat that had been left in the hollow of an oak by some shepherds, he entered it and ate them. His stomach got swollen and he was moaning and wailing, because he could not get out. Another fox who was passing by, heard his moans, approached and asked what was the reason [*for his moans*]. When he learned what had happened he told him: "So you should stay here until you are as thin as when you entered, and thus you will get out easily."

There is a sequence of reasoning in this fable. At the beginning, the fox's hunger (λιμώττουσα) and the presence of food provide the motivation for her to follow a particular course of action (to go and eat the bread and meat, ταῦτα εἰσελθοῦσα κατέφαγεν). This first-order reasoning is not followed by a reflection on the implications of this action. It is described as if it simply follows the instinct of hunger. The fable is more interested in a rapid presentation of the chain of events than in an explicit and detailed description of the motives and reflections involved.

The reaction of the fox to his suffering also involves first-order reasoning: he laments because he cannot get out of the hollow (ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἠδύνατο ἐξελθεῖν) and not because he thought about the fool-

[16] Ibid., 73–4.

ishness of his initial choice. The reply of the other fox offers first-order reasoning on the proper course of action to be chosen. It is in the *epimythium*, outside the story, that second-order reasoning is given, which, however, chooses to comment that time heals difficulties.[17] The *epimythium* isolates an interpretation of the fable and its message often differs from the one that the fable points out (as noted on pp. 7–8 above).

The collection's description of the reflections behind action is not always as incomplete as in this example. Quite often, the fables describe the choice of an action as deliberate and deriving from a conscious engagement with a role (see IV.1.5 below). Even when the description is not as categorical as this, there is a word (usually a participle, e.g. λιμώττουσα in P24) that indicates the motivation behind the action and gives indirectly the agent's first-order reasoning.[18]

Fables are usually limited to first-order reasoning. This is so, because of the practical dimension of their messages. Practical thought is pre-eminently first-personal, it contains only first-order reasoning.[19] There are, however, a few fables in which second-order reasoning appears in the form of a reflective phrase by the suffering agent or a comment by a passer-by.[20] These phrases reflect on the goals and implications of the protagonist's action (second-order reasoning), thus forming a guide for the reader's future action in communal engagement; in this way, they allow the application of the "objective-participant conception" of the person in Gill's model. Fable P132 offers a good example of this second-order reasoning inside the fable:

> A hunting dog saw a lion and chased him. However, as the lion turned and roared, the dog ran back scared. A fox who saw him said: "you fool, you chased a lion, although you could not even stand his roar".

The fox's criticism at the end of the story is a reflection on the goals and implications of the dog's action (second-order reasoning), namely that he has been ridiculed for not possessing the inner strength needed to chase a lion; it forms a lesson for future use by the reader,

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[17] "The fable shows that time resolves difficulties" (ὁ λόγος δηλοῖ ὅτι τὰ χαλεπὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ὁ χρόνος διαλύει).

[18] E.g. words that indicate physical needs, such as hunger and thirst, and envy. See pp. 76–7 n. 82 below.

[19] Williams (1985), 21.

[20] See II.5, p. 77 below.

namely that one should weigh well both his and the opponent's capacities before facing him.[21] The role of the fox is that of an intermediary between the plot and the reader; the fox observes the protagonist's action, comments on it and presents the reader with the fable's message. The fox is also a sort of a reader *inside* the fable, standing outside the action and commenting on it.

Nevertheless, the second-order reasoning usually follows a fable's narrative and is not placed inside it, as in the above fable. It is articulated in the *epimythium*, but, more importantly, it may also be articulated by the reader of the fable or its user (for example, an orator) who draws his conclusions about the rules that operated in the first-order reasoning of the fable's protagonist; it is also the reader or user who places the fable's message in the context of his participation in a social group and is helped by it to determine the course of action he should take (see pp. 37 f. above).

The rarity of second-order reasoning in the fable itself should not be surprising. The Greek fable was not a high and complex form of art, capable of delivering a deeper insight into concepts or a highly articulated debate over issues of Greek thought. According to Hegel "its notions are only witty, without any energy of spirit or depth of insight and substantive vision, without poetry and philosophy".[22] To conclude, the *Augustana* provided its user with a stock of exemplary stories that could be used in the field of daily practical ethics, in which the user would have to maintain a balance between self-benefiting and other-benefiting actions and to choose the proper course of action according to the situation. The fables illustrated first-order reasoning on human action which facilitated second-order reflection on social practice.

II.2 *Lessons on Survival*

> An oak-tree and a reed were disputing over their strength. When a strong wind began to blow, the reed avoided being uprooted by bow-

[21] Note the limitation of fable's message to slanderers (συκοφαντεῖν) in the *epimythium*: "this fable would suit those arrogant men who, trying to slander those who are much more powerful, get thrown off at once, when the latter oppose them".

[22] Hegel (1832–45), 497.

ing and yielding to the wind's breaths, while the oak-tree resisted and was uprooted.

The above fable (P70) offers a clear and brief illustration of one of the most prominent themes in the *Augustana*, namely how to survive. The plot is quite simple. The fable is an agonistic one, because it demonstrates a sort of contest between the figures (ἤριζον).[23] Being plants, they cannot engage in a physical conflict, so the test of strength is supplied by an external factor, a strong wind that starts blowing and encounters their resistance.

The wind enacts a second contest, between it and the two plants. The fable endows the reactions of the plants with will; they are represented as not being subject to the wind's force, and their motions are voluntary. The words chosen to describe the movement in the scene are suggestive of such voluntary movement: the oak-tree "stands against" the wind (ἀντιστᾶσα), while the reed "bows up and down" (ἀνακλώμενος) and "bends with the wind" (συγκλινόμενος). The reed conforms to its blows and survives. The oak-tree chooses to resist them and is, therefore, destroyed.

The result of the contest against the wind offers both the outcome of the initial dispute on which plant is the strongest and the fable's message: the reed is the strongest of the two plants, for strength does not involve only physical power, but also the ability to survive in any circumstances. It is often not the external qualities that suffice for survival (that is, the oak-tree has a more robust material and is much bigger than the reed), but rather the ability to conform and retreat in front of the powerful.[24]

In the *Augustana* survival matters most.[25] In fable P39, the swallow gives up any attempt to persuade the other birds of the danger of bird-limes being used by hunters, for they do not listen to her. She decides to become man's suppliant, so she leaves the other birds and lives close to men. As a result, she survives and nests under man's protection, while the other birds, who were warned but scorned

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[23] A contest between trees takes place in P439 (Call. *Iamb.* 4.6 f., fr. 194 Pfeiffer). On Callimachus' fable see Van Dijk (1997), 237–50.

[24] Compare the view that god loves cutting down what excels, including the high trees in Hdt. VII.10 (similarly in e.g. A. *Pers.* 532–4, 827–8). See also the related issue that sudden changes may occur and, therefore, even the greatest might fall in III.3.5, pp. 139–40 below.

[25] Cascajero (1991), 36–8; id. (1992), 59. See also P245, 261, 447, 457; Pr. 108, 141–2, 168.

her, are hunted by the use of bird-limes. Foreseeing the future and submitting to the stronger's power guarantees survival. The fable criticizes the other birds for their failure to prove themselves as thoughtful as the swallow did.[26]

Fable P60 demonstrates the high valuation placed on life in the *Augustana*:

> Once an old man had cut wood and had been carrying it for a long way. Since he got tired, he threw the load to the ground and was asking the help of Death. But when Death appeared and asked why he was calling him, the old man answered "so that you lift the load".

It is easy for the reader of this story to think of an old person in suffering asking for the end of its physical pains. Besides, old people are generally regarded as having come to terms with the idea of death.[27] The present fable makes use of the audience's familiarity with these images from daily life. The old man's pleas sound as a normal old person's grievance. Nevertheless, as Death appears in person in front of him, the old man turns his previous wish into a pun. The joke lies behind the expression "so that you lift the load" (ἵνα τὸ φορτίον ἄρῃς), which may also mean "so that you lift my body". It is a game of words to fool death, who had been invited to enact the last meaning of the expression.[28]

Therefore, when things get serious, people will always seek a way to survive. Another fable, which resembles a zoological observation, informs us that the beaver, when chased, might cut off his own genitals so that he will run faster and save himself (P118). That is, he will deny the means of continuing his species in order to save his existence. Sacrificing what one values most is another way to survive.[29] The *Augustana* describes various ways to achieve survival.

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[26] On P39 see Karadagli (1981), 151–2; Rodríguez Adrados (1979c); id. (1982).

[27] See Elias (1985).

[28] A similar statement is made in E. *Alc.* 669–72, namely that old men ask to die but when death approaches they appreciate life again. Cf. Cascajero (1991), 52, who takes the Euripidean passage to be an allusion to P60. Contra: Van Dijk (1997), 654. See also entry for 'φορτίζω' ('φορτίον') in *LSJ*.

[29] Cf. Ael. *NA* 6.34, Apul. *Met.* I.9. See also Burkert (1983), 68 f.; Van Dijk (1996), 519; id. (1997), 6 n. 19; Schumacher (1992). Herodotus in IV.109 notes that the beaver's genitals are used in Scythia as a remedy for hysteria. This information could be the linking point between the imaginary and the real behind the beaver's reported act of survival: hysterical people are thought capable of harming themselves, a self-damaging behaviour that was transferred to the behaviour of the animal that produced their remedy. In other words, an animal whose genitals cure

Submission to the power and will of the stronger is one of them.[30] Like the reed that had to acknowledge the wind's supremacy, the fox recognizes the lion's supremacy and his right to the biggest portion of the prey and survives (P149, p. 66 below). Sometimes, it is the strongest who reminds the weak of this law of survival, as in "the wolf and the heron" (P156). The wolf had promised to pay the bird if it used its beak to take out a bone that had stuck in his mouth. This done, the heron asks for its reward and the wolf points out that having come intact out of a wolf's mouth is big enough a reward.

The success of the physically weak over the physically strong is a remote possibility in the collection. When such a thing happens, it is thanks to the craftiness of the weak (e.g. P3, 79).[31] The usual outcome is that the physically stronger antagonist succeeds in a physical conflict with a weaker one. The imbalance of physical strength sets the rules for survival and success for both the weak and the strong. The weak one knows that it is usually hopeless to fight against the strong and that obedience should be preferred as a course of action. The strong opponent, on the other hand, knows that he should pursue his immediate interest and exert his power at any given opportunity (e.g. P4, pp. 58–9 below).

The *Augustana* advises the immediate satisfaction of one's interests in the field of daily action. The fisherman's response to the sprat's pleas to let it go now that it is small, in order to catch it in the future when it will have grown in size (P18), is identical to the hawk's response to the nightingale (P4): "but I would be the biggest fool if I left the profit that I have in my hands and chased a hope that is not yet manifest". The *Augustana* negates hopes for the future and

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hysteria should be capable of a hysterical act, such as cutting off its own genitals. Burkert (1996), 47–8, analyses this belief about the beaver—which is also etymologically interconnected in Latin, where the word 'castor' is used for 'beaver' and the verb 'castro' means "to castrate"—in terms of ritual and the belief that partial sacrifice (i.e. castration) offers in return the salvation of the whole.

[30] That the weak should yield to the power of the strong was a common one in Greek thought. E.g. Pl. *Grg.* 483c–d; id. *R.* 338c–e, 358c–d. See also P368, 443, 450, 452; Pr. 92, 128. By the term 'power' I mean "the ability of individuals or groups to make their own interests or concerns count, even when others resist. It [power] sometimes involves the direct use of force", Giddens (1997), 338.

[31] Cascajero (1991), 38, 48–9; id. (1992), 53–6; Davies and Kathirithamby (1986), 24. See also IV.1.3 below.

asks for immediate action and pursuit of one's interests (e.g. P126, 133–4, 148, 158).

The pleas or arguments of the weak to escape death at the hands of the strong are empty words, because the strong will destroy the weak if this is in his interest. The cat looks for a pretext to eat the cock (P16). She accuses him of making noise at night and having intercourse even with his own mother and sisters. He refutes her by arguing that he does so in order to serve man (to wake him up and give him eggs respectively). The cat's last argument is that "if you have enough excuses for everything, does that mean that I will not eat you?". The argument of the strong is similar in P155 (pp. 59–60 below). The strong will even break any agreements he made beforehand, if these go against his interests (e.g. P149, 156). The general conclusion of the collection is that the weak should avoid conflict with their superiors, especially if they do not have the qualities for coping with such an engagement (e.g. P132, 144, p. 171 below).[32]

Fable P159 offers a striking exception. In this, a wolf tells a sheep that if it says three true statements he will let it go unharmed. The sheep says, first, that it had not wanted to come across him, secondly that it did so because it was blind, and, thirdly, that it wishes that "all the evil wolves may face the worst death, because you always fight us although we have not caused you any harm". The fable concludes that the wolf acknowledged that the sheep told the truth and let it go. The *epimythium* also notes that "many times the truth has power even over enemies". Nevertheless, the exceptional outcome of this fable might be explained if one reads a curse behind the sheep's third argument. This phrase contains certain characteristic elements of the Greek curse: its force to destroy its receiver and his kin, the formula κακῶς ἀπόλοισθε, the acceptance that the sheep is right in his complaints and therefore its curse is strong.[33] So the dissuasive potency of the curse might be the real motivation behind the wolf's departure. Furthermore, the fable's beginning makes it clear that the wolf was full (τροφῆς κεκορεσμένος) before meeting the sheep. That is, a major motivation for a predator, hunger, was absent and he could afford to enter a debate with its potential victim and to lose it.[34]

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[32] See Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.171–2.
[33] See Watson (1991), 5–7, 33–8.
[34] Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.519–20 claims that the wolf obeys a sense of justice.

"Action and not words"—and especially prudential action—is a motto that complements the collection's stock of guidelines for survival. This is the message in the case of the rich Athenian who prays to Athena to save him from drowning after a shipwreck (P30). One of the other survivors who swims nearby, rebukes him: "together with Athena's help, move your hand as well".[35] Similarly, in P211 a boy who drowns in a river asks the help of a traveller who passes by. Instead of assisting the boy, he starts criticizing him for having entered the river at first place. The boy answers: "help me now, and after I am saved you can criticize me".[36]

Prudence is another means of survival (e.g. P93, 192, 199). Custom may also help by promoting compromise with an unpleasant situation that one has to face, but it may equally prove to be disastrous, when one persists in the usual and refuses to adapt to the changing circumstances (e.g. P10, 69, 204; see pp. 62 f. below). On the whole, the collection's messages constitute a series of practical lessons on how to survive under unfavourable situations. The collection usually describes conflicts characterized by imbalance of power, which often end in the defeat of the weak and offer a dissuasive message on the sort of action to be avoided. Survival might be difficult for the fable's physically or mentally weak protagonists, but it will be easier for the reader who learns from their sufferings.

II.3 *The Fulfilment of Personal Interest*[37]

II.3.1 *The Need for Immediate Action and the Issue of Καιρός*

Most of the points discussed in the previous section point to the same idea: that the choice of the right course of action in every situation is a guarantee of success and survival in life's uncertainties. A single momentary choice might prove disastrous or successful. The course of action that is chosen is important not only in terms of whether it is the right or the wrong one, but also in terms of timing. The fable's narrative leaves no room for any lapses of time.

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[35] On the proverbial allusions of P30, see Rodríguez Adrados (1978b), 46.

[36] Action instead of words also appears in proverbs: Zen. VI.28 *CPG*; Greg. Cypr. I.90 *CPG*.

[37] See Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.193–4.

Action in the fables seems immediate, instant.[38] Since the collection's ethics promote the pursuit of personal interest, it follows that the protagonist's actions in such a pursuit must be immediate. Indeed, a group of fables explicitly advocate the immediate satisfaction of personal interest. The fable of the hawk and the nightingale is a good example (P4):

> A nightingale was perched on a tall oak and was singing as usual. When a hawk saw her, he swooped down and seized her, because he was in need of food. The nightingale, being close to death, begged him to let her go, saying that she was not [*big*] enough to fill a hawk's stomach; if he needed food, he should go after the bigger birds. And he answered: "but I would be the biggest fool if I left the profit that I have in my hands and chased a hope that is not yet manifest".

The fable's plot is similar to its famous Hesiodic original: the nightingale, trapped in the hawk's claws, fails to persuade the predator to spare his life (see p. 14 above).[39] What distinguishes this version from Hesiod's, is the hawk's reply: ἀλλ' ἔγωγε ἀπόπληκτος ἂν εἴην, εἰ τὴν ἐν χερσὶν ἑτοίμην βορὰν παρεὶς τὰ μηδέπω φαινόμενα διώκοιμι. This statement of the need to satisfy one's interest immediately comes as an answer to the nightingale's argument that the hawk should go for a bigger bird which would give him a richer prey. In the Hesiodic *ainos*, on the other hand, the hawk's reply is that the force of the stronger prevails over the pleas of the weaker and that the weaker makes a fool of himself simply by trying to dissuade the stronger (although Hesiod rejects such behaviour as unjust).[40] It looks as if the compiler of the *Augustana* chose to justify the hawk's insensitivity to the nightingale's pleas on the argument that he who has the upper hand should immediately satisfy his interest—in this case hunger—and that it would be foolish to look for future and uncertain gains when one has something, no matter how big, already at hand.

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[38] See Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.217: "Car le paradoxe du temps de la fable, c'est que son action ne semble pas demander du temps: elle paraît momentanée!".

[39] Ibid., 500, sees no direct link between the two versions.

[40] On the differences between the Aesopic fable and the Hesiodic *ainos* see Dalfen (1994–5); Daly (1961b), 46; Van Dijk (1997), 127–34; Ford (1965), 3–4; García Gual (1976), 309; id. (1978), 184; Lasserre (1984), 82 f.; Puelma (1972); West (1978), 204–5. Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.444, on the other hand, thinks that the two stories have the same message. The nightingale in Greek thought: Thompson (1936), 16–22. The hawk in Greek thought: ibid., 114–18.

The same message is found at the fable's *epimythium*.[41] This fable also runs counter to Nøjgaard's view that the author of the collection seeks above all to promote the need for justice by offering a negative portrayal of injustice. If this was his main wish, then why did he not take advantage of the use of the specific *ainos* in Hesiod, who mentions it as an example of the strong's unjust behaviour? The answer lies, I think, in the practical character of the collection's ethics. The collection seeks to bring out a practical message, that quite often the essential thing is the satisfaction of the agent's interest, irrespectively of his ethical status or of any claims to justice as a concept.[42]

The same advocacy of the immediate satisfaction of the protagonist's interest is apparent in other fables too (P16, 18, 133–4, 148, 155). Some of them demonstrate how thoughtless it is of someone to neglect an opportunity to satisfy his interest for the hope of a bigger future gain (P18, p. 55 above). The usual outcome of such behaviour is the complete loss of any gain and the ridicule of the vain protagonist (P133, P134, p. 132 below). In P148, for example, the lion is about to eat a hare, when he sees a deer in the distance. He leaves the hare and chases the deer, which manages to run away. He returns to find that the hare has gone and the fabulist warns the reader of the calamities that come from postponing the immediate satisfaction of personal interest in the hope of future gain: "I suffer justly, because I left the prey that I had at hand and preferred hope".

In other fables, the stronger animal is defeated in debate, but proclaims that despite his verbal defeat he must satisfy his interest and, consequently, he will devour the weaker animal (P16, p. 56 above, P155). In these fables, the typical argument is "but since you have some right arguments, am I supposed not to eat you?".[43] This is so in P155:

> A wolf saw a lamb that was drinking from a river and wanted to devour him using a reasonable pretext. So he stood upstream and

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[41] "So too those who dismiss what they have at hand for the hope of greater things are fools."

[42] See Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.519–25; id. (1984), 234–6. On justice see III.3.1 below.

[43] The narrative then ends, but the tone of the question implies that the weaker animal is devoured.

> accused him of muddying the water and deterring him from drinking. When the lamb answered that he drinks using the tip of his tongue, and that it was impossible anyway that he, who was standing in a lower part of the river, could be muddying the water for someone who stands in a higher part, the wolf, having failed in his accusation, said: "Nevertheless, last year you abused my father". As the lamb answered that he was not one year old yet [*and therefore was not born then*], the wolf told him "if you have so many answers, am I not going to eat you?".

It is illustrated from the beginning of the story that the wolf's true intention was to devour the lamb. He could have devoured the lamb without any pretence whenever he wanted. Instead, he starts a debate. In other words, he leaves the field of his physical superiority and enters that of mental contest, against the collection's precondition that a fable figure cannot be strong at both the mental and the physical levels. As a result, he loses the mental contest. Besides, the wolf's arguments are false; they are invented by the wolf to justify his real natural needs. Therefore, they were easily refuted by the lamb. Being unable to compete at the mental level and with his pretensions exposed, the wolf resorts to physical strength and exercises his natural predatory needs. The message is that you should satisfy your personal interest.[44]

The notion that underlies many of these fables is that a prerequisite for a successful action is that it matches the καιρός, a word that in the *Augustana* means both 'time' and 'condition'. The ethical agent should seek the timing and conditions that best guarantee success for his action. The idea of action in accordance with καιρός was a prevalent one in Greek thought and once again the *Augustana* presents us with an idea that cannot be limited to a single phase of Greek culture but rather runs through its history.[45] Some fables point

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[44] The *epimythium*, on the other hand, criticizes the wolf as a wrongdoer: "the fable shows that for those who intend to do wrong a fair defence has no force". Cf. pp. 7–8 above, on the differences between the messages that are drawn from the fable and the *epimythium*. Furthermore, there are two fables, in which the stronger protagonist is persuaded and lets the weak one go (P150, 159). See p. 56 above, pp. 125–6 below.

[45] In the *Augustana* καιρός appears, in the narrative or in the *epimythium*, as 'time' or 'season' in P3, 111–12, 169 and as 'condition', 'situation', 'conjuncture' or 'opportunity' in P15, 54, 61, 97–8, 112, 172, 234. In Greek literature the most prevalent meanings of the word refer to 'time', 'due measure', 'opportunity'. See A. *Ag.* 787; id. *Ch.* 710; id. *Pr.* 507; Anaxarchus fr. B1.28–30 DK; Ar. *Ec.* 576; Arist. *Rh.* 1382b11; D. 3.16, 20.44; E. *IA* 800; Hdt. VIII.144; Hes. *Op.* 694; id. *Th.* 401; Pi.

(often quite sarcastically) to the negative effects of an action which fails to match the right timing or conditions (P11, 114, 169, 233). In P233, a man buys a swan to listen to its renowned beautiful song. The bird, however, did not sing while it was alive despite the man's appeals to do so. However, it started singing when it forecasted its death. The man comments that he should have threatened the swan with death beforehand in order to listen to its song. The fable points both to the man's imprudence and to the importance of selecting the right course of action according to specific conditions.[46] In P11 a fisherman plays the pipe and sings, expecting the fish to come out of the sea and listen to him. Of course they do not, so he leaves the pipe and resorts to the use of the fishing net. As he sees the fish wriggling in the net, he sarcastically comments that they are dancing at the wrong time.[47]

In P169 a profligate (ἄσωτος) young man has sold everything he had inherited from his father, apart from a cloak. Seeing a swallow who has appeared earlier than her normal season (παρὰ καιρόν), he interprets it as a symbol of spring approaching, which gives him an excuse to sell his last possession, the cloak. As winter keeps on, colder than before, the now freezing young man sees the swallow lying dead on the ground and accuses her of destroying both him and herself with her early appearance. The main messages are the disastrous consequences of profligacy and imprudent action (he should not have trusted a single swallow to reach conclusions about the changing seasons). But the ill-timed appearance of the swallow is also responsible for the disastrous chain of events that followed.[48]

In contrast to the other fables, in which the example is negative,

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P. 4.286; id. *O.* 8.24; Pittacus of Lesbos fr. 10.3 DK; Pl. *Plt.* 277a; id. *R.* 374c; S. *El.* 1292, 1368; Th. II.34, IV.27. Cf. the entry for 'καιρός' in *LSJ*.

[46] On the famous swan-song see e.g. A. *A.* 1444–6; Diogenian. V.37 *CPG.* Contra: Pl. *Phd.* 84e–5b. See also Thompson (1936), 180–3.

[47] The connection of P11 with the issue of καιρός becomes evident from the context in its Herodotean original (I.141). The Herodotean version is the oldest prose fable in Greek literature. On it see Van Dijk (1997), 270–4; Hirsch (1985); Karadagli (1981), 23; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.40–1.

[48] The *epimythium* too comments on the insecurity of action that is ill-timed (πᾶν τὸ παρὰ καιρὸν δρώμενον ἐπισφαλές ἐστιν). See also the proverb that "one swallow does not bring the spring" in Diogenian. V.12 *CPG* and the expression "new swallow" signifying deceit in Appendix IV.4 *CPG.* On the swallow as a symbol of hope, indicating the coming of spring in the "swallow-songs": e.g. fr. 848 *PMG*; A. fr. 450 Radt; Ar. *Th.* 1. Cf. Bowie (1993), 158; Burkert (1983), 180 f.; Thompson (1936), 319–20.

P172 gives a positive example of the benefits that result when the protagonist is capable of adjusting his course of action to changing circumstances. A bat is twice seized by a different weasel who is about to eat her.[49] The first time she survives by persuading the weasel (who argued that it is in her nature to eat birds) that she is not a bird, but a rat. The second time, the weasel argues that she is going to eat her because she hates rats. The bat answers that she is a bird, not a rat, and she survives again. The bat survives because she adapts her identity to the arguments for her death given by her captor. Grasping the proper opportunity and satisfying one's interests is a major theme in the collection, illustrated through exemplary stories of successful or ineffective action. However, this theme should not be studied in isolation in the *Augustana*, but should be included in the collection's broader nexus of practical messages concerning prudential action that leads to success and survival.

II.3.2 *Custom*

> When men saw a camel for the first time, they ran away scared and terrified by its size. As time passed, though, they grasped how mild-tempered it was and gained enough courage to approach it. Then, as they realized, little by little, that the animal had no anger, they despised it to the extent of putting reins on it and giving it to their children to ride.

The above fable (P195) is indicative of the value that custom has in the *Augustana*. Custom is antithetical to the immediate satisfaction of personal interest. It promotes passivity instead of action and compromise when the circumstances are unfavourable. When the first impressions discourage any action, custom may offer an alternative route to diminish the initial hesitations or fears and to make action possible through a gradual progress of familiarization in time and space. Similarly, in the above fable a series of temporal markings (πρῶτον—χρόνου προϊόντος—κατὰ μικρὸν) and motions (ἔφευγον—προσελθεῖν) highlights the transition from fear to familiarization and the resultant approach to the beast. The process of familiarization culminates in the taming of the beast and its subordination to man. As surface impressions are blunted by custom, they give way to rea-

[49] On the translation of γαλῆ as 'weasel' see Benton (1969). On weasels see ibid. and Borthwick (1968a) and (1968b).

soned action instead of instinctive reaction; the initial flight at the sight of the beast is replaced by the knowledge (συνεῖδον) that the beast is mild and harmless and by the consequent contempt and taming.

The same can be said about fable P10. There is a similar description of repeated, and gradually less fearful, encounters of a fox with a lion, an animal that the fox had never seen before. Finally, having got used to the lion's physical appearance, the fox manages to find the necessary courage to approach the beast and converse with it. The difference from the previous fable is that the lion does not become an object of contempt, maybe due to its physical strength and its status in the animal world.[50]

These fables have a common message: that custom brings us to terms with terrifying situations; it helps to make them less terrifying and thus renders action possible.[51] A variation on this theme is that even when things are simply disagreeable and not terrifying, custom may help one to compromise with an irksome reality. This is the case in P204, where a rich man moves next to a tanner. He cannot stand the foul smell and asks the tanner to move to another neighbourhood. The tanner keeps postponing his move, until finally the rich man gets used to the smell (ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενόμενον τῆς δυσωδίας) and is not bothered by it any more. The fable illustrates an unexpected situation: a rich man moves next to a tanner.[52] Being rich, he could afford to live in an area of 'higher' status. The fable describes such an unusual proximity in order to stress the importance of custom as a soothing factor in unpleasant situations, including the most extraordinary ones. It also brings together two opposed poles (in terms of aesthetic and financial status) in a social group.

The above fables illustrate the positive aspect of custom, when it helps someone overcome his fears and difficulties and proceed to decisions over his present situation and his future moves. In this respect, custom is not antithetical to action in accordance with καιρός, but it can be seen as a version of it which teaches to transfer action

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[50] On the lion's status in fables see Pugliarello (1973), 83–96.

[51] The *epimythia* of both fables point to this message with an almost identical phrasing (τὰ φοβερὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἡ συνήθεια (μεγάλως) καταπραΰνει).

[52] The phrase is πλούσιος βυρσοδέψει παρῳκίσθη. It does not clarify whether it was a tanner's house or workshop. Because of their foul smell, tanners' workshops were outside the city and their owners had to live close to their work. See Burford (1972), 77–80.

to the future when the circumstances will be more favourable. Nevertheless, there is a negative aspect too, when custom promotes passivity and negation of change. The collection often describes the uncertainty and fickleness of life (pp. 139–40 below); therefore, one must be on constant alert and prepared to face any situation. In this context, custom may become a negative factor by disabling the fable's figure from being on alert for any possible future disturbance of his daily routine, that is from being ready to observe and grasp the opportunities. In this sense, custom is opposed to action in accordance with καιρός. This is the message in fable P69:

> Two frogs were neighbours. One lived in a deep lake far from the road, while the other lived in a small pothole on the road. And every time the one who lived in the lake urged the other to come and live with him, in order to have a better and safer lodging, the latter was not persuaded and he argued that he was accustomed to his place and could not leave it; until it happened that a chariot passed by that road and killed him.

The frog's habituation to his lodging proves to be fatal. It prevents it from altering its environment, although it knows for sure that the proposed new lodging will be better and safer. The fable's message is that one should take his chances in life and seek a better future, especially when such a future is guaranteed, and that one should not stick only to what he is accustomed to. The fable, thus, presents the negative aspect of custom as a destructive encouragement of immobility.

As a conclusion, the *Augustana* describes custom as a favourable or a destructive force, depending on the way in which it is employed. This is due to the collection's realistic and polymorphous practical ethics, that is, its attempt to supply as many aspects of a single idea as someone normally confronts in his daily life. Once more, the collection exhibits a view that cannot be located to a single period of Greek thought, but seems to have been popular throughout the history of Greek thought.[53] But custom should not be treated as a predominant motif in the collection. It should rather be examined as

[53] On custom as both a positive and destructive concept in Greek thought see e.g. Ar. *V.* 508–12; Arist. *EN* 1154a22 f., 1179b20–1; id. *Rh.* 1369b6 f.; id. *Pr.* 928b24–5; Epicur. *Sent.Vat.* 46; Greg. Cyp. III.65 *CPG*; Pl. *Lg.* 655d–e, 792e, 797e–798d; S. *Ph.* 894; Th. I.123, II.16, VI.18.6, VII.67.2; X. *Mem.* III.14.6. See also P247, 366; Pr. 23.

one of a number of themes which indicate ways to achieve success and survival in the field of daily action. For example, the idea that custom helps one to come to terms with a disagreeable or fearful reality can be linked with the idea that everyone should be content with his lot and not try to alter it (such as "do not exceed your limits", "obey your superior"). So it can be argued that custom promotes conformity with one's unfavourable condition, a view that indicates the class-basis of the collection's ethics (see I.3.2 above, also the qualifications to this view in I.3.1, pp. 40–1 above). Custom is another means by which the socially weak and oppressed can reach an accommodation with their social position and abandon any efforts to change it.[54]

II.4 *Learning through Suffering and the Theme of Toil*

II.4.1 *Learning through Suffering*

The idea that one learns through misfortune is another prominent issue in the ethics of the *Augustana*. To conceive one's sufferings as a lesson for the future and not as a frustrating reality was a key issue in Greek ethics.[55] In the collection's framework of conflict and continuous need for survival, the lesson that derives from defeat and suffering is equally important to that derived from victory, both being practical messages. The message promises future success on the basis of a more thorough accumulated experience. On the narrative level, the fable's protagonist does not put into practice the lessons that come from his misfortunes. He simply acknowledges that he has learned his lesson at the end of the fable. Yet it is either too late, for he dies afterwards, or, even if the consequences of his mistake are not fatal, we never see him again in another fable demonstrating his knowledge.

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[54] However, the fable of "the rich man and the tanner" (P204, p. 63 above) points to a different social message, namely that concord between the classes can be achieved through custom. Nevertheless, the particular fable still admonishes conformity with one's situation and does not advocate the amelioration of the socially weak's condition.

[55] E.g. A. *Ag.* 177–8, 250–1, 533; Hes. *Op.* 218; Hdt. I.207; S. *OT* 403; Pl. *Phd.* 96a; Zen. II.14 *CPG*. See also P254, 467; Pr. 132–3. Another prominent view was that learning through suffering applied to the foolish; see Democr. fr. B54, 76 DK; Hes. *Op.* 216; Hom. *Il.* 17.32; Pl. *Smp.* 222b.

Nevertheless, on the post-narrative level, that of the apprehension of the fable by the reader or the audience, the fable gives the reader a cautionary example. Thus, the collection helps the reader to "learn through the misfortunes of the others" (i.e. the suffering figures). This message appears in P149:

> A lion, an ass, and a fox formed a partnership and went out to hunt together. After they had seized a lot of prey, the lion ordered the ass to share it out for the three of them. He made three equal portions and as he exhorted the lion to choose [*his portion*], the lion got angry, jumped at him and devoured him. And [*then*] he ordered the fox to share it out. The fox put almost everything into one portion, keeping only a small part for himself, and exhorted the lion to choose. He, in his turn, asked the fox who taught him to share in such a way, and the fox replied "the sufferings of the ass".

This fable illustrates how one can survive when confronted with someone stronger. The ass divides the quarry into equal portions (ἐξ ἴσου), for he interpreted that their hunting partnership (κοινωνίαν) entailed equal rights between all three of them in the division of the prey. Yet no equal division was possible, because there was no equality of physical strength among them. Being the strongest, the lion started and controlled with his orders (προσέταξε) a game of power. He thus tested his companions' consciousness of his superiority. The ass's equal division of the quarry amounted to questioning the lion's power and his right—based on might—to a bigger portion. Therefore, he had to devour him and re-establish his superiority.

When it was the fox's turn to express his opinion on the lion's power, he signalled his obedience by assigning the biggest portion to him. The answer of the fox at the question who *taught* him to share the prey as the lion pleased, was that he learned from the ass's *sufferings*.[56] In a way, the fox here articulates the function that the πάθει μάθος message has for the fable's reader: gaining experience not just from one's own sufferings, but also by carefully observing the others' hardships and avoiding to repeat their mistakes, a message to which the *epimythium* agrees.[57] The message is similar in P6 (p. 124 below). In this fable the wild goats experience the goatherd's

[56] ἐρομένου δὲ αὐτὴν τοῦ λέοντος τίς αὐτὴν οὕτω διανέμειν ἐδίδαξεν, ἡ ἀλώπηξ εἶπεν "αἱ τοῦ ὄνου συμφοραί".

[57] "The fable demonstrates that the others' misfortunes make men wise" (ὁ λόγος δηλοῖ ὅτι σωφρονισμὸς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις γίνεται τὰ τῶν πέλας δυστηχήματα).

neglect towards the tame goats, that he already possessed, as soon as the former arrived at his herd. So, they learn not to trust him and decide to leave the herd.

There is, however, a fable in which the protagonist learns from his own sufferings. In P207 a shepherd decides to sail across the calm sea and become a sea-trader. He encounters a storm and is shipwrecked. He survives, but loses all his merchandise, and returns to his old occupation. One day, when he hears someone praising the calm sea, his reaction is immediate: "Oh, my friend, she longs for your merchandise". His phrase indicates that he learned his lesson from his misfortunes and he now warns anyone who might repeat what he did.[58]

Fable P48 illustrates another dimension of the message that one learns from his sufferings. A bird (a *boubalis*) is singing at night.[59] A bat approaches it and asks its reasons for being a nocturnal bird. It replies that this is so, because once it was caught whilst singing during the day; since then, it was brought to sense (ἐσωφρονίσθη) by this suffering and turned to nocturnal singing to avoid being caught again. That is, it learned from its sufferings. But the bat comments that the bird should have been careful enough not to have been caught in the first place. This comment brings out another aspect of the πάθει μάθος message: it should not become a panacea, a condolence that will erase the fact that suffering resulted from a mistake. One should be prudent enough not to suffer at all, instead of suffering in order to take care in the future.[60]

Many fables furnish their accumulated experience to the reader by stressing the irreversible character of their protagonists' sufferings (P25, 74–7, 80, 86, 97, 115–16, 120, 128, 131, 147–8, 176, 181, 187, 203, 209, 234). In these fables, the lesson derives from the contemplative words that the defeated protagonist delivers at the end of the story. The usual formula in the first part of his words is "I

[58] Another message is that one should not attempt something different from what he knows or his nature dictates. A shepherd cannot be a sea-trader. Cf. II.5 below. Still, the πάθει μάθος message is also present in the fable's *epimythium* (οὕτω πολλάκις τὰ παθήματα τοῖς φρονίμοις γίνεται μαθήματα). The fable also reflects the general dislike of sea-trading in Greece, on which see Bravo (1977), esp. 24–5.

[59] *LSJ* and *DGE* translate βούβαλις as "an African antelope". However, Perry asserts that βούβαλις indicates a kind of bird, following Thompson (1936), 65. See Perry (1952), 340.

[60] Also pointed by the *epimythium*: ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι μετάνοια ἀνωφελὴς καθέστηκεν.

suffer justly/I deserve to suffer since . . ." (ἄξια/δίκαια πέπονθα . . .).[61] The second part of his words criticizes his action that resulted in his misfortunes and sums up the message of the particular fable, for example, "I exceeded my natural limits" or "my passion for pleasure destroyed me". Some of these phrases are uttered before the protagonist's death (P74–5, 77, 80, 86, 115–16, 128, 131, 139, 176). The fatality renders their message even more imperative and their example more cautionary, because it shows how ultimately disastrous a mistake might prove to be.

Finally, on the same theme that someone should admit his mistakes and learn from his sufferings, there is a set of fables which criticize those protagonists who refuse responsibility for their mistakes or failures and instead try to find various excuses (P15, 110, 167, 174, 232). In P110 a man spends huge amounts of money to make offerings to a family hero that he worships at home. The hero appears in the man's dreams and warns him to stop his extreme expenditure, because if he becomes poor because of it, he will not put the blame on himself, but will accuse the hero for not reciprocating his offerings. Man has to face his mistakes and correct them. The traveller is similarly reproached by Chance in P174 (pp. 174–5 below). The fly in P167 tries to turn her suffering into a matter of indifference to her (p. 153 below). In P232 a group of foxes stands by a rapid river, unable to drink from it out of fear of being swept away by its rapid flow. One stands out of the group, accuses the others of cowardice and enters the river which sweeps him to its middle and is about to carry him away. As the other foxes mock him by asking him to show them how they could also enter and drink, the suffering fox turns black into white; he replies that he cannot help them, because he is in a rush for an appointment and he will show them the way when he returns. Another fox in P15 demonstrates the same ability for self-deception, by distorting the truth:

> As a starving fox saw some grapes hanging from a vine that was trailed on a tree, he tried to reach them but he could not. As he was leaving he told himself "they are unripe".[62]

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[61] Occasionally the formula is "oh, poor me, who . . ." (δείλαιος / ἄθλιος / βαρυδαίμων ἐγὼ ὅστις . . .): P25, 74–6, 80, 86, 115, 128, 131, 147. This formula has a less self-critical content. It is the "complaining reply" (*la réplique plaintive*) in Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.169–70. Cf. Karadagli (1981), 119–27.

[62] See Dolby-Stahl (1988); Skillen (1992), 172–3. This fable has survived in the current saying "sour grapes".

The instances of the theme πάθει μάθος promote prudential action aimed at avoiding a disastrous repetition of the protagonist's mistakes. This message should be studied as one of many principles of practical ethics that constitute the rules for conflict and survival in the collection (such as "grasp the opportunity", "save your life at any cost"). In this respect, if the reader learns from the protagonists' sufferings throughout the collection, he stands a good chance of future success under similar circumstances.

II.4.2 *The Theme of Toil*

That toil is an inherent and inevitable part of human existence, is a very old theme in Greek thought from Homer onwards.[63] This idea is present in the *Augustana*, exemplified in the fable of "the ant and the beetle" (P112):

> During summer an ant combed the fields collecting wheat and barley, storing for himself food for the winter. A beetle saw him and said that he was astonished because of the ant's extreme labour, especially because he worked during the season when the other animals abandoned their work and were at ease. The ant remained quiet, but later, when winter arrived and the dung was washed away by rain, the beetle went to him starving and begging him to let him share his food. The ant replied: "oh, beetle! If you had worked back then, when I was working and you were reproaching me, you would not need food now".

The fable of the ant and the beetle preaches the value of work and prudence.[64] It stresses that work is necessary for survival, that the

[63] On the view of human life as being full of toil and pain and on the idea that goods come only through labour see Hom. *Il.* 1.467, 4.230, 5.811, 17.446–7, 19.227, 21.525, 24.527–33; id. *Od.* 14.417; Hes. *Op.* 42–9, 101–5, 176–7, 299–307, 470; Thal. fr. 10.3 DK; Heraclit. fr. 84b DK; Democr. frs. 182, 223, 242 DK; Prodic. fr. 2.28–30 DK; Pi. *P.* 6.54, 12.28; id. *O.* 8.7; Hdt. VII.24, IX.122; A. *Ch.* 921, id. *Pr.* 66, 541; S. *Aj.* 473–4, 866; id. *El.* 231 f., 945; id. *OC* 1211–38; id. *Ph.* 637–8, 1418–22; id. *Tr.* 125–8, 1101; E. *Hipp.* 189–90; id. *IA* 161–3; id. *Med.* 1224–30; id. *Or.* 1570; Pl. *Lg.* 846d; id. *R.* 526c; [Pl.] *Ax.* 366d–9a; X. *Mem.* II.1.28; id. *An.* VII.6. On the issue of work and idleness in Greek thought see Balme (1984); Burford (1972); Dover (1974), 112, 163; den Boer (1979), 28; in fables: Cascajero (1991), 40; Nestle (1937). See also P438; Pr. 12, 36, 48, 70, 167; S21, 42.

[64] The *epimythium* stresses the importance of prudence (προνοούμενοι), in the form of provision for future prosperity: "so too those who do not make provisions for future prosperity suffer most when the times change". In Greek thought the ant mode of living exemplified hard and organized labour as well as wisdom and foresight. See Davies and Kathirithamby (1986), 38–40, 43–4.

idle are punished and that labour pays off, especially when done for the future.[65] Nevertheless, work as a general idea does not normally figure in the collection. When the theme of work as a means of survival appears (P42, 119, 212), the reference is to specific occupations (agriculture, cattle-raising) and the consequences for those who practise them.

Certain fables deal specifically with human intervention in the production of natural resources. Fable P42 illustrates the benefits from agricultural work. Here a farmer is about to die and wants his sons to become good farmers. So he calls them and tells them that a treasure is hidden under one of their vines; after that, he dies. The sons dig the land and find no treasure, but, as the fable comments, they are compensated by the rich crop that they get. A first message from the story is that the earth pays back many times the amount of human labour spent on it. But this message can be generalized as regards labour and wealth. Wealth comes through hard work; therefore, labour is a sort of treasure in life, which is the message of the *epimythium* (ὁ κάματος θησαυρός ἐστι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις).

Nevertheless, fables P102 and P119 offer a more negative picture of human intervention in nature and its exploitation for man's needs. P102 is an aetiological fable on the perishable character of human existence and the grief that accompanies its end. After Zeus created man and woman, he ordered Hermes to take them to Earth and show them where to dig in order to make a shelter. At first, the Earth refused to co-operate and to lose part of herself for mankind's sake. But, when Hermes reminded her that this was an order from Zeus, she consented saying: "let them dig as much ground as they like; they will pay it back with their laments and tears". The ground that the Earth lost is repaid by men turning into ground after they are buried. The Earth made it clear that its exploitation would be reciprocated by tears and moaning at the end of every man's life. Digging the earth is described here as a form of violent intervention, which is against the Earth's will.

In P119 a gardener is asked why the wild garden-herbs[66] are bigger and looked more vigorous than those cultivated by man. His answer is that for the former the earth is a mother, while for the

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[65] On the resemblance between this fable and the story of Amphion and Zethus in Euripides' *Antiope* see Borthwick (1967), 41.

[66] See entry for 'λάχανον' in *LSJ*.

latter she is a step-mother.[67] Gardening is a human intervention in nature, therefore it is characterized by artificiality and its value is secondary to the natural products.[68]

There is also a group of fables in which the figures belong to a specific professional group, such as fishermen, farmers, shepherds, astrologers, magicians, doctors, traders, and artisans (P5, 8, 18, 29, 40, 49, 51, 56–7, 99, 103, 114, 120, 161, 170, 204). In these fables the presence of a member of a professional group sometimes offers the narrative setting for the plot (a fable with a fisherman usually takes place in the sea, e.g. P11, 18), but the message from the story is unrelated to that profession or to work in general. But many such fables are limited to the ridicule of a particular profession (e.g. P40, 161).[69] No general thinking and message on the concepts of toil and work appears in these fables.

The collection's material on toil and work is too limited to allow these to count as major themes. Nevertheless, the subject gains importance when seen as part of the practical message of the *Augustana*. In the collection's framework of conflict and survival, work, and toil offer another prudent way to success. The image of work as an action that involves toil but will some day be repaid is similar to the more general description of human action as something which needs patience, planning, careful steps, cunning, and strength, but which, in return, enables one to succeed and survive in a hostile world.

II.5 *Respect Your Limits*

The interpretative categories discussed as regards the struggle for success and survival point to the existence of certain limits to the protagonist's field of action. The theme that action, especially by the weak, is restricted by both the protagonist's natural capacities and by his opponent's corresponding abilities is a recurrent one in the

[67] The theme, but not the fable, also occurs in the *Life of Aesop* 35–7 (G). See Van Dijk (1996), 521.

[68] Yet fable P119 might be carrying a more general message, on the superiority of the natural over the artificial, an idea that can be drawn back to the Sophistic antithesis between *nomos* and *phusis*.

[69] See Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.161f.

Augustana.[70] The limits that the collection sets can be grouped in three categories:

(a) The protagonist's personal distinctive qualities and abilities; these consist predominantly of physical qualities such as speed or predatory skill; inner qualities, such as inner strength, are rare (e.g. P132, see p. 171 below), with the exception of the intelligence that the prudent character has (see IV.1.4 below).
(b) The circumstances under which action takes place, which include the opponent's capacity and a possible imbalance of strength (physical or mental).
(c) The protagonist's natural field of action; this includes his natural environment (e.g. a sea-animal should not strive on land) and his 'kin', the social group in which he belongs by nature (e.g. ravens, crows).

With regard to the protagonist's natural qualities and abilities, the general message is that he should not attempt action that his nature does not allow. However, it is interesting to note that the Greek word for nature, φύσις, is conspicuously rare in the collection. It occurs in the fable of "the lion and the dolphin" (P145, p. 98 below). When accused by the lion for not assisting him in his battle against a bull, as the alliance that they had formed obliged him to do, the dolphin justifies himself arguing that it is nature (φύσις) that should be blamed for his lack of assistance, because it has made him a sea creature that cannot step on land. The word 'nature' here indicates the external factor that endows the protagonist with his personal abilities and qualities. The word also occurs in fables P50 (p. 78 below) and P84 (p. 94 below); yet, in P50 it seems to refer to natural 'form' rather than qualities (Aphrodite transforms the weasel back to her old form, "εἰς τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν ἀποκατέστησεν"). As for P84, the word *phusis* refers to the natural characteristics of the place in which the plot unfolds. *Phusis* and cognate terms appear mainly in *epimythia.* We are told that those who want things that are against their natural abilities suffer at the end (παρὰ φύσιν P184); that not everyone is equipped by nature to do everything (οὐ πάντες πρὸς πάντα πεφύκασιν P91); and that the wicked by nature do not change (οἱ φύσει πονηροί P50). The absence of this term from the narrative could be interpreted as another indication of the collection's lack of

[70] See Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.625–9. In addition to the *Augustana* fables that are discussed in this section, see also P268, 358, 461; Pr. 53.

analytical or 'philosophical' thought and of the 'popular' character of its ideas (see I.3.2 above).

Sometimes an animal pays a heavy price for demanding more than his nature allows. In P117 the camel is punished by Zeus for asking to have horns like the bull. The god gets angered because she is not satisfied with her own size and physical strength, but asks for more (εἴ γε μὴ ἀρκεῖται τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῇ ἰσχύι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περισσοτέρων ἐπιθυμεῖ). Not only does he reject her demands, but he also removes part of her ears.[71] In P184 the ass dies as a result of his efforts to change his natural abilities and become sweet-voiced. Envying the beautiful voice of the cicadas he asks them to reveal their secret to him. They reply that this is so because they feed on dew. The ass tries to follow the same diet, but he starves to death.[72] In both fables failure to conform to one's natural abilities and the attempts to change them are disastrous.

The theme of natural limits is related to that of conflict and survival for respecting limits is another way to survive. For example, some animals are predatory by nature. This implies that they possess a set of qualities and techniques which enable them to succeed in their natural role as hunters. A group of fables depict the fixed character of these natural limits and the disastrous consequences that occur when they are trespassed. See, for example, fable P2:

> An eagle flew from a high rock towards the ground and seized a lamb. A jackdaw saw him and, driven by envy, wanted to imitate him. So he flew downwards with a great rush and tried to lift a ram. However, his claws got entangled in the fleece, and he kept beating his wings being unable to fly away, until the shepherd, who noticed what was going on, came up and seized him. And after he cut off his strong wings, as the night was coming, he took him home [*as a gift*] for his children. When they asked what kind of bird that was, he replied: "I surely know that he is a jackdaw, but he wants to be an eagle".

The jackdaw's activities are a common source for ridicule and an opportunity for criticism in the collection (P101, 123, 126, 129, 131).[73] In this particular fable the jackdaw provides a cautionary example

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[71] This is an aetiological fable about the small size of the camel's ears.

[72] The fable can also be linked to the ass's frequent portrayal as foolish. See Pugliarello (1973), 84–5. Plato also reports (*Phdr.* 259c–d) that cicadas live and sing eternally because they are fed on dew. See Davies and Kathirithamby (1986), 123–4; Van Dijk (1997), 328, 646–7; Karadagli (1981), 181–6.

[73] Pugliarello (1973), 98.

of the consequences that follow when somebody goes beyond his field of action and his natural abilities. The reason for the jackdaw's arrest and humiliation lies in his desire, driven by envy (διὰ ζῆλον), to imitate the eagle's hunting skills, in other words to enter and play a role (that of the hunter) which is not natural to him. His efforts are doomed to failure, because the jackdaw lacks both the natural abilities and the knowledge of the techniques of a bird of prey. The shepherd stresses the jackdaw's self-deception and denial of his natural role: he knows that the bird is a jackdaw, though the bird pretends to be an eagle. There is also a tragi-comic aspect in the depiction of the jackdaw's hunting enterprise: a small-sized bird that whirls in a hissing sound and tries to lift a disproportionally bigger animal with its small claws. It even tries to outdo its model for mimicry: the eagle lifted a lamb, the jackdaw will lift a ram. The fable is quite realistic in its portrayal of the eagle's hunting skills, which are mirrored through their imitation by the jackdaw. The eagle attacks in a hissing sound from high cliffs, digs his claws in his victim's skin and lifts it.[74]

The need for the protagonist to respect his natural distinctive qualities and abilities and the disastrous effects of any attempts to imitate or appropriate other qualities, are themes which are repeated in many other fables (e.g. P83, 91, 97, 125, 187–8, 203, 232). For example, the ape who attempts to imitate the fishermen's techniques and get some fish (P203) and the crow who wants to share the appreciation for the raven's divinatory abilities (P125) both pay the price for transgressing their natural limits and attempting to enter a role that has not been theirs.[75] The ape ends up trapped in the nets and is seized by the fishermen, while the crow is chastised by some passers-by, who hearing her cries comment: "let us go, friends, it is just a crow; her cries carry no omens".[76] Similarly, the kithara player

[74] The word for the hissing sound, the rush of the wings (ῥοῖζος; see entry in *LSJ*), is also used in a destructive context in P113 (p. 115 below). See Pollard (1977), 77–9. The jackdaw's claws are too weak: Thompson (1936), 155.

[75] On the ape's grotesque and incompetent imitation of human actions, see Lilja (1980), 37; MacDermott (1935), 166, 175–6. Fable P125 may hint at the popular contempt for the crow's divinatory abilities when compared to the raven's. See also fables P127, 162, 236. See Pollard (1977), 25–6, 127 and Zen. I.67 *CPG*. On the crow see Austin (1911), 308–9; Bowie (1993), 155; Pollard (1977), 25–7, 127; Thompson (1936), 168–72; Zaganiari (1974). See the restoration of the crow's value as a prophetic bird in the fable Dio Chrysostom narrates in XXXIV.5.

[76] Luria (1929). See also P249.

in P121 (pp. 153–4 below) is punished for going beyond his natural abilities. The fable clearly states that he has no natural musical talent (ἀφυής). Nevertheless, he decides to give a concert only to be booed and humiliated by the audience.

Some fables demonstrate how fruitless it is to fight against a stronger or more skilled opponent is (P82–3, 104, 125, 132). They represent the second category of limits, those that refer to the conditions under which action takes place. See, for example, fable P82:

> An ass and a rooster lived in a certain farm. A hungry lion, as he saw the ass, was about to enter [*the farm*] and kill him. But he cringed from fear of the sound of the rooster who crowed—for it is said that the lions are afraid of the rooster's cockcrow—and ran away. The ass was all worked up against the lion, although in fact the latter was afraid of the rooster, and went out of the farm to chase him away. But the lion, when he got away from the farm, ate him up.

The reason for the punishment of the ass is not his ignorance of the zoological information that lions are afraid of a rooster's cockcrow.[77] It all goes wrong for him, since he misinterprets the lion's fear and is imprudent enough to take pride in his hunting abilities against the lion (ἀναπτερωθεὶς κατ' αὐτοῦ . . . ἐξῆλθεν ὡς ἀποδιώξων αὐτόν). The physically inferior ass should never even imagine chasing the mighty lion, let alone actually carrying out such an act.

The third category of natural limits are those set by the protagonist's kin or by the natural environment in which he must operate.[78] There are some fables that express how disastrous a change of natural environment can be. In P116, the crab abandons the sea and feeds himself at the shore. A fox perceives him and seizes him. As he is about to be devoured, the crab comments that his sufferings are deserved; he is a sea creature and therefore he should not have attempted to become a creature of the land (δίκαια πέπονθα, ὅτι θαλάσσιος ὢν χερσαῖος ἠβουλήθην γενέσθαι).[79] In P139 the sea-gull is

[77] For the belief that lions were afraid of the rooster's crows, see Hambroer (1966); Pollard (1977), 180; Thompson (1936), 41–2. This belief is the basis of a fable in Ach. Tat. 2.21. See Van Dijk (1996), 525.

[78] This theme is further discussed in the chapter on friendship, III.2.1 below. However, it also belongs to the theme of respect for the natural limits for action, because for the animals in the fables their kin is at the same time a social bond that involves relationships of amicable reciprocity and a naturally imposed limit for action, because by nature certain species cannot co-exist.

[79] On the crab's amphibious nature see Thompson (1947), 105.

criticized for his change of environment. He had swallowed a fish that pierced his throat and killed him. A kite sees him and comments: "Well, you got what you deserved, because although you were born a bird you fed yourself from the sea". The sea-gull is, of course, a sea bird. However, the fable points to the disastrous effects of the combination of two spheres of action by this bird, the sea and the air.[80] The message of respect for one's limits for action entails maintenance of one's social role and position and negates the possibility of social mobility. The framework for action that the protagonist's kin sets is a variation of the limits that the protagonist's natural environment raises. The fable protagonist belongs to a specific group and should not leave it to join another. For example, the jackdaw is the protagonist who betrays his own kin twice in the collection, only to be subsequently rejected both by his kin and the species he tried to enter (P123, 129).

The message that everyone should respect his limits is often articulated through fables that result in punishment of him who does not abide by this rule in all its three versions. It is often stressed that it was the protagonist's own will, his personal choice, to abandon his natural limits.[81] Or his actions are described as the results of his jealousy, which forces him to try to attain certain natural qualities or abilities that others possess.[82] In general, it is wrong and disastrous

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[80] There might also be a hint here of the voracious nature of the sea-gull. See Ar. *Nu.* 591, where the sea-gull is used as a metaphor for the greed of the demagogues. Cf. Thompson (1936), 193.

[81] E.g. through the various forms of the verb βούλομαι ("to want", P2, 83, 117, 125) or ἐπιθυμέω ("to desire" P230). Cf. IV.1.5 below.

[82] The key-words are ζῆλος, μίμησις, φθόνος, βασκανία, in various forms (P2, 81, 83, 91, 97, 100, 117, 125, 163, 184, 203). Furthermore, there is the key phrase that the agent "wanted to attain the same things" with the object of his envy (ἐβουλήθη τῶν αὐτῶν ἐφικέσθαι P83, 117, 125, 173; see also P203, 230). The *epimythia* sometimes suggest that certain qualities and abilities simply "did not belong" to the suffering agent (τοῖς μηδὲν προσήκουσιν P139, 187, 203). The word φθόνος (resentment) usually had a negative meaning, while ζῆλος had a positive one. In the fables, φθόνος keeps its negative connotations, because it involves negative feelings for the person who is envied (P81, 83, 91, 100, 117, 125, 163), while ζῆλος is not associated with any feelings at all, but simply indicates the desire to attain what someone else has (P2, 184). Nor is it positive, however, because its consequences are as disastrous as those from ζῆλος. The Greeks believed that it was natural for man to be envious, but they distinguished between strife as a fruitful motivation, in a competition to outdo the others in excellence, and as a disastrous one, in an attempt to destroy one's fellowmen. For envy and jealousy in Greek thought see e.g. Arist. *Rh.* 1387b22, 1388a30; Hdt. III.30, VII.236–7, IX.71; Hes. *Op.* 11 f., 195; Hom. *Od.* 18.18; Pi. *P.* 1.85, 11.29; Pl. *Phlb.* 47e, 50c; id. *Lg.* 679c; S. *OT* 1526. For a

to envy someone for an ability or quality that one has not been granted by nature and to try to attain it through imitation.

Punishment for the transgression of one's limits for action might be physical or verbal (the protagonist is rebuked). It often comes from a god, usually Zeus (e.g. P106, 117, 163, 166. Cf. III.3.5 below). When it is not the gods, the opponent undertakes the task of punishing the protagonist for not respecting his limits (P82–3, 91, 123, 129, 230). When the cautionary lesson does not derive from an external punishment (either by a god or an opponent) it is the suffering protagonist himself who articulates the message through a self-blaming comment at the end of the fable (P97, 116, 187, 203). The same might also be done by a third person, a passer-by, who criticizes the protagonist's imprudent behaviour (P2, 125, 132, 139).[83]

However, two fables illustrate a different example, namely that the protagonist is punished for *not* being able to exceed his natural limits. The first fable is that of "Zeus and the fox" (P107):

> Zeus, having admired the fox's prudent and cunning way of thinking, handed the kingdom of the irrational animals to him. Because he wanted to see if by having his luck changed the fox would also have changed his pettiness, he left a beetle in front of the fox's eyes while he was carried on a litter. But because he was not able to resist, while he was moving above everyone on the litter, he leapt out and tried to seize the beetle. Zeus was angered at him and brought him back to his original condition.

Having just appointed the fox as the king of the animals, Zeus decides to test if the fox's character is suitable for such a position. The test takes place on the moment of the fox's 'triumph', as he parades on a litter, standing higher than any animal as is suitable to a king. When he jumps off the litter to catch the insect, Zeus punishes him for his pettiness (γλισχρότης). His climbing up the hierarchy of power in the animal world presupposed that he would be able to rise above his natural drive to satisfy her alimentary needs through conflict with his future subordinates; he should overcome this drive, but he cannot. Thus, his jumping down from the litter symbolizes his fall from

detailed study of envy see Walcot (1978), 1–31. On jealousy in the fables see Karadagli (1981), 104–5. For other examples from the Aesopic corpus where jealousy and envy are condemned and punished see P260, 266, 269, 449, 454, 468; Pr. 44, 60, 81, 84, 98, 104.

[83] Or "le survenant" in Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.159–60.

a high position (rising above his animal instincts) down to his animal nature. He is punished precisely because he did not overcome the limits set by his natural drives.

Similarly to the fox, the weasel is punished by Aphrodite in P50 for not being able to escape her animal nature and adopt the human nature. The weasel falls in love with a young man and prays to the goddess of love to help her fulfil her passion by transforming her into a woman. The goddess responds to her prayers and transforms her into a beautiful young woman. As the transformed weasel sits with her lover in the bedroom, Aphrodite puts the weasel to a test: she throws a mouse in the bedroom and the weasel starts chasing it to eat it. So the goddess punishes her by transforming her back into a weasel.[84] Again the protagonist is punished for being unable to transgress his natural ways.

Still, both the above fables point to the same message with the previous categories, namely that there is no possibility of social mobility and exchange of roles, because of the unchangeability of one's natural qualities and the limitations for action, and consequently social position, that they set. Both the fox and the weasel were punished for trying to adopt a role to which they have not been entitled by their nature.

Scholars have stressed the inescapable character of the natural limits for action and have pointed out that in the fables there is no scope for a change of one's qualities and condition.[85] Some explained these examples of ineffective changes of roles and natural qualities as an indication of the 'conservative' character of the collection. They argue that the *Augustana* promotes the maintenance of the ethical agent's social status and that it denies any mobility among the social classes. In other words, the collection's main message is "be content with your lot and do not try to better it".[86]

The collection's messages, that there is no chance for one's natural situation to be ameliorated and that any attempt for a change of social role is doomed to failure, are strongly 'political' and class-defined (see I.3.2 above, also the qualifications to this view in I.3.1,

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[84] See Zen. II.93 *CPG*. Cf. Borthwick (1968a), 136–7; Rodríguez Adrados (1993), 5.

[85] Borthwick (1968a), 137; Cascajero (1991), 37–8, 48–52; id. (1992), 57; Van Dijk (1997), 173; García Gual (1976), 317–21; id. (1978), 197–8; Leibfried (1982), 34–9; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.48–51; Skillen (1992), 171.

[86] Gasparov (1968), 126–7.

pp. 40–1 above). They can be interpreted as promoting conformity and abandonment of the hope of social change by the weak. Everyone should stick to his own situation and avoid entering any sphere outside his field of action. Personal status and the social hierarchy must remain unchallenged.[87] The remedy for common people comes from prudential action that secures mere survival and not the amelioration of their living conditions. On the other hand, the collection's picture of social life as characterized by conflict and cruelty might reflect a sense of social injustice by inferior and oppressed groups in the Greek social hierarchy.[88]

The idea that no-one should exceed his natural limits, but that one should conform to one's naturally defined living conditions is both 'conservative' (because it promotes the maintenance of the social hierarchy and social roles), and 'practical' (because it is a message for practical use by the reader). It is close to the realism of the Platonic dictum that in life "we do what we are able to and not what we want to".[89] Or to Callicles' statement that natural justice consists in the strong's supremacy and domination over the weak.[90]

The view that one should stick to one's own was popular in Greek thought.[91] But, although its ideological consequences in the *Augustana* affected mainly the socially weak, it does also apply to the socially privileged. The wolf who fails to devour the lamb and the ass who is devoured by the lion are both punished because they fail to respect their natural limits for action (see P97, pp. 164–5 below and P82, p. 75 above), although the first animal could be termed 'strong' and the second 'weak'. The message has a general social application and favours social prudence (translated in the maintenance of the status of the different and unequal social groups).

The fables constitute stories about the results of the natural qualities (φύσις) of their protagonists. These stories refer, at the level of second-order reasoning, to their reader's social reality and experience and to the social conventions that operate in social life (the

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[87] The idea that one should not abandon τὰ οἰκεῖα ἐπιτηδεύματα (one's proper "ways of living", according to the entry for 'ἐπιτήδευμα' in *LSJ*) is found in the *epimythia* of P116, 139.

[88] García Gual (1976), 318; id. (1978), 198–9, 206–8.

[89] *Hp.Ma.* 301c4–6.

[90] Pl. *Grg.* 483d–4c.

[91] E.g. Hdt. III.17 f.; Pl. *Phdr.* 223d; id. *R.* 433a; id. *Lg.* 793d. Cf. Braund (1998), 167–8, 174; Dover (1974), 88, 269–71.

νόμος). The fable's practical lessons can be interpreted as attempts to impose the values of φύσις on νόμος. The lessons of the 'natural' consequences of the actions of the figures ('natural' because they are part of their nature, unavoidable and unchangeable by definition) are projected on to human society in order to confirm the validity of social conventions. So the need for the socially weak to conform to their living conditions and to the (conventional) rules of social life is justified on the grounds of the naturalness of social injustice, as it can be seen from the world of fables. In other words, the powerful must keep on ruling in society because "might is right"; or "look, the lions will always rule over the asses, because this is the natural law, like in the Aesopic fable, in which . . .". The fable's simplicity made its messages more easily understood and accepted by the Greek common man (compared, for example, to a philosophical analysis; see I.3.1–2 above).

The message of respect for one's limits should be studied in relation to the other messages of the collection, such as the value of moderation and prudential thought (IV.1.4 below), the destructive results of passions, and the manipulation of amicable reciprocity (III.2.1 below). All these messages point to the same idea, the importance of careful action, the maintenance of one's social status (expressed through the need for survival) and the evaluation of action not in terms of ethics but of practicality and personal interest.

CHAPTER III

RECIPROCITY IN THE *AUGUSTANA*

III.1 *The Norm of Reciprocity*

Recent work on Greek ethics has emphasized the importance of the norm of reciprocity.[1] Interpersonal and communal relationships can be interpreted as a network of mutual obligations that link individuals through reciprocal actions for benefit or harm. The norm of reciprocity is totally absent from scholarship on the Greek fable; it seems that scholars who occasionally discuss the ethics of the fable, such as Rodríguez Adrados and García Gual, ignore this interpretative category. However, reference to reciprocity offers a useful insight, both into the framework in which conflict takes place in the collection and into the moral standards that guide the protagonist's actions and lead to the production of the collection's ethical messages.

Reciprocity involves a voluntary exchange of goods and services between two or more parties. In essence, it poses the following demands to the ethical agent: to help those who helped him, to harm those who harmed him and not to injure those who helped him. Therefore, it has two main facets, a positive and a negative one. The first can also be termed 'amicable' reciprocity and it involves the repayment of gifts and favours, while the second can be termed 'hostile' and involves the repayment of injuries. However, the more widely used categorization is that of M. Sahlins, between 'generalized', 'balanced', and 'negative' forms of reciprocity; the first two belong to the amicable facet of the norm, the third one to its hostile. In the case of generalized reciprocity, the exchange is not simultaneous and the expectation of a future return is implied, although the procedure is supposedly disinterested (e.g. Hes. *Op.* 349–51). In balanced reciprocity there is a *quid pro quo* exchange; the giving party clearly expects a return of the benefit in a finite period of time. In both types of reciprocity, the failure to reciprocate disrupts the balance

[1] The term 'norm' refers to "rules of conduct which specify appropriate behaviour in a given range of social contexts", as in Giddens (1997), 583.

of the relationship and may generate justified demands by the party waiting for benefit (e.g. Hes. *Op.* 187–92, 342–60, 707–14). The value of the objects or actions exchanged in both generalized and balanced reciprocity is defined by the participating members in the relationship and it must be equal in relation to each one's capacities and abilities, but not necessarily alike in other respects.

Hostile reciprocity consists in the promotion of self-interest at the expense of the other party; it breaches the mutuality of the relationship because the agent takes something and gives nothing in return. Hostile reciprocity involves the *lex talionis*, the repayment of the harm by harm often of identical value (i.e. the murderer must be murdered, the arsonist's house burned etc.). The categorization proposed by Sahlins will be used in the present analysis of reciprocity in the *Augustana*.[2]

As a practice and a central value in social relationships, reciprocity was dominant in the pre-state period of Greek political history, that of the Archaic chieftains. In these social formations, power and the institutions that supported it and controlled its application were dependent upon interrelated social groups, such as the chief, his kin and group of supporters, or the aristocratic families. Reciprocity as a norm ensured the undisturbed continuity of the existing hierarchy of power and the maintenance of social cohesion, by making the members of the various groups dependent on mutual obligations. During the process of formation of the Greek *polis* as a form of social organization, reciprocity was to some extent replaced by the social ideal of solidarity among the citizens as a guarantee for the stability and flourishing of the collective interest, of the city as a whole. But reciprocity remained a norm in social life, especially in the framework of support between friends and vengeance between enemies.[3]

Indeed, reciprocity operated at the very heart of many frameworks of social life in the Greek *polis* from the Classical period onwards. It was mainly present in social interaction, acting both as a starting

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[2] See Sahlins (1974), ch. 5. Cf. Malinowski (1950), 176–94; Gouldner (1973), ch. 8; Gallant (1991), ch. 6; Watson (1991), 42–3; Seaford (1994), ch. 1; Gill (1995), ch. 3; Burkert (1996), 129–34; Braund (1998), 159–61; Donlan (1998), 51; Seaford (1998), 1; Van Wees (1998); Zanker (1998), 88–9.

[3] See Seaford (1994), ch. 1 and (1998), 1–7. Cf. Gouldner (1973), ch. 8; Von Reden (1995), 79–81; Van Wees (1998), 29. On reciprocity as a factor in interpersonal relationships in Classical Greece and onwards and on related Greek passages see Blundell (1989), ch. 2; Gallant (1991), ch. 6; Seaford (1994).

mechanism for interpersonal relationships and as a stabilizing factor for social cohesion. On the one hand, an initial favour could initiate a series of interdependent reciprocal actions, thus establishing relationships between the citizens. On the other hand, reciprocity in the *polis* promoted solidarity by placing the citizens in an interlocking relationship with the centralized collective authority of the *polis*, for the citizens' actions and interests were bound up with civic institutions and the proper functioning of the latter relied upon the prosperity of the majority of the citizens. Collective welfare and the undisturbed function of the civic institutions guaranteed personal (the citizen's) interest, and the latter's prosperity benefited the city (e.g. through the *leitourgiai* imposed on him).[4]

Reciprocity in Greek social life dominated the content and the behaviour associated with friendship and enmity. Greek discussion of friendship was articulated through a terminology that emphasized the ideas of debt and obligation for repayment among friends and enemies, epitomized in the motto "help your friends and harm your enemies". Reciprocity among friends also involved placing value in the ideas of loyalty, courage, and trustworthiness. Being able to help a friend demanded constant preparation for support, which should better be offered in times of danger and misfortune rather than of prosperity. Friends were a means of protection in poverty and adversity. This led to the belief that the more friends one had the more secure he was against his enemies. Therefore, utility and being trusted to help when needed characterized a true friend.[5]

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[4] See Gouldner (1973), 239–51; Seaford (1998), 6–8; Van Wees (1998), 25–8; Whitehead (1983). On *leitourgiai* see Millett (1998). Cf. Donlan (1998) who states that the idea of mutual benefit between the leaders and the people was not invented by the democratic ideology, but is already present in the Homeric epics.

[5] On friendship generally see Arist. *EE* 1234b18–46a25; id. *EN* 1155a3–72a15; Pl. *Ly*. 212b–22d. On mutual support between friends see Arist. *EE* 1237b12–8a16; id. *EN* 1155b31–6a5, 1171a21-b28; id. *Rh*. 1361b36–7; Democr. frs. 99, 101, 106–7 DK; D.L. I.98; E. *Hec*. 984–5; id. *HF* 1425–6; id. *Or*. 1155–7; Epicur. LS 22.E–F, H-I; Lys. 30.33; Pi. *Pae*. 2.20–1; Pl. *Ep*. 8.352e; id. *Ly*. 212d; id. *R*. 334e; Pythag. fr. D.9.18–21, 25–6 DK; Th. I.24 f.; X. *Hier*. III.2–3, IV.1, XI.15; id. *Mem*. II.9.8, III.6.2, II.12.4. Cf. Blundell (1989), ch. 2; Dover (1974), 181–94; Ferguson (1958), 53–67; Gallant (1991), ch. 6; Konstan (1997), chs. 1–2; id. (1998); MacIntyre (1985), 122–3; Osborne (1994), ch. 6; Pearson (1957); Price (1989), chs. 1, 4–5; Vlastos (1991), ch. 7. On reciprocity in guest-friendship (ξενία) see Herman (1987), 121 f. On the meanings of the word 'friend' (φίλος) that varied from friend to dear, member of kinship or anyone with whom established ties existed, see entry for 'φίλος' in *LSJ*. Cf. Arist. *EN* 1155b17–7b5, 1161b16–2a33, 1163b32–5b36; X. *Oec*. VII.1–4.

To achieve this continuous mutual devotion, assistance, and benefit, friendship was thought to need time and practice. Friends must become accustomed to each other and a good way to bring this about was by living together and getting used to each other. So Greek friendship included the idea of co-existence and sharing. As it was often claimed, "friends have everything in common", κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων. Sharing referred to a range of things, such as residence, daily experience, belongings, danger. It also referred to sharing hatred for an enemy. Just as one should help his friends and their friends too, he should also punish his own and his friends' enemies. Long-standing feuds were a common phenomenon in a *polis* relationship. Athens and the Athenians did not refrain from expressing their hatred of their enemies at every opportunity.[6]

Although there is much continuity in Greek attitudes to friendship, it is possible to mark certain historical stages.[7] The distinctive features of the Archaic period are indicated by the reflections on the unreliability of friends in the poems attributed to Theognis. These elegies reveal an intense concern for loyalty and trustworthiness as the paramount virtues of a true friend. This indicates a transition from the old certainty about the functionality of the reciprocal obligations among the aristocratic networks of friends and alliances to a disruption of this trust due to the social turmoil that characterized the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. and the gradual replacement of the aristocratic ideals, including those on friendship, by those of the rising democratic *polis*.

In the second stage, democracy brought with it a change in friendship networks from social institutions that promoted the interests of particular citizens and groups of citizens into social institutions under the control of the democratic institutions and ideology. The resulting ideological concepts were those of equality among friends, of mutual assistance and benefit and of the interdependence of citizens

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[6] On friends sharing everything see Ar. *V.* 345; Arist. *EN* 1157b5–8a10, 1159b31, 1167a22–b16; Pl. *Alc.1* 126b–c; id. *Lg.* 739c; id. *Ly.* 207c; id. *Phdr.* 279c; id. *R.* 424a, 449c. On the motto "to help one's friends and to harm one's enemies" see Sol. 13.5–6 West. Cf. Arist. *Rh.* 1367a19–20; id. *Top.* 113a2–3; Pl. *Men.* 71e. Cf. Adkins (1972), 55; Konstan (1997), 81–2; Vlastos (1991), ch. 7.

[7] Thgn. 61–5, 79–80, 337–8, 363–4, 561–2, 1087–90. On friendship as equality: Arist. *EE* 1239a1–6, 1242a9–11; id. *EN* 1157b36; Pl. *Lg.* 837a. On its value for social cohesion in the *polis*: Arist. *EN* 1155a22–31, 1169b3–71a20; id. *Pol.* 1287b25–35; X. *Hier.* II.11–15. See Connor (1971), chs. 1–2; Donlan (1980), 87–9; Konstan (1997); id. (1998); Osborne (1994), 144–6; Von Reden (1998).

on one another in an egalitarian framework. This diminished the opportunities for particular networks of friends to gain power at the expense of the other citizens and, thus, to threaten the very basis of the democratic ideology.

The final stage is that of the Hellenistic period, in which the institutions of the *polis* are partly replaced by those of the post-Alexandrian kingdoms and by Roman domination. The stress on frankness and honesty, which is a dominant theme in the discourse of friendship in this period, needs to be linked with the requirement by the royal courts of reliable counsellors. At the transitional point between the egalitarian view of friendship in the Classical democratic *polis* and the utilitarian view of the Hellenistic period stands Menander, who points to the need for mutual help among friends but also highlights the validity of character as a criterion for choosing a friend.

Reciprocity was also present in religion and interstate politics. The faithful made offerings to the gods expecting a favourable return by them. Furthermore, religious practice itself (i.e. prayers, sacrifices, offerings in general etc.) constituted a reciprocal act in return for the gods' benefits to mankind.[8] As for the political sphere, although relationships between groups of citizens based on reciprocal sets of duties were a threat to the power of the *demos*, the norm of reciprocity often guarded the relationships between the various city-states (it was a feature of Athenian politics in particular). Greek diplomacy gave a pivotal role to the obligation of the city to repay previous favours and failure to do so was often condemned.[9]

The above frameworks in which reciprocity operated in Greek social life, will also be the frameworks to consider with regard to its operation in the *Augustana* fables. The following parts of this chapter will discuss, in connection with the norm of reciprocity, the collection's portrayal of co-operation and of political processes, such as elections for a king of the animals (III.2.2), the description of interpersonal relationships, especially those between friends and enemies (III.2.1, III.2.4), and the character of divine intervention (III.3.5).

The collection also provides material for exploring two issues in the ethics of reciprocity raised by scholars. The first issue refers to the debate about whether or not altruism formed part of reciprocal ethics

[8] See Bremer (1998); Burkert (1996), 134–8; Parker (1998).
[9] See Missiou (1998) and Pearson (1957), 228–30.

in particular and Greek ethics in general. A related question is whether the collection promotes behaviour based on self-restraint and generosity (III.3.2–3). The second issue is whether reciprocity is possible in unequal relationships (III.2.1, pp. 95 f. below).[10] Both issues will be discussed in relation to the fables of the *Augustana.*

III.2 *Reciprocity in the* Augustana

III.2.1 *Amicable Reciprocity: Friendship and Alliances*

Amicable and hostile reciprocity in relation to friendship is a frequent theme in the fables.[11] They usually illustrate failed or dysfunctional reciprocal relationships between friends and successful hostile retaliation between enemies. Fable P1 exemplifies these themes:

> After they became friends, an eagle and a fox decided to live close to each other, and thus to confirm their friendship through habit. So the eagle mounted on a very high tree where she gave birth to her chicks and made her nest, while the fox entered a bush under the tree and gave birth to her cubs. One day when the fox had gone hunting, the eagle, having nothing to eat, flew down to the bush, seized the cubs and devoured them with her chicks. The fox came back and when she saw what had happened she did not regret the death of her cubs as much as her inability to take revenge; because, being an earth-bound animal, she could not chase a flying one. So she stood at a distance and cursed the enemy, which is the only thing that remains for the incapable and the weak to do. But it happened that the eagle soon paid the price for her irreverence towards friendship. That is, when some people were sacrificing a goat in a field, she flew downwards and grasped some burning entrails from the altar; as she brought it into her nest, a strong wind blew and a thin and dead little piece of wood ignited a great fire. From this the chicks flared up (for they were not able to fly yet) and fell on the earth. And the fox run and ate them all in front of the eagle's very own eyes.

Friendship, its betrayal and the actions that occur from it are encapsulated in this fable. The eagle and the fox become friends; the expression that is used is φιλίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιησάμενοι, which

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[10] Braund (1998), 161–4; Millett (1998); Konstan (1998); Von Reden (1998); Van Wees (1998), 33–5, 46–7.

[11] See also P256, 265, 342, 370, 422; Pr. 2, 24, 41–2, 102, 109, 114, 129, 135, 170–2.

literally means "creating friendship towards each other".[12] Friendship between the fox and the eagle is something artificial, something they *create* (ποιησάμενοι); this artificiality is explained by the fact that amicable reciprocity is not the natural disposition between two predatory animals. The friendship between a land animal and a sky bird is unnatural for another reason: their natural environments are in two separate spheres, the land and the sky; therefore, in order to co-exist both will have to surpass their natural limits. Their agreement is a paradox from its very outset and the possibility of these animals living together causes tension; it predisposes the reader for the subsequent violence among them and for the failure of their amicable reciprocity. Their relationship of amicable reciprocity is dysfunctional and it is because of its enactment (the co-existence of two predators) that the consequent disaster occurs.[13] They decide to live in proximity, so that their daily companionship will make their friendship stronger. The Greek idea of a shared life as a component of the reciprocal relationship between friends is present here. The expression used is βεβαίωσιν φιλίας τὴν συνήθειαν ποιούμενοι, "making custom the confirmation of friendship". The vocabulary of artificiality appears again; they will have to *make* custom turn into a confirmation.

The story is structured by spatial ideas (such as 'high' and 'low'), which highlight the formation and disruption of reciprocal friend-

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[12] The versions Pb and Mb read συνθέμενοι and σπεισάμενοι respectively (see the *apparatus criticus* in P1). The readings ποιησάμενοι and συνθέμενοι stress the idea of an agreement, while the reading σπεισάμενοι offers a ritualistic meaning, namely that libations (σπονδαί) might have been offered as part of the beginning of friendship in Greece. In fact, libations were part of the ritual for guest-friendship (ξενία). See Herman (1987), 49. Φιλία is connected with the verb συντίθεμαι ("to agree on", "to conclude"). The verb σπένδομαι means "to pour libations one with another", and from this it came to mean "to make a treaty", because the offering of libations was a custom before any agreement or treaty. See both entries in *LSJ*. For the formula (φιλία) πρός + noun or pronoun + ποιοῦμαι, see the entry for 'φιλία' in *LSJ*. The formula appears in many fables to denote the parties that are in an amicable or hostile reciprocal relationship (e.g. P1, 35, 62, 145, 151, 171, 191). If the reading σπεισάμενοι is preferred, then the eagle's culpability is greater; he will be culpable both to the earth and the deities who received the offerings of libations. On divine intervention in the collection see III.3.5. Karadagli states that the original form was the φιλίαν σπεισάμενοι one (see P35, 145). In fables P149, 151, and 171, Perry reads κοινωνίαν . . . στειλάμενοι/ποιησάμενοι/στειλάμεναι ("they sent and asked for/made/sent and asked for companionship") respectively. According to Karadagli the reading σπεισάμενοι must replace all three of these readings. See Karadagli (1981), 101–2.

[13] The eagle was thought to be a natural enemy of the fox. See e.g. Ar. *Av.* 651–3 and Pollard (1977), 78–79.

ship. The eagle and the fox *enter* into amicable reciprocity and its obligations. They share residence by living in the *high* and *low* parts of a tree; the eagle nests on it and the fox in a bush by its roots.[14] They both give birth, which transforms their neighbouring nests into neighbouring households. Initially, their reciprocal relationship seems successful. The narrative does not describe their effective shared life as friends any further. Instead, it jumps straight to the betrayal of friendship.[15] Driven by hunger (ἀπορῶν τροφῆς), the eagle activates her predatory qualities and breaks the bonds of friendship. She flies *low*, seizes the cubs from their nest, then flies *high* to her nest and shares them for food with her chicks. The movement upwards and downwards throughout the fable coincides with the figures' movement in and out of their residence and metaphorically in and out of their reciprocal relationship that turns from amicable to hostile. The eagle's flight took place while the fox was *out* hunting. The fox, then, satisfied her natural needs away from her shared residence and respected the obligations for fellow-living, namely that of living peacefully with another predatory animal, bringing only mutual benefit and not harm. The eagle violated these rules and confirmed the dysfunctionality of this relationship. She flew with her prey *up into* her nest and *out* of her friendship with the fox.

The fox's reaction is revealing: it is not the death of her cubs that causes her grief, but her inability to avenge it. The breaking of friendship has made the parties move *out* of amicable reciprocity and *into* hostile reciprocity; the obligation for mutual benefit has turned into obligation for mutual harm and the punishment of the betrayer. The *high*—*low* distinction is now the obstacle to the fox's revenge.[16] She is a terrestrial animal who cannot chase a flying one or reach its nest. She can only curse (κατηρᾶτο) her former friend who has turned into an enemy (τῷ ἐχθρῷ), calling the supernatural forces to help her in her cause. The fable acquires religious connotations.[17]

[14] Although they usually nest on lofty places, such as cliffs, eagles were sometimes said to nest on trees. Pollard (1977), 78.

[15] The temporal adverb ποτε, "one day", marks this shift. This particular use of the temporal adverb should be distinguished from the frequent use of ποτε in the incipit of fables, on which see Van Dijk (1997), 363.

[16] This distinction occurs elsewhere in the *Augustana* (P98, 157). See Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.231–45.

[17] On curses see p. 136 below. These religious connotations are more evident in Archilochus' version, see fr. 177 West. See Van Dijk (1998), 209–10.

The eagle's betrayal of friendship is an act of impiety (ἀσέβεια) and is very soon punished (οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν δίκην ὑποσχεῖν). Punishment is enacted as the eagle flies *low* to a sacrificial altar and steals a burning entrails from it.[18] Her act of theft adds sacrilege to her betrayal of friendship and to the fox's curse, all of which demand retaliatory punishment. She flies *away* from the altar and back *into* her nest *high* on the tree, bringing the entrails *into* the nest to feed her chicks. Her amicable obligations as mother to her chicks are again accomplished by an act that violated amicable relationships (humans sacrificing to the gods).[19]

What follows is the reversal of the initial spatial disequilibrium. The eagle unwittingly carries her punishment *into* her household. Food turns into death, the object of theft into punishment, the security of the nest into a trap. Her chicks, who cannot yet fly and enter their natural sphere of action and superiority against the fox, fall *out* of the nest and its security *down* to the ground and *into* the domain of the fox's strength. Hostile reciprocity is then completed. The fox rushes (προσδραμοῦσα) to fulfil her vengeance. She did not witness the death of her cubs, but the eagle does see (ἐν ὄψει) her chicks' devoured, being unable to react. This visual aspect and the rush for vengeance render retaliatory violence more manifest and cruel. The fable's message is clear: those who betray friendship will soon be punished by one way or another. This is also the message of the *epimythium*.[20] But the overall image is pessimistic; it portrays a world in which amicable reciprocity is unattainable, because of its violation by the parties concerned, and hostile reciprocity replaces it as an effective way of handling social relations.[21]

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[18] Sacrifice signifies the sacred solidarity of humans, who as a group give up part of their goods (the sacrificial animal) and offer it to the gods in exchange for their blessings. The eagle's theft violates this symbolic expression of human solidarity. The sacrificial animal should go *up* to the sky, but the eagle (Zeus' sacred bird) flies *down* to it and prevents its ascension and violates his protector's (Zeus) and the other gods' reciprocal relation with men. On eagle as Zeus' sacred bird see Thompson (1936), 3–4.

[19] On the reciprocal aspect of sacrifice see Burkert (1996), 149 f.; Parker (1998), 106–8.

[20] "The fable's message is that those who betray friendship, even if they escape punishment from the wronged ones because of the latter's incapability, will not elude divine punishment."

[21] The fable of the eagle and the fox also appears in Archilochus as an αἶνος (frs. 174–181 West). It is very similar to the Aesopic version and is its oldest possible source. See Baldi (1961), 381–3; Davies (1981); Van Dijk (1997), 138–44,

The collection treats friendship and companionship quite often, though normally in less detail than in P1 (P35, 53, 65, 67, 68, 136, 145, 153, 196, 216, 239, 242). The description of friendship in the collection often takes the form of failed amicable reciprocity and successful hostile reciprocity. Friendship is sometimes phrased as a form of agreement between two parties (see p. 87 n. 12 above) who, without necessarily knowing each other beforehand, decide to become friends. A direct result of this is that they live together, whether this implies a common residence (P1, 35, 196) or travelling together (P65, 67).

Fables P65 ("wayfarers and bear") and P67 ("wayfarers and axe") express in different ways the Greek belief in the reciprocal content of amicable relationships, through two exemplary stories on companionship. They show that reciprocity is also a precondition for amicable relationships and that its violation is a good enough reason to dissolve the relationship.[22]

> Two friends were walking on the same street. When a bear appeared before them, the first one had time to climb a tree and hide there, while the other, being close to being caught by the bear, fell to the ground and pretended to be dead. As the bear moved her snout close to him and smelt him, he held his breath; for it is said that this animal does not touch the dead. When the bear left, the one who was on the tree asked him what the bear told him in his ear.[23] And he answered "not to travel from now on together with the kind of friend who does not assist in time of danger."

The fable's message (P65) is that friendship presupposes the readiness to support each other in hardship. It is in times of danger, not during happiness, that the true nature of a friend is manifest. Shared life between friends demands (apart from shared time, residence, and danger) the sharing even of possessions. In P67 two wayfarers are

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210–13; García Gual (1976), 319–20; Karadagli (1981), 13–14; Rodríguez Adrados (1964); West (1979).

[22] Aristotle includes friendship between wayfarers (ὁδοιπόροι) in the category of friendship that resembles a co-operative agreement, because it is based on a kind of contract. The same goes for friendships between fellow-citizens, the members of a tribe and guests. See Arist. *EN* 1159b25–63b28.

[23] I choose Perry's reading ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ δένδρου ἐπυνθάνετο ("the one who was on/from the tree asked") instead of the Pb version ὁ ἀπὸ τοῦ δένδρου καταβὰς ἐπυνθάνετο ("the one on the tree came down and asked"). Perry's reading emphasizes the wayfarers' cowardice, because he does not come down even though the bear has left. See the *apparatus criticus* in P65.

travelling together. One of them sees an axe and takes it. He refuses to share it with the second wayfarer. So when the original owners of the axe show up, angrily demanding its return, the second wayfarer refuses to share responsibility for his companion's action. The reciprocal character of friendship as shared life is again stressed, but now the other way round. Because someone did not *share* with a friend in happiness (i.e. the possession of the axe), he should not expect any help from him when he finds himself in danger. Once more, the collection uses an example of a failed amicable reciprocal relationship to underline the value of the ability and willingness to reciprocate.

Friendship is viewed by the collection as a sort of alliance based on mutual sharing, support, and benefit, that resembles the demands of balanced reciprocity.[24] Hence, the fable of "the lion and the dolphin" (P145), makes no clear distinction between friends and allies. It actually describes friendship and mutual help as preconditions for an ideal alliance. The lion and the dolphin agree to create alliance (συμμαχία) for "it is extremely proper for them to become friends (φίλους) and helpers (βοηθούς)" (for a detailed discussion of P145 see p. 98 below).

As regards the inner qualities of a good friend, he must be well-intentioned, and not sneaky, like the snake who refuses to share the crab's well-intentioned and simple ways. The crab is straightforward and kind in its ways towards the snake during their sharing of residence (ἁπλῶς . . . καὶ εὐνοϊκῶς προσεφέρετο). But the snake is insidious and tricky (ὕπουλός τε καὶ πονηρός). The crab keeps on asking him to imitate his honest ways, but the snake refuses. So one day the crab grabs the snake and kills it (P196). This fable offers another case of failed amicable reciprocity due to its mistreatment by one of the parties; this time, however, it is the fault of character rather than failure to act in a friendly way.

The modern Greek version of this fable offers a different reason for the snake's death: it tried to suffocate the crab while it was asleep. Megas finds this to be a more convincing justification than that of the snake's refusal to comply with the crab's moral demands. However, the idea that one should punish a malicious friend, even by death, has a parallel in Greek thought, again from the corpus of Greek

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[24] See Osborne (1994), ch. 6.

fables. The older version of the fable is found in Greek sympotic poetry and was probably the source for the *Augustana* version. It reads: "so spoke the crab, / holding the snake with his pincers; / the friend (τὸν ἑταῖρον) should be straight / and not thinking in an oblique way". Still, the modern Greek version provides a narrative addition that explains why things reached this dramatic culmination. A link between these versions might exist in Euripides' *Cyclops* 608–10. Richard Seaford in his commentary of the play prefers the translation 'tongs' (e.g. a smith's tongs) for καρκίνος and gives the following translation: "the tongs will grasp fiercely the throat of the guest-eater", explaining that the phrase is a comic reference to the Homeric simile of a smith dipping burning metal into cold water. However, this phrase might also reflect a current image of crabs as punishers of inappropriate behaviour in amicable relationships in relation to the aforementioned fable and the symposiastic fragment. The translation, then, would be that "the crab will grasp fiercely the throat of the guest-eater".[25]

The fables sometimes offer arguments for rejecting friendship which are based on inner qualities, namely the future friend's instability of character. So in P242 the hyaena's unstable nature (she was believed to change sex every year) is the reason the fox refuses her offer of friendship. Similarly, in P35 the satyr ceases to be friends with the man for a similar reason: he can bring both hot and cold air out of his mouth, which the satyr interprets to mean that his character and disposition are not stable.[26] Finally, in P136 a hare is seized by a hunting dog who licks and bites his quarry by turns. So the hare asks the dog to stop licking and biting him at the same time and

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[25] On P196 see Megas (1960), 196 f. Cf. Carmina Convivalia fr. 9 *PMG*, p. 892, on which see Van Dijk (1997), 150–2 and VD 6T1–3a. On *Cyclops* see Seaford (1984), 214. In Greece snakes were generally thought to be deceitful and insidious, e.g. Hdt. III.109; S. *Ant.* 531–2. On snakes in Greek thought see Garbe (1988); Pugliarello (1973), 111–25; Sancassano (1996). It is an oxymoron for the crab to ask for 'straightness' for crabs were characterized by their slanting movement. See Ar. *Pax* 1083. See also P322. On crabs see Bowie (1993), 95–6; Detienne and Vernant (1993), 308–13; Thompson (1947), 105–6.

[26] Aristotle cites three reasons for dissolving friendship. A friend's incurable corruption, a reason that refers to character; being deceived by a friend, which refers to both character and friendship's reciprocal obligations; and the preference of an old friendship, which refers to custom and use. See *EN* 1165a36–b36. All three reasons are reported in the collection, the third one in relation to alliances in general. See pp. 96 f. below.

to display stable behaviour; thus, he can figure out whether he is a friend or an enemy.

The collection is rich in examples of failed or dysfunctional amicable reciprocal relationships (P 6, 9, 17, 26, 29, 31, 39, 44, 52, 84, 90, 94, 101, 106–7, 145, 149, 153, 181, 191, 219–20, 238). The important question in the *Augustana* is this: "is the violation of amicable reciprocity wise or unwise?". Depending on the particular circumstances, which primarily involve the protagonist's personal interests, and the consequences of action, violation is proposed or rejected.

The principal motive for the exploitation of co-operative relationships is the pursuit of individual interest. For example, the goatherd in P6 breached his reciprocal obligations towards the goats (p. 124 below). The fox makes a promise of mutual support between herself and the billy-goat so as to get out of a well, but then violates it (P9, pp. 163–4 below). In the fable of "the fisherman who beat the water" (P26), the fisherman's profit prevails as a criterion for action over the collective interest and the demands for obligations towards the social group. A fisherman is asked by the residents around a river to stop beating the water and making it muddy because he thus renders it undrinkable for them. He answers back that if he does not do so, the fish will not fall into his fishing nets and he will starve instead. The reciprocal obligations for mutual support and benefit that the sharing of a place sets are violated in favour of someone's survival and interest. Social cohesion and common interest are problematic demands when individual interest is concerned and, thus, amicable reciprocity as a means of social coexistence and co-operation is proved dysfunctional.

Likewise, the nightingale in P39 prefers to save her skin by leaving the company of the other birds and attaching herself to the humans (pp. 53–4 above). This does not illustrate violation of the obligations for mutual support in a social group (the species of birds). The nightingale initially advises the other birds of their shared future danger from man's bird-limes, but they refuse to believe her. So she is justified in seeking shelter with the man. The fable's conclusion is that you should not stick to the obligations for mutual support for too long, especially when in danger. The issue here is not simply the need to respect reciprocal obligations in a social group but rather that of the proper duration and the limits of this respect. This respect in the *Augustana* is not unconditional. Amicable reciprocity is balanced and not generalized. It assumes that you must get something

in order to give. The main question is "what do I get out of the relationship?" and what one should give comes second and is usually not respected.

In P84 two beetles graze on the same place. They are in fact described as a 'friend' to each other (φίλος).[27] Aiming to ameliorate his living conditions, one of them goes off in search of a place with more food (dung). He promises that if he finds enough food there, he will return and bring some to his friend. However, as soon as he discovers such a place, he starts satisfying his own needs and forgets his promise. He returns, fat and vigorous, and is accused by his friend of breaching his promise. His reply stresses the priority of personal interest over reciprocal obligations for assistance: "do not blame me, but the nature of that place; because there it is possible to feed oneself, but impossible to carry any out from there". He does not apologize for himself, but shifts responsibility from his behaviour to the nature (φύσις) of his treasured place (see p. 68 above). His phrase implies that it is 'natural' to forget a friend when one is having a good time. The conclusion is both pessimistic and realistic: a friend might forget his promises and obligations as soon as he has satisfied his own interests.

The lion disrupts the equality between himself and the other two members of his hunting group when the time comes for the prey to be divided (P149, p. 66 above). In P191 a fox and an ass have formed a hunting partnership. When met by a lion, however, the fox approaches the lion and promises to surrender the ass to him if he lets her survive. She then leads her partner to a trap. But the lion, seeing that the ass cannot escape, seizes the fox first. There are two violations of reciprocal obligations here, first by the fox as regards her partnership with the ass, and then by the lion in his agreement with the fox. The fable's message is in line with the general portrayal of amicable relationships in the collection: inequality, either of physical strength or of personal interest, is a justification for dissolving the relationship. Inequality renders amicable relationships problematic.[28] It is also important that the fox is punished for her betrayal, while there is no comment on the lion's behaviour. He also acted out of preference for his interest, i.e. he chased the least guar-

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[27] On shared residence and friendship see p. 90 above.

[28] See Aristotle's category of friendship between parties of unequal status in *EN* 1158b11–9b2.

anteed prey first. However, the underlying message seems to be that, on the grounds of the hierarchy of power based on physical strength in the fables, the weak ones might not escape their violations unharmed, while the strong ones always will.

When amicable reciprocity based on dependence and inequality is respected by the stronger party, it is not out of obedience to the obligation to reciprocate, but out of a careful calculation of personal interest. In P215 the farmer rejects the offer by the thirsty wasps and the partridges to serve him in exchange for some water. He replies that he does not need their services, because he has his oxen working for him; he will keep them, instead of employing the bees and the partridges. But he stands by his oxen not out of return for their services, but because they serve him without asking for anything in return, even water. Their exploitation is the most profitable to him, because it is total, without even the slightest requirement of repayment.

All this intensifies the collection's pessimistic message: that there is no possibility of the socially weak ameliorating their position, for their social relations will be dependent on the will and interest of the socially superior. The weak should simply obey and keep their masters satisfied if they want to retain their current position; the alternatives are only worse. Even if they perform their part of the obligations effectively, the maintenance of their relationship is not guaranteed, as it is dependent upon the circumstances and the changes of the stronger party's interests. The utilitarianism, inequality and violation that characterize amicable relationships in the collection are class-significant. They represent, once again, the collection's promotion of conformity and a pragmatic approach (I.3.2). The physically—and consequently socially—weak may also apply these tactics to their relationships. For instance, both beetles in P84 lived in dung, they shared the same way of life and consequently the same social status. Nevertheless, as soon as one of them found more dung, he pursued his interests and violated his reciprocal obligations.

There are other criteria too for the starting and maintenance or violation of amicable reciprocity. Amicable reciprocity is impossible among parties that are *de facto* opposed to each other (e.g. between predatory animals or a land animal and a sky bird as in fable P1, pp. 86 f. above). So, for example, the charcoal maker's proposal to the fuller to share lodging and each other's company is rejected on the grounds that their professions are antithetical and forbid their

cohabitation (P29). Accordingly, the middle-aged man fails to maintain his love relationships with an old mistress and a young one (P31). The former pulls out his black hair to make him look older than he was, whilst the latter pulls out his white hair to make him look younger. Finally, he becomes bald.[29]

Another criterion for judging a future ally is to see how he has treated his former allies. It is justifiable to violate a reciprocal relationship of co-operation with someone, if he is known for betraying his former allies, to avoid a future repetition of his behaviour at your expense (e.g. P6, p. 124 below; P52). This is the argument of the wild goats in P6. In addition, the company that someone chooses marks out his character and consequently the behaviour to be adopted towards him. So the bird-catcher in P194 judges the stork to be worthless because of his companionship with the cranes. He caught him in his nets together with them. As the stork begs him to let him live, he replies that he deserves not to be spared because of his companionship with birds as wicked (πονηροί) as the cranes, and therefore he must be a worthless bird too (φαῦλος). Amicable reciprocity with someone vicious is a destructive factor.[30]

A final criterion for entering or violating an amicable reciprocal relationship is the character of the ally or the companion and his ability to assist in times of great need. The ability to assist as a precondition is in line with the collection's utilitarian approach to reciprocal relationships; it presupposes only the other party's obligations for support and benefit. Yet the other party's character is also analysed from a utilitarian standpoint: an ally or a companion should possess the inner qualities that are necessary in danger, courage, for exam-

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[29] The issue that the opposites cannot come to terms with each other runs contrary to the collection's message that custom brings together even those who are by definition opposed to each other. See II.3.2. Greek thought supported the idea that amicable relationships are impossible between those who are dissimilar in virtue and that it is only those resembling each other in virtue who come together. See Arist. *EE* 1235a4–28; id. *EN* 1155a32–9b24, 1165b17; Democr. fr. 164 DK; Diogenian. VII.63 *CPG*; Hom. *Od.* 17.218; Pl. *Grg.* 510b; id. *Lg.* 837a–b; id. *Ly.* 214a–d; id. *Phd.* 103b–4c; id. *Smp.* 195b; Stoics LS 57.A, E, H, 67.P; Zen II.47 *CPG*. See Rodríguez Adrados (1978b), 73. For the contrary view see Diogenian. III.55 *CPG*; Heraclit. fr. 10 DK; Philol. fr. 10 DK; Pl. *Ly.* 215c–6b. Fable P31 is also narrated in D.S. 33.7.6. See Van Dijk (1997), 283–4.

[30] See Democr. fr. 184 DK who states that companionship with the mean augments the ethical agent's vices. Cf. IV.1.1 on the destructive consequences from vices. The cranes' wickedness, however, is nowhere attested in Thompson's presentation of this bird in Greek thought. See Thompson (1936), 68–75.

ple, and a predisposition to assist. Fable P90 illustrates most of these preconditions for an effective partnership:

> An adder used to drink from a particular spring. But the water-snake who lived there was preventing him, being indignant with the fact that the adder did not limit himself to his land area, but was also visiting his. As the feud kept on growing, they agreed to have a battle and the winner would get both the land and the water areas to be his own. After they fixed the day, the frogs, driven by their hatred for the water-snake, went to the adder and encouraged him, promising to become his allies. However, when the battle started, the adder was fighting with the water-snake, but the frogs, being incapable of doing anything more, were croaking loudly. The adder, having won, accused them because, although they had promised to be his allies during the battle, they not only offered him no help at all, but furthermore were singing. The frogs replied: "but you know well, our friend, that our alliance consists not in hands, but in voices".

At first, the fable's figures are unable to live a shared life. There is no room for co-existence between the adder and the water-snake, because the water-snake demands dominance over his domain. Their fight for dominance in this agonistic fable ends, interestingly enough, with the adder's victory. The water-snake who refused to share is punished. However, the fable does not comment on this example of punishment of non-reciprocal behaviour, but it focuses on the alliance (συμμαχέω) between the frogs and the adder. The impulse for their promise (ἐπαγγελλόμενοι) to assist him is their hatred (διὰ μῖσος) for the water-snake, the product of natural hostile reciprocity (water-snakes feed on frogs, e.g. P44, p. 100 below).[31]

However, this alliance is dysfunctional from its very beginning, due to the frogs' natural inability to offer any physical support. Hence, when the battle starts, the alliance is proved ineffective. The adder marks out the frogs' violation of their reciprocal obligations (ᾐτιᾶτο αὐτούς/συμμαχήσειν αὐτῷ ὑποσχόμενοι/οὐκ ἐβοήθουν). The frogs justify their behaviour on the grounds of their natural abilities, which implies that one should judge a potential ally's natural qualities and ability for support in danger before entering into an amicable relationship with him.

A similar example is found in the fable of "the fox and the bramble" (P19). There, the bramble cannot assist the fox who grabs it as he falls down from a fence; he asks it to help him and save him

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[31] On hatred as motivation in hostile reciprocity see pp. 115–16 below.

from falling, but instead the bramble scratches him badly with its thorns. The fox accuses it of violating the rules of support and of worsening his condition instead of helping him, but the bramble's justification for its behaviour is based on character: "you are out of your mind, my dear, for wanting to cling to me, for I am accustomed to cling to others".

The ally's natural abilities are responsible for the failure of the alliance between the lion and the dolphin in P145. The lion proposes and forms an alliance (συμμαχία) with the dolphin. Being the kings of the land and the sea animals respectively (βασιλεύει), the lion expects that their alliance will render them invincible and benefit their power to the maximum degree. Their alliance implies mutual friendship and help (φίλους . . . καὶ βοηθοὺς γενέσθαι). Soon, however, the lion has a fight with a bull. He asks the dolphin for help, but the dolphin can do nothing but watch their fight from the sea. The lion accuses him for betraying (προδότης) their alliance, but the dolphin replies that it is not that he did not want to help, but his nature (φύσις) prevented him from assisting, because he could not get on the land. The fable provides another example of dysfunctional and failed amicable reciprocity which is grounded on inequality; this time it is inequality of natural abilities, which are shown as important criteria for choosing an ally.

III.2.2 *Political Fables*

The fable of "the lion and the dolphin" describes an alliance between kings. In fact, a group of fables in the *Augustana* provides examples to rulers on the proper administration of power through the use of reciprocal relationships. To these we must add the fables that describe the issue of elections for a king of the animals (P44, 81, 101, 107, 219–20). I term this category "political fables". In these, amicable reciprocity is again portrayed as ineffectual and dysfunctional and the messages are cautionary and dissuasive rather than admonitory. Through their negative portrayal of reciprocal relationships as a way to operate in politics, they also illustrate criteria for the ruler's choice or rejection of an alliance or partnership. In addition, they display the qualities that the ideal ruler must possess, through the depiction of the inefficacy of failed rulers.[32]

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[32] I use the term 'politics' to refer to the actions of particular individuals or

Fables were sometimes used in Greek politics.[33] The ancient sources inform us of a few cases where fables on reciprocity were used as part of political rhetoric, either to persuade the people to compromise with a current unpleasant situation or to give guidelines on what to do. The first of these fables with a 'political' character is recorded by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* (1393b10–22); it is the fable of "the horse, the stag and the man":

> A fable, to give an example, is that of Stesichorus concerning Phalaris . . . For Stesichorus, when the people of Himera had chosen Phalaris as dictator and were on the point of giving him a body-guard, after many arguments related a fable to them: "A horse was in sole occupation of a meadow. A stag came and did much damage to the pasture; the horse, wishing to avenge himself on the stag, asked a man whether he could help him to punish the stag. The man consented, on condition that the horse submitted to the bit and allowed him to mount him javelins in hand. The horse agreed to the terms and the man mounted him, but instead of obtaining vengeance on the stag, the horse from that time became the man's slave. So then," said he, "take care in case, in your desire to avenge yourselves on the enemy, you are treated like the horse. You already have the bit, since you have chosen a dictator; if you give him a body-guard and allow him to mount you, you will at once be the slaves of Phalaris."[34]

This fable is used in a speech in front of the Assembly of the Himeraeans. Its role in Stesichorus' speech is dissuasive and cautionary, a metaphorical reference to the current political situation, which becomes directly connected to it at the end of the narration. It is the desire for hostile reciprocity that leads the horse to enter thoughtlessly into a reciprocal relationship with the man. The conclusion is both that hostile reciprocity is disastrous when not performed properly and that amicable reciprocity can be manipulated

groups of individuals in the social formation of which they are members, which influence the administration of power by the governing authorities. Political fables from the rest of the corpus are P269, 275, 338, 348, 356, 439, 450. See also T35, 40; Pr. 80, 128, 136; *Life of Aesop* 97 (G).

[33] On the use of fables to address particular political issues see Cascajero (1991), 23 f.

[34] The translation is from Freese, J.H. (1975) (ed. and tr.), *Aristotle's Rhetoric* (Cambridge Mass. & London), slightly modified. The fable is P269a in the *Augustana*, which also gives a different version of it in P269. On this fable see Cascajero (1991), 25; Van Dijk (1993b), 33; id. (1994), 130–1; id. (1996), 537–8; id. (1997), 155–8; Karadagli (1981), 14–17; Nøjgaard (1963). The fable is also narrated (attributed to Stesichorus again) by Conon fr. 1.42 *FGrH*.

in the interest of one of the parties and, thus, prove ineffective and disastrous for the other party. The fable is about prudent political decision-making that uses the reciprocal relationship between the ruler and his subjects, in this case to the profit of the latter. However, the profit for the dominated party in this relationship is simply that the amount of evil done to it is reduced.

Xenophon describes Socrates (*Mem.* II.7.13–14) narrating "the fable of the dog".[35] One day, the sheep complained to their master that he was not fulfilling his reciprocal obligations to them properly. They give him their wool and meat and cheese, and in return he simply lets them pasture in the fields; at the same time, he shares his food with his dog, who gives him nothing in return. The dog intervenes to present matters as they really are and describes a hierarchy of reciprocal relationships: "and he does so rightly; for I am the one who saves you from being stolen by other men or by the wolves, because if I did not protect you, you would not have been able even to pasture yourselves out of fear of being done for." The sheep agree with this and thus compromise with an unpleasant reciprocal relationship by recognizing the acceptable violation of reciprocal obligations that guarantees the interests of the strong, because it is also beneficial to them. This is Socrates' interpretation of the fable too: the women in the house should acknowledge the man as their master and guardian.

As regards the collection's political guidelines, some fables promote obedience and respect for the ruler and censure discord. The frogs feel contempt for the king that Zeus appoints for them (a piece of wood) in P44. As a result they demand a new king and Zeus punishes them by sending a water-snake who devours them. The message is one of compromise with the current political system and of respect for the ruler, because he may well be replaced by a more violent one. Interestingly enough, when Phaedrus narrates the same fable, he claims that Aesop narrated it at Athens during Peisistratus' tyranny in order to persuade the Athenians to compromise with his unpleasant government and stop complaining, because the likelihood was that an even worse tyranny might replace that of Peisistratus.[36]

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[35] On this fable see Van Dijk (1997), 336–40.

[36] Phaed. 1.2. Cf. Cascajero (1991), 27–8; Jacobsen (1952); Rodríguez Adrados (1984b). A related theme is that of compromising with a current situation, because (instead of improving) it may worsen. See III.3.5, pp. 139–40 below. As for the

In addition, fables P53 and P130 preach conformity and concord in the political context. In the first, a farmer shows his quarrelling sons that by acting in harmony and like-mindness they will be invincible to their enemies, while discord will make them defenceless (ἐὰν μὲν ὁμοφρονῆτε, ἀχείρωτοι τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἔσεσθε, ἐὰν δὲ στασιάζητε, εὐάλωτοι).[37] He proves his point by asking them to break a bundle of woods first and then a single wood; the first they find impossible, while the second is pretty easy.[38] P130 is an agonistic fable, in which the stomach and the feet argue over who is the stronger. The feet say that they are the ones who carry the stomach; to this, the stomach replies that it offers them the nutrition that enables them to carry it. Therefore, the leader's position as the one who offers the guidelines of action to his subjects must not be questioned.

P130 is a characteristic example of the 'political' and class-directed aspect of amicable reciprocity in the collection: when the parties are unequal, the only peaceful solution is that the relationship remains unbalanced and a hierarchy of power and obedience is accepted. The weak must obey the strong;[39] the subjects must obey the leader; they must also trust him and never question the fairness of his actions. The stomach distributes food to the other parts of the body and this distribution must be perceived as being fair. In both these fables, the theme is that of social concord. Concord is achieved either through the rearrangement of the social hierarchy (the stomach's dominance is re-established) or through co-operation against an exter-

appointment of a king of the animals, it is either the animals themselves who elect him (P81, 219–20), or the electoral process is triggered by the intervention of Zeus (P101), or the king is appointed by Zeus (P44, 107).

[37] In fact, the terminology used is politically charged: they were 'revolting' (ἐστασίαζον). Against political discord (στάσις) e.g. Democr. frs. 245, 249 DK; E. *HF* 34; Isoc. IV.79; Lys.25.26; Pl. *Lg*. 628c–9d.; id. *Ep*. VII.336d–7d; id. *R*. 470b–c; Th. III.34, IV.61; Thgn. 781; X. *Mem*. IV.4.11. On στάσις in the *Augustana* see Cascajero (1991), 54.

[38] See Karadagli (1981), 89–90.

[39] This is also the conclusion of the *epimythium*, which specifies leadership to the army's generals. Menenius Agrippa is reported by Plutarch to have used this fable to draw a similar argument, as he was trying to persuade the people of the respect they had to display towards the Senate's decisions. See Plu. *Cor*. 6.3–4. Other versions of the fable: D.H. 6.86.1–3; Liv. 2.32.9–11. An extended version can also be found in Shakespeare's *Coriolanus* I.1.93–151. Cf. Van Dijk (1993b), 31–2, 34–6; id. (1994), 126–8, 131, 133–4; id. (1997), 312; Jedrkiewicz (1989), 395; Karadagli (1981), 24–5; Nestle (1927). On the literary tradition of P130 see Gombel (1934); Hale (1971); Nestle (1927); Patterson (1991), ch. 4; Peil (1985).

nal group (the sons' enemies).[40] In P53, in particular, the need for the continuity of positive reciprocity is justified by the existence of a hostile relationship.

A related message is that the strong should not quarrel with each other, because by doing so they weaken themselves and offer a chance to the weak to profit. A lion and a bear are fighting over some prey; they seriously injure each other and, as they lay exhausted and about to die, they both see the fox stealing the prey undisturbed and running away. They cry together: "poor us, we have gone through pains for a fox to profit!" (P147). The quarrel between the pomegranate and the apple-tree in P213 gives an opportunity for the bramble to raise herself from her low status and offer her counsel to them. However, in some cases the strong are shown to have learned their lesson. In P62 the dolphins are fighting against the whales. The gudgeon sees this as an opportunity to raise his status and proposes that they be reconciled. A dolphin answers his proposal as follows: "we would rather kill each other fighting than have you as a mediator".[41]

The problematic character of amicable reciprocity is also apparent in certain fables that describe the election or appointment of a king of the animals. They illustrate the preconditions for choosing a king who can really benefit and assist his subjects in order to render effective the reciprocal relationship between ruler and subjects. The collection does not mention democratic political institutions such as the Assembly and the Council of Five Hundred. However, in some fables the kings have to be elected by the other animals (P81, 219–20). Elections for the rulers were a democratic process and the presence of related examples in the collection is surprising in connection both with its dating by scholars and with monarchy being the collection's form of government *par excellence*. Perhaps these fables originated in the Classical democratic period. However, the theme

[40] On the issue of concord in the particular fable and on concord in Greek literature see Nestle (1927).

[41] Similarly, in another agonistic fable, where the protagonists are again trees and plants, Callimachus' "the laurel, the olive, and the bramble" (Call. *Iamb.* 4, fr. 194 Pfeiffer), the bramble is rebuked for its intervention on the grounds that its status is insignificant compared to the status of the two trees and, therefore, its advice is worthless. See Van Dijk (1997), 237–50. See also P197. The gudgeon was of little worth as a dish in Greek cuisine, it was a poor man's fish. See Thompson (1947), 137–9. This might explain the rejection of its offer by the dolphin.

of an election of a king by the animals can be traced back to Archilochus, who can be seen as its source.[42]

In the collection, monarchy is not hereditary, but the future king is voted or judged by the other animals on the grounds of his qualities, the most predominant of which is his ability to assist and protect them. Yet monarchy as a political system fails in the collection. But this does not constitute a criticism of the political system itself, but of the qualities and the character possessed by the animals chosen to be kings. Their inability to govern is exposed and they are punished either by the other animals or by Zeus.

The birds are about to vote for the peacock to become their king on the grounds of his excellence in beauty, when the jackdaw points out that he will be unable to help them if the eagle attacks (P219). It is qualities of character, such as courage and the physical ability to fight that are demanded by a king and not beauty. In P220 the two candidates for kingship, the elephant and the camel, are criticized by the ape, who proposes their rejection as candidates despite their strength and size: the elephant because of his fear of mice and the camel because he shows no bitterness against wrongdoers.[43]

A future king must be prudent and not driven by his appetites, as is the ape in P81 who falls victim to the fox's trap and has his true character exposed. After the ape is appointed king of the animals, the fox sees a piece of meat in a trap and tells him that she has left it for him as a gift to his highness. The ape goes thoughtlessly to get it, falls in the trap and is then mocked by the fox for wanting to be king of the animals although he has such an imprudent way of acting. His character cannot guarantee his subjects' effective protection.[44] The fox in P107 is punished by Zeus, who had just appointed him as the king of the animals, for his pettiness (pp. 77–8 above).

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[42] See also I.2.2, pp. 14–5 above and n. 44 below. The political terminology used in the collection to denote monarchy is a) the words βασιλεύς, 'king' in P44, 81, 101, 219–20 and βασιλεύω, "to reign", in P107, 124; b) the word ἄρχων, 'ruler', used to suggest a monarch in P44 and the judges in P57. Besides, there is the word δεσπότης, 'master', in P16, 49, 52, 55, 92, 179, 233, 237–8, 244 to suggest relationships of dependence.

[43] On the elephant's fear of mice: Zen. III.67 *CPG*. Cf. Scullard (1974), 113–14.

[44] See Luria (1929); id. (1934), 450 f.; MacDermott (1935). For allusions to this fable in Greek literature (esp. Archil. frs. 185–7 West) see Van Dijk (1997), 144–7, 200–3, 332–4.

Likewise, the fable of "the mice and the weasels" (P165) describes the inner qualities that the leader of the army needs. There is a constant war between the weasels and the mice. The mice keep on losing and they decide to change this by appointing some generals for their army. These want to differentiate themselves from the soldiers and put some horns on their heads. As they are chased by the weasels, the common soldiers run to their holes and save themselves. However, as the generals try to do the same, their horns are stuck on the entrance of the hole and they are seized and devoured. A leader, then, distinguishes himself by his ability to fight and not by his dress-code.[45]

Finally, fable P101 gives a detailed example of the exposure of the inadequacies of the king of the birds:

> Zeus wanted to set up a king of the birds and so he set a date on which they should appear before him. A jackdaw, conscious of his ugliness, went about picking up the feathers that the birds moulted and fastened them around his body. When the appointed day arrived, he went to Zeus having become motley. While Zeus was about to name him king for his beautiful appearance, the other birds became indignant, surrounded the jackdaw, and each one removed from him the feathers that belonged to it. And so it happened that when he was stripped, he became a jackdaw again.

Zeus sets a timetable (προθεσμίαν αὐτοῖς ἔταξεν) for the candidates to prepare themselves, a detail that gives a sense of reality to this fictitious political process.[46] The jackdaw is culpable for breaching the solidarity of the group of the contestants. In addition, he is conscious (συνειδώς) of his deformity from the very beginning and therefore clearly culpable. Zeus ignores the fact that the rules of the contest had been violated from the start. His role, then, as an inspec-

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[45] Compare fable P74 where the deer's horns are also stuck and cause her death and Archilochus' portrayal of the general who is brave, despite being small and unathletic in physique, in fr. 60 *PLG*. See also the fable in S. *Aj*. 1142–9, on the leader's need to prove himself useful in times of danger. For this Sophoclean fable see Van Dijk (1997), 176–9.

[46] Perry's version of the fable is more condensed compared to Chambry's and Hausrath's. Their version (Chambry 163 and Hausrath 103) makes it clear that the criterion for the selection will be good looks. It also places the jackdaw's trick by a riverside, where the other birds were making their toilet as part of their preparation. The jackdaw picks up the feathers that the other birds got rid off while they prepared their appearance. The narrative chain is more cohesive here than in Perry, where it seems as if the jackdaw picked up feathers that were simply falling off the other birds.

tor and guarantor of the success of the political process is faulty, because he chooses the jackdaw, who abused solidarity, as king, that is to be the guarantor of solidarity and harmonious co-existence among the birds. The key word for his choice is the jackdaw's εὐπρέπεια ("good looks"). This is what sets off the other birds' reaction. For they know that the jackdaw's beauty is a false and not permanent quality of the jackdaw, because it was achieved at their expense and against the rules of solidarity.[47]

They get indignant (ἀγανακτήσαντα), a reaction that the collection usually attributes to Zeus before he punishes any of his subjects (e.g. P100, 106–7). It looks as if, for a moment, the birds replace their supreme ruler's function of anger and punishment and they proceed to reveal the trickery.[48] In this case, solidarity among them is respected, because its aim is to unmask its betrayer.[49] Solidarity in the social group is proposed through the collective punishment of its opposite. The fable also delivers a message on the proper handling of political affairs. It indicates through a failed political reciprocal relationship (the choice of a king) that the rules of the political game must be respected by everyone.

Nevertheless, non-reciprocal action is sometimes punished in the collection. The goatherd is criticized for his behaviour towards his old subjects (P6, p. 124 below) and the trick of the fox with the cropped tail is exposed and slashed (P17, pp. 121–2 below). The jackdaw's violation of solidarity is exposed and punished in P101 (pp. 104–5 above). The turtle is punished for refusing to reciprocate Zeus' invitation to go to his wedding (P106). All the other animals 'obeyed' the invitation of the master-god, but she says she prefers to stay at home. Zeus punishes her by making her carry her home ever since that day (an aetiological fable on the origins of her carapace). The message is again that of the destructive consequences for the weak of failing to respect their part of the obligations in a reciprocal relationship of inequality and dependence.[50]

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47 Another meaning of the word 'ἀπρέπεια' is 'speciousness' in comparison to truthfulness. Therefore, there is a double meaning behind the jackdaw's goodly appearance, for it is at the same time a false one. See the entry for εὐπρέπεια in *LSJ*.

48 On crowds' punitive action see III.3.6.

49 On the meaning and history of this fable see Austin (1911). The fable was already well-known in the time of Philodemus. See Van Dijk (1997), 305–7.

50 The image of one who carries his home with him is negative; it denotes a nomadic way of life in contrast to culture as the creation of settled life in the cities,

Sometimes, the price that the betrayer of amicable reciprocity pays is the heaviest one. As a result of surrendering their allies, the dogs, to the wolves, the sheep are left unprotected and the wolves eat them (P153).[51] A vine shelters a hunted deer who in return starts eating the vine's leaves in P77. Her faulty reciprocation reveals her hideout to the hunters who kill her. As she dies, she admits that her death is well-deserved, because she betrayed her saviour. Similarly, a mule rejects the ass's appeal for solidarity and a help in carrying his load (P181).[52] He refuses to enter into a relationship of mutual support because of what he considers his interest at that moment. Because of his heavy load, the ass falls down a mountain and dies. The mule is now obliged by his masters, to double his load by also carrying the dead ass's one. In self-criticism he admits the fairness of his punishment as a result of his violation of reciprocal behaviour. The fox in P191 is killed first by the lion and is thus punished for her betrayal of her companion the ass (pp. 94–5 above).

The general picture of reciprocal relationships in the *Augustana* is one of dysfunctionality, ineffectiveness, and manipulation for individual self-interest, especially that of the stronger. Amicable reciprocity as a means of social relations is abused according to the circumstances and cannot be trusted. This mode of representation bears no relation to the democratic view of reciprocal relations as a set of interlocking obligations between the citizens and the central

as in Hdt. IV.46 on the Scythians. On the association between this image of the turtle and Cynic life see Rodríguez Adrados (1978b), 47 and (1988a), 425. There was also a traditional use of the turtle as a symbol for women and homekeeping. See Arthur (1980–1), 58–9. On this fable see also Van Dijk (1997), 253–6; Karadagli (1981), 150. The turtle's reply to Zeus that "the house is the best friend" (οἶκος φίλος, οἶκος ἄριστος) was proverbial, see Appendix IV.15 *CPG* and Van Dijk (1997), 253–6.

[51] This fable was ascribed in antiquity to Demosthenes. See Van Dijk (1995b), 139–40; id. (1997), 291–6. Demosthenes is reported to have used the fable in a speech—that, unfortunately, has been lost—that he delivered to the Athenians when, after the destruction of Thebes, Alexander the Great (or his father, Philip) demanded the extradition of eight orators accused by him of being demagogues, Demosthenes among them. The fable was clearly used in a political context. Demosthenes implied that the sheep (the Athenians) must not be persuaded by the wolves (the Macedonians) to hand over to them the dogs (himself and the other orators), their true protectors. The fable, thus, represents another case of fable use in rhetoric and politics (see pp. 16–8 and 98–100 above). It was also inserted in the *Life of Aesop* 97 (G), again in a political context, as Aesop uses it to dissuade the Samians (the sheep) from handing him (the dog) over to Croesus (the wolf).

[52] A similar story can be found in Apul. *Met.* IV.4–5.

authority that produces common benefit and welfare. Nor does it recall the general Greek view of the importance of collective benefit and mutual support from political relations, even unequal ones.[53] In the *Augustana*, solidarity is not promoted by the proper functioning of reciprocity, but by conformity with the exploitation of reciprocity. Exemplary stories about relationships between unequal parties and the destructive outcome of the weak failing to respect the existing disequilibrium of power are used to convey this message. A related message is that you should also violate reciprocal relationships to your profit, if you find someone weaker than yourself.

The fables' approach is cautionary; it draws attention to the precautions and the processes you must take before and during amicable relationships in a framework of betrayal and pre-eminence of individual interest at the expense of mutual interest. The only effective reciprocal relationships are the negative ones, involving revenge and enmity. Together with the view that life is full of unpleasant and unexpected turns, the collection portrays a pessimistic view of social life as regards the socially weak. They should compromise with the current political conditions, despite their unfairness, and submit to the will of the ruling groups. In this way, the existing social hierarchy is maintained; the strong maintain their power, the weak survive and avoid the worsening of their condition.

III.2.3 *Reciprocity and Economic Life*

Scholars have also studied the norm of reciprocity as an important factor in the history of Greek economy.[54] The economy of the Greek *polis* was embedded in society in that economic processes were dependent upon ethical principles and the value systems of the political frameworks (e.g. Archaic chieftains, democracy) that shaped social and political life; the development of the Greek economy was related to the ethical, ideological and political development of Greek society.

The role of reciprocity in the Greek economy changed because of the gradual transition from the Archaic period onwards from an

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[53] On reciprocity as a means of exploiting the socially weak see Van Wees (1998), 42–6. See also Pearson's account on the dysfunctionality and manipulation of amicable reciprocity (friendships and alliances) in Thucydides in Pearson (1957).

[54] See Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977), chs. 1–2; Dover (1974), 170–5; Humphreys (1978), 32–45, 136 f.; Seaford (1994), chs. 1, 6; id. (1998), 2–3; Von Reden (1995), 18–27, 88–131, 171–94; Van Wees (1998), 34–41.

economy based on the reciprocal exchange of gifts to one based on trade and market exchange. Market exchange was practised in, and controlled by, the institutions of the *polis*. This shift was connected with the appearance and use of coinage, a market (*agora*) and the presence of state authorities throughout the economic process. In fact, the "exchange of inalienable things [i.e. the gift and the counter-gift] between transactors who are in a state of reciprocal dependence [i.e. the donor and the recipient]" is the opposite of commodity-exchange (market exchange) which is "an exchange of alienable things [i.e. the product and the coin's worth] between transactors who are in a state of reciprocal independence [i.e. the merchant and the customer]".[55] The economic ethos that was related to the *polis* promoted public interest and prosperity because of the abundance of goods on offer and the collection of taxes by the civic authorities. Yet, trade was ethically criticized in so far as it took as its goal individual profit and the subsequent accumulation of wealth and of economic and political power and influence. A rich merchant was valued by the community if he spent his earnings for the communal prosperity (e.g. in *leitourgiai*) but the accumulation of wealth was suspicious as a potential threat to political equality and independence.[56]

In the *Augustana*, economic reciprocity is shown as faulty and as a means of manipulating social relations for individual profit. In relation to the analysis of the Greek monetary economy just outlined, the *Augustana* fables are poor in detailed information; nevertheless, they may reflect certain widespread stereotyped views. Occasionally, the fables display *in passing* some snapshots from the economic life of the *polis*, a life characterized by commodity-exchange. We read about shoplifters and see them in action in a butcher's (P66); a merchant puffs and praises his wares in a loud voice trying to attract customers (P99), while all artisans and especially the shoemakers are presented as born liars (P103). If in need, one can find professional female mourners to intensify the lamentation over a dead beloved (P205). The agreement for the rendering of services can be limited to an oral promise for payment (P156). In another fable (P57, p. 113 below) a financial dispute over the payment of services is

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55 Seaford (1994), 13.

56 See Von Reden (1995), 82–96, 106–31; id. (1998), 260–1. See also IV.1.1, pp. 147 f. below.

brought in front of the city's magistrates who are to preside over a settlement.

These snapshots are limited in scope. They usually form a brief realistic background to the fictitious narrative and to its ethical conclusion. The fables' stylistic demands for brevity and the priority of the ethical conclusion over the narration do not leave enough room for any detailed description of the economic processes of Greek daily life. However, in two types of fable economic relations carry more important connotations for the messages that are drawn. The first type includes fables about market exchange, services in payment and violations of the obligation to reciprocate economic agreements, and is discussed shortly. The other type examines the presentation of wealth and especially its pursuit as a vice with disastrous consequences. These fables are discussed in the next chapter (IV.1.1).

In some fables it looks as if the protagonist's financial situation and attitude towards economic relations promotes a specific course of action that leads to an ethical conclusion which is more or less general and not limited to action in the economic sphere. In two fables (P28, 34, see p. 135 below) a poor man vows to sacrifice a hundred oxen to the gods (ἑκατόμβη) if they help him recover from his bad health. His plea fulfilled, he breaks his promise. In both fables the introductory phrase is almost identical: "a poor man who was ill and desperate promised to the gods to sacrifice a hundred oxen" [ἀνὴρ πένης νοσῶν και κακῶς διακείμενος ηὔξατο τοῖς θεοῖς ἑκατόμβην τελέσειν (τοῖς θεοῖς ηὔχετο ἑκατόμβην ποιήσειν)].[57] There seems to be a hint here of a specific ethical disposition due to the man's financial condition: poverty makes man desperate and capable of promising the impossible (a hundred oxen sacrifice is an overstatement by a poor man) even to the gods. It pushes him to the immoral act of initiating a reciprocal relationship (a vow to the gods has to be repaid), that he will have to breach (a poor man having a hundred oxen is an oxymoron).

A related moral hint lies in fable P30 (p. 57 above). The message here is "action instead of words". But the very beginning of the fable informs us that the drowning man is a rich Athenian (ἀνὴρ πλούσιος Ἀθηναῖος). This information would be unnecessary if it did not hint

[57] The two fables are so alike that it seems plausible that one was drawn on the basis of the other before they entered the collection.

at the incapacity for physical effort that results from a wealthy and luxurious way of living. The fact that this man is rich would justify to the fable's ancient popular audience his incapacity to save himself. In fable P239 a man has been entrusted of money by a friend (φίλος) and decides not to return it. When his friend demands its return, he denies having received it at first place. As his friend asks him to take an oath about this, the man leaves the town. At the town's gates, however, he comes face to face with Oath the divinity, who is also leaving the town to go after the impious. He asks about how often the god visits the town and Oath answers that he visits it every forty or thirty years. Pleased at that, the man returns to his friend and swears that he had not received the money. But Oath appears and is about to kill him. As the man accuses the god of lying about the frequency of his visits, the Oath answers "but bear in mind that when someone disturbs me a lot, I usually return on the same day". The fable both illustrates the punishment of perjury and the disastrous consequences of violating an economic agreement. When money is involved even friendship and trust among friends can be corrupted.[58] It is interesting to note the striking similarities between this fable and the story of Glaucus in Herodotus VI.86. Glaucus wants to keep for himself a sum that a guest-friend had trusted to him, thus breaching his reciprocal obligations and his oath to safeguard his guest-friend's money. He receives a Delphic oracle which states that Oath has an unnamed brother who has no feet or hands, but rushes swiftly over the unjust and destroys them. Scared by such a warning, Glaucus changes his mind. Whether the Herodotean passage formed the literary basis for this fable or not,[59] it raises the possibility that the two friends in P239 were guest-friends (ξένοι), although the fable does not name them as such. Oaths were part of initiatory rites of guest-friendship, while guest-friends could help each other as safe-keepers of property abroad.[60]

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[58] In Antipho Soph. fr. 54 DK there is a fable that is similar to that of the "avaricious man" (P225, pp. 151–2 below). It presents the disastrous consequences when money is not diffused to the market and is kept away from any sort of exchange. In this fable a man gets a large sum of money, but when asked by someone to lend him some, he refuses because he is distrustful and has never helped anyone. However, the man is punished for his non-reciprocal economic behaviour by having his money stolen. See Van Dijk (1997), 313–17.

[59] See Van Dijk (1997), 656–7.

[60] See Herman (1987), chs. 3.4 and 4.2. Hesiod (*Op.* 219–21) too mentions the

Some other fables seem to present widespread views on wealth and economy. In P88 the lesser value of Hermes' statue in comparison with those of Zeus and Hera may also indicate the general negative evaluation of profit by the Greeks. Hermes was a god related to economic processes; he was the patron god of the merchants, the "profit-god" or κερδῷος (he was also the patron god of thieves). The fable in discussion concludes with the stigmatization of Hermes' vanity (believing that his statue will have the highest price, he learns from the sculptor that it is given for nothing in case someone buys the statues of the other two gods). Yet, because of the popular stigmatization of profit when used only for personal interest, it is possible to guess that the ancient audience or reader of this fable would expect such an outcome to Hermes' desire to learn how valued he is among people.[61]

The complaint at the artificiality and hypocrisy of human relationships when money is involved is echoed in fable P205. One of the two daughters of a rich man died and he hires some mourners for her funeral. During the lamentation, the other daughter self-critically notes that the family itself does not mourn as intensively as those women. Her mother replies that it is not a matter of true feelings, but that they lament in this way because they do it for money (ἐπὶ γὰρ ἀργυρίῳ τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν). Professional lamentation is reported as an acceptable kind of service, for the rich man hired (ἐμισθώσατο) the mourners without arousing criticism for his action; on the contrary, it looks like a kind of luxury, a desired heightening and maximization of pain that only the rich can afford. Yet there is a sombre tone in the criticism against paid services that follows. The fables' view of social reality, which is thought to represent the popular view, highlights the hypocritical and conventional character of these paid lamentations and does not hesitate to comment upon it. There is the feeling that money, together with its distortion of sincerity in human relationships, threatens to falsify domains of life as precious and sacred as the lamentation for the dead.

The collection's dominant attitude towards money in general and

swiftness of punishment for breaching and oath. On divine punishment from the breach of an oath see Burkert (1985), ch. 5.3.2; id. (1996), 169–76; Yamagata (1993), 11–14.

[61] See, for example, Pl. *Lg.* 727e, 743c–4a; S. *Ant.* 222; id. *Ph.* 132–3. Cf. Rodríguez Adrados (1978b), 53; Vernant (1983), ch. 10.

commodity-exchange in particular is that they corrupt human relationships and are characterized by deceit and lies. This view is reflected in the caustic comment in fable P103 and the detailed description of market transactions in P5. The first is an aetiological fable that reports how, under Zeus' instructions, Hermes created the artisans and filled them with lies, particularly the shoemakers. The people of trade, then, are born liars, so their role in economic exchange is explained as *naturally* faulty on the grounds of divine causation; they were created by the gods to be so. This fable might also reflect the low social status of manual professions in Greece as well as on the low reputation of these professional groups and especially of the shoemakers.

P5 is more revealing on the role of deception in commodity-exchange:

> A debtor at Athens, when his creditor demanded the repayment of the debt, at first asked to be given an extension, arguing that he had no money. Because he did not persuade the creditor, he brought his only sow and was trying to sell it in the creditor's presence. A buyer showed up and asked if it was a brood-sow, and the debtor answered that she not only gives birth, but she does so in the most unexpected way; at the Eleusinian Mysteries she gives birth to females, while at the Panathenaia she gives birth to males. As the buyer was astounded by this information, the creditor said: "Oh, do not wonder; because for your sake she will even give birth to kid goats at the Dionysia".[62]

The fable starts with a faulty economic relation, that of the inability to repay the debt in due time. Everything is ethically dysfunctional in this economic relation: breaches of promises, excuses, no room for argument. The need for money to fulfil the obligation to repay the debt leads to a trade exchange, which is full of lies and exaggerated praise of the merchandise in order to gain a hasty profit.[63] Fable P99 also underlines the traders' wish for quick profit. A sculptor tries to sell a statue of Hermes by praising its beneficial quali-

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[62] There is a connection between the pig's sex and the particular feast, as well as between the sacrificial animal and the deities that are involved in the particular feasts (Dionysus, Demeter). The Eleusinian mysteries had a 'female' character. The pig had sexual connotations (slang for female genitals) and it was the sacrificial animal in Demeter's cult, while the goat (male goat, kid) was the sacrificial animal in Dionysiac cult. On these issues see Bowie (1993), 33; Burkert (1983), 65–8, 77, 256 f.; id. (1985), 13, 232–3, 242, 286.

[63] A point stressed by the *epimythium*: "the fable shows that, for the sake of their own profit, many men will not hesitate to bear false witness on impossible things".

ties of bringing goods and profit to its holder (ἀγαθοποιόν . . . καὶ κέρδους δωρητικόν). When someone asks him why he does not keep it for himself, and enjoy the benefit instead of selling it, he replies that the god brings profits slowly, while he needs quick profit (ἐγὼ μὲν ταχείας ὠφελείας τινὸς ἐπιδέομαι, αὐτὸς δὲ βραδέως εἴωθε τὰ κέρδη περιποιεῖν). The need for profit leads the merchant to exaggerate the qualities of his merchandise, which is another form of deception.

In fable P156 the power of the physically stronger animal justifies the breach of the financial agreement. The wolf has swallowed a bone; he begs the heron to save him and promises to pay him (ἐπὶ μισθῷ) for his services. The heron puts his head into the wolf's throat and takes the bone out with his beak. When he, justifiably, demands his payment the answer is that he should consider himself lucky for having come intact out of the wolf's mouth.[64] The message here is that the powerful impose themselves on the weak and decide what is right and wrong, even in economic issues. Inequality of strength once again disrupts the reciprocal relationship at the expense of the weaker party involved.

The picture of economic activity in the *Augustana*, including trade, is usually presented as faulty. It includes deceit and lies, breaches of agreements, shoplifting, the pursuit of profit at any ethical cost (P5, 28, 34, 57, 66, 99, 103, 156, 205, 239). There is one case where justice is sought for the breach of an economic agreement (P57). An old woman gets her sight treated by a doctor but then refuses to pay him the fee they had agreed. Here we have another case of faulty economic relation, but now, it seems, justice will prevail. However, the old woman is proved right in her refusal because during the treatment, while she had her eyes shut, the doctor was stealing her furniture, one piece a time. Her accountability for faulty economic behaviour is erased by the doctor's previous faulty economic behaviour. As she ironically points out, before his therapy she could see all her furniture, while now she sees none of it, implying that this is so because the furniture has been stolen; in some way, she also denies that she has been cured and that he has succeeded in his therapy, because she now sees less than before.

What is left to the victims of economic injustice is the hope that the gods will intervene and restore the practice. This is the wish of

[64] This was a proverbial expression. See Zen. III.48 *CPG*.

the butcher in P66. Although he has noticed that two young men have stolen a piece of meat in his shop while he was busy, he is unable to prove it. This is so, because the one who stole the meat threw it into the fold of the other's garment. Therefore, when accused by the butcher, they deny their guilt by playing a trick of words. The one who stole the meat swears that he does not *have* it, while he who has it swears that he did not *steal* it. Thus, they both do not lie, but they do so by distorting the truth and by avoiding to tell the full story. As a result, the butcher puts his hopes to the gods and wishes that the thieves will not escape divine punishment.[65]

Some general remarks can be made on the presentation of economic relations in the *Augustana*. The negative picture that we get from the faulty function of the economic life might reflect a popular view against commodity-exchange, especially when profit is concerned. It may represent the feelings of the lower classes in the Greek *polis*, who could not afford many commodities and, therefore, expressed their distrust and aversion for the cheating merchants, the rich men, the professional mourners, the shoemakers etc. It may express their complaints against their exploitation in their economic agreements with the powerful and the professionals, such as the old woman in P57 and the heron in P156. This pessimism about commodity-exchange that the *Augustana* expresses does not extend to a more generalized and severe criticism of this economic system. What interests the fables is not whether, during the exchange, the transactors are in a state of reciprocal independence or not, but rather the fact that the transaction is faulty. Apart from the reasons just suggested for this pessimistic view, one should also consider the collection's preference for extracting messages on practical behaviour through negative exemplary stories.

III.2.4 *Hostile Reciprocity*

The *Augustana* fables often describe the practices to be adopted against an enemy. In this sense, they may extend our knowledge of Greek thought on this subject. Fable P68 features an interesting account of enmity:

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[65] Note the similarities between the fable and the Sausage-Seller's (Ar. *Eq.* 418–24) theft of meat as he made the cooks look away and his subsequent denial of his action, including oaths to the gods. See Bowie (1993), 55.

> Two enemies travelled on the same ship. Because they wanted to be as far away from each other as possible, one rushed to the bow, the other to the stern, and they remained there. But as a storm started and the ship was sinking, the man in the stern asked the steersman which part of the ship was likely to sink first. When the latter replied "the part in the bow", the man said "then, death brings me no sorrow, as long as I see my enemy drowning first".

The fable describes the extremes of behaviour between enemies (ἐχθροί). The introductory phrase causes tension and predisposes us to the disastrous end of the story; no happy ending should be expected when *two* enemies travel in *one* ship (δύο ἐχθροὶ ἐν μιᾷ νηὶ ἔπλεον).[66] Their first action is a symbolic expression of the polarity that characterizes enmity: they go and occupy the two extremes of the ship. Where friendship brings people closer, enmity sets them apart. In fact, they *rush* (ὥρμησαν) as far away from each other as possible, thus adding a passionate aspect to their actions. The storm is the turning point. As the ship sinks, the enemies demonstrate that enmity leads men to abnormal behaviour. The normal thing to do during a shipwreck would be to try to save yourself. One would expect that the steersman's answer would satisfy the man in the stern, because it would mean that he would have more time to save himself. His answer, though, is both unexpected and indicative of the hatred involved in enmity and the wish for the enemy's misfortune despite personal cost. Unlike friends, enemies share nothing apart from their hatred and their will to destroy each other. In contrast to amicable reciprocity, hostile reciprocity is presented as successfully carried out. The ruling desire is the annihilation or punishment of the enemy. Retaliation is complete when the enemy dies, but an important injury to him can be satisfactory too. The fox devoured the eagle's chicks, and this was as important as if she had killed the eagle herself (P1, pp. 86 f. above).

Witnessing your enemy's death is equally important. The man in the stern states it clearly. So does the tunny in P113. Chased by the dolphin, it is washed ashore because it is rushing away, followed by the dolphin, who did not have enough time to stop. As they both die, the tunny comments that it does not mind its death, because it sees the dolphin dying too. In P216 a wasp stings a snake, which

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[66] Surprisingly enough, Karadagli reads this fable as comic in its impact. Karadagli (1981), 125–6.

in its turn places its head under the wheel of a passing chariot and so punishes its enemy (ἐχθρός). The drive for the enemy's destruction often leads to mutual death. Someone dies voluntarily and happily if he knows that his enemy will die too (P68, 113, 216). The expression used in these cases is "but death brings me no grief anymore (ἀλλ' ἔμοιγε οὐκέτι λυπηρὸς ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν) because I will see my enemy (or 'him who caused my death') dying". The enemy's death brings nothing but joy at any cost.[67]

There is, however, one case of unsuccessful retaliation in P51. A farmer's son is killed by a snake. The farmer tries to kill it, but fails. He then asks the snake for reconciliation. The snake's answer and the fable's message is that, once started, the reciprocal violence between enemies cannot be stopped. The farmer will always remember his son's death and the snake the farmer's attempt to kill it.[68] There is no room for reconciliation or for a resolution of violence in hostile reciprocal relationships. It is impossible for the two enemies even to sit at a close distance (P68). Nor would the wolves ever become friends with the sheep (P153, p. 106 above).

The wish to avenge an enemy is passionate. This is another characteristic of hostile reciprocity in the collection. The fox rushes to her revenge (P1); the farmer suffers intense grief from his son's death (P51); and the chase between the tunny and the dolphin is fast and furious (P113). In addition, sight plays an important role in hostile reciprocity. Revenge gains its utmost consummation when it takes place in front of the enemy's eyes. The eagle witnesses her chicks' death (P1); both the man in the stern and the tunny see their enemies dying (P68, 113). But enmity may also be prolonged thanks to sight. As long as both the snake and the farmer see the testimonies of their mutual hatred they will never be reconciled (P51).[69]

Reciprocity, whether amicable or hostile, is the key code of behaviour between friends and enemies in the *Augustana* fables. Amicable reciprocity is proved faulty and ineffective, while hostile reciprocity is effective, with disastrous consequences. The collection's pessimistic picture is drawn from a world-view in which revenge and violence

[67] See e.g. Call. fr. 219 Pfeiffer; E. *El.* 281; S. *Aj.* 388–92. See Thomson (1966), 49–50.

[68] See Garbe (1988).

[69] These testimonies are the grave of the farmer's son and the imprint that the farmer's axe left on a stone next to the snake's nest, when he tried to, unsuccessfully, kill it. On the fable's modern Greek versions see Megas (1960), 198 f.

succeed where co-operation and assistance fail. This is in line with the idea of human agency and action, and of collective interest being violated at the profit of the individual.

III.3 *Factors that Control the Function of Positive Reciprocity*

III.3.1 *Justice*

Justice, either as a virtue or in its judicial aspect, is hardly mentioned in the *Augustana*. Courts and the state's punitive institutions are rarely present in the stories. They are narrative details, as in the fable of the witch (P56) where we read that she was accused and presented with a case (γραψάμενοι, κατηγορήσαντες), taken to court (εἰς δίκην ἀπήγαγον) and condemned to death (κατεδίκασαν αὐτὴν θανάτῳ) for introducing novel religious practices (καινοτομοῦσαν περὶ τὰ θεῖα).[70] Yet, although the terminology for the judicial process is present and justice in a court is shown as an effective mechanism for unmasking and punishing a culprit, the fable does not conclude with an explicit appreciation of justice in its institutional function, but prefers the general message that the cheater will eventually be revealed and punished (IV.1.3, pp. 161–3 below).

In fable P200 a thief is caught in the act (ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ), has his arms tied behind his back (περιαγκωνίζεσθαι) and is taken to the executioner (δήμιος). Again the legal process described and its effectiveness in the punishment of an unjust act receive no further comment but are only part of the narrative which concludes with the importance of upbringing for a child's future. The thief bites his mother's ear because, although she knew about his thieving tendencies since he was a child, she did nothing to prevent him from following this profession, but, on the contrary, had been encouraging him.[71]

The only case of criticism of the function of institutionalized justice in the *Augustana* is found in fable P227. There, a swallow nests in a court. While she is away, a snake creeps up and devours her

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[70] See Socrates' trial on similar grounds Pl. *Ap.* 24b; id. *Euthphr.* 3b.

[71] On the relation of the various aspects of the legal process that are described in these two fables to Athenian legal practice see Harrison (1971), 62–3, 74–82, 85–90, 222–9.

chicks. The swallow laments not so much for losing her chicks, but for having being wronged in the very place that helps the wronged (ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ ἠδίκημαι ἐν ᾧ οἱ ἀδικούμενοι βοηθοῦνται). The present fable acknowledges the role of the court as an institution that corrects injustice and protects the weak. However, the fable reveals a crack in the operation of institutionalized justice. It might be reflecting a popular disappointment and complaint about judicial institutions.[72] One reads about the inevitable death that awaits a killer as a punishment (P32, 152), without the source of this punishment being named. The meaning here, as well as in the fables that describe divine punishment (see III.3.5 below), is that an act of murder will provoke a punitive counter-act. A specialized form of this retaliatory justice includes the obligation to avenge an enemy.

However, in the majority of fables, action is conducted within the agonistic framework (II.1.2 above). The presentation of interpersonal relationships in the *Augustana* usually supports the stronger protagonist's demand for self-interest and his need for victory and survival. There is no room in the collection's utilitarian and pragmatic ethics for a discussion of the concept of justice or for the application of judicial institutions. Reciprocal relations are generally manipulated for individual profit, and practicality and opportunism prevail over other ethical claims.

The collection's general message is that 'nature' will inevitably prevail over 'culture'. The first comprises the protagonists' natural qualities which establish a hierarchy of power and the limits of action, which must be respected, otherwise the effects are disastrous. The figures of the fable are mouthpieces for human society. They themselves have no sense of justice, which is a 'cultural' product (the result of human agreement and intervention on the handling of social life), but proclaim the realistic 'naturalness' of the stronger's right.[73]

Violence, physical or verbal, usually characterizes the winning protagonist's behaviour. Cruelty and the affirmation of the winner's

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[72] This fable's message can also be classified under the theme that life is fickle and that unexpected changes to the worse might occur at any time. See III.3.5, pp. 139–40 below.

[73] Hesiod (*Op.* 276–9) stresses justice as the differentiating factor between men and animals. The first have it, while the latter lack it. Cf. VD 2T171. In Archilochus' version of fable P1 (pp. 86 f. above), though, the fox does apply to justice (δίκη). See Archil. fr. 177 West and Van Dijk (1997), 140.

superiority dominate his behaviour towards the weak or the defeated.[74] The protagonist's action and, consequently, the handling of interpersonal relationships in the *Augustana* are usually dependent on pursuit of individual interest.[75] In addition, the loser is often ridiculed and sneered at by the winner or by a passer-by.[76] Moreover, it is sometimes the loser himself who acknowledges his defeat in a self-contemplative phrase;[77] his lament for his unfavourable situation authorizes the winner's violent behaviour, because it shows that the loser foolishly decided to do something he should not have done. This is to enter a conflict against someone physically or spiritually superior, or to try to escape his status and natural or social limits for action.

III.3.2 *Internalized Sanctions*

Does the *Augustana* acknowledge any restraints on individual behaviour towards the weak or defeated protagonists? Are there any internalized sanctions, which derive from the ethical agent's consciousness of moral demands accepted by him as valid? For example, the need to avoid *hubris* might be regarded as a sanction to control violent behaviour towards a weaker or defeated opponent. *Hubris* in Greek ethical thought designated a deliberate act or general behaviour towards someone in order to assault his honour and diminish his status. At the same time, the words or actions used deliberately by the stronger claim his superiority against someone weaker (e.g. socially, economically, physically) and thus give him pleasure. *Hubris* was associated especially with the rich, the young, the upper classes, namely those who were likely to perform an arrogant social practice at the expense of others by displaying their wealth, by sneering at the weak and those incapable of defending themselves (e.g. the old) or by exploiting them. In general, *hubris* denoted excess, the sort of behav-

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[74] See Cascajero (1991), 46–9; Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.261–8; Rodríguez Adrados (1978b), 53–4; id. (1979–87), I.172–4, 193–8.

[75] P4, 6, 9, 16, 18, 22, 26, 39, 41, 52, 55, 58, 65, 67, 81, 84, 87, 105, 112, 122, 124, 140–1, 149, 153–7, 160, 178, 181, 187, 191, 193, 215, 227, 238, 241.

[76] P2, 9, 11, 24, 38, 40, 54, 62, 81, 96, 98, 112, 124, 132, 134, 137, 139, 144, 164, 182, 185–6, 188–90, 233.

[77] P25, 74–7, 80, 86, 97, 115–16, 120, 128, 131, 147–8, 176, 179, 181, 187, 203, 209, 234. See also p. 77 above.

iour that did not consider the due measure towards the honour and social status—no matter how high—of others.[78]

It would be legitimate, then, to expect to find *hubris* being used in the *Augustana* as a key term to disapprove of the behaviour displayed by the collection's protagonists. It happens too often that a weak or defeated figure is laughed at, that his pleas are not respected at all, that the winners express their superiority and so on. That is, the fables exhibit too many cases of behaviour that could easily be termed 'hubristic'. Yet the term is very rare in the collection. It appears only once in the story itself, namely in P123 (see p. 76 above), where the jackdaw is punished for his *hubris* (ἐπὶ τῇ ὕβρει) by the other jackdaws.[79] Even the ass, an animal that was characterized in antiquity by its hubristic behaviour, is nowhere treated as hubristic despite the opportunities for such a characterization (e.g. P82, 182, 185, 188).[80] This lack of stigmatization of *hubris* can be ascribed to the collection's ethics, which promote behaviour for individual profit despite the claims to collective or other-oriented benefit.[81] In addition, the collection's figures feel no shame at criticizing or mocking a defeated figure for his misfortunes (see p. 119 above). In this way they accentuate the reasons that have led to his suffering and articulate the fable's message.[82]

The collection's attitude is not different with regard to inhibition as a sanction that controls behaviour towards others. The key term in Greek thought was αἰδώς ('reverence', 'self-restraint', 'inhibition').[83] This term described the behaviour that was appropriate in social interaction and that resulted from the ethical agent's internalization

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[78] See Fisher (1992). Also Arist. *Rh.* 1378b23–35; Heraclit. fr. 43 DK. However, in a recent article, Cairns gives evidence of the dispositional aspect that *hubris* had in Greek ethics. The word *hubris* could be used as a name both for the ethical agent's disposition regardless of the acts that might spring from such disposition (e.g. thinking big of himself) and for his acts themselves which deliberately inflicted shame and dishonour on others. See Cairns (1996).

[79] The term also appears in the *epimythia* of two other fables, P23 and 217.

[80] See Fisher (1992), 120–1.

[81] Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.544–7.

[82] The same can be done through the suffering protagonist's self-contemplative comment at the end of the story. See p. 77 above.

[83] A survey of the Greek thought on αἰδώς together with an abundance of Greek sources can be found in Cairns (1993). Cf. Yamagata (1994), 156–74. On self-restraint as a social ideal promoted in Classical Athenian politics see Herman (1998), 213–15. On the connection between αἰδώς and prudence see North (1966), ch. 1. On the related term of αἰσχύνη (shame) see Pl. *Lg.* 646e–7c.

of the moral standards of his society and their application to his actions. The αἰδοῖος was conscious of the restrictions he should impose on his actions in order to respect the behavioural demands and the interest of the others (e.g. his fellow-citizens, fellow-warriors, relatives etc.) and to avoid social disapproval of his actions. In this way, self-restraint was associated with external sanctions, the moral demands and honour of others. However, it was also an 'internalized' sanction. The αἰδοῖος person had adopted in his conscience the moral standards of his society to such an extent that he would see them as his own moral standards and sanctions for his behaviour.

The *Augustana* contains two examples of this internalized sanction. The first is in the fable of the middle-aged man and his two mistresses (P31, see p. 96 above).[84] Both the mistresses are described as feeling shame for the inappropriateness of their relationship with a man who is older or younger than them (αἰδουμένη, ὑποστελλομένη), although one would expect them to feel αἰδώς simply for being mistresses. We should not infer, however, that this indicates that being a mistress was not morally condemned. The unexpected reason for their shame is a narrative requirement to explain their following acts. Their feelings are described as internalized sanctions that urge them to act accordingly, by trying to eliminate the visual manifestation of their relationship. Their actions are nowhere described as deriving from inhibition in the face of external sanctions, what "people might say". They are rather described as deriving from their own sense of what is morally appropriate for them.

The other example is in fable P17.[85] There, a fox with a cropped tail feels ashamed (δι' αἰσχύνην) for his physical defect. He fell in a trap and lost his tail. Therefore, his cropped tail is a visual manifestation of his failure to be as cunning as a fox should and to avoid the trap. Again, the moral sanction derives from his own awareness (ἡγεῖτο . . . ἔγνω) and is nowhere inspired by external moral demands. Yet the fable is revealing of the process of internalization of social standards of behaviour described above and the dependence of individual sanctions upon the social. The fox decides to persuade the other foxes to cut their tails too, so that "he could hide together with them his own defect through it becoming a common misfortune".

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[84] See p. 96 n. 29 above and Van Dijk (1997), 283–4.

[85] Timocreon fr. 3.4–5 *PMG* alludes to the image of a fox with a cropped tail. See Van Dijk (1997), 165–7.

That is, a shared defect will create a new social moral standard for appropriate appearance, an external sanction that will in turn become internalized in every member of the group and, because a cropped tail will no more be considered a physical deformity, the new criteria for appearance will delete the previous shamefulness.

Still, in both fables the internalized sanctions are mere details in the broader theme which is the manipulation of reciprocal relations in favour of individual interest (see III.2.1–3). The protagonists of both fables are not concerned with the interest of their partners, their lover or the other foxes, but only look to satisfy their own interest. Even though they do have internalized sanctions on specific types of behaviour, these sanctions are not purely other-oriented. But neither are they purely self-interested. Their criteria for appropriateness can be placed somewhere in the middle between what is collectively seen as appropriate (a fox must have its tail at full length, the lover's age must be close to the woman's) and what is expedient and practical for the protagonist.

In P109, Zeus creates man, but forgets to put shame inside him (αἰσχύνη). He forces shame to enter the human body through the rectum. At first shame refuses to do so, but as Zeus insists she agrees on the condition that every time something comes after her through the rectum, she will immediately leave the body. The fable concludes that from that day on, all catamites lack shame (ἀπὸ τούτου συνέβη πάντας τοὺς πόρνους ἀναισχύντους εἶναι).[86] The fable supplies an aetiological censorship of a specific sort of sexual behaviour, which aims to strengthen the formation of a moral sanction. Through this fable the reader will be led to regard this sort of scxual behaviour as inappropriate and will use its condemnation (maybe citing the Aesopic fable as a proof) in his social life. It is tempting to see this fable as an example of the moralization of the collection that Nøjgaard described (see I.3.1, pp. 33–4 above), as well as of the gradually intensifying criticism of homosexuality in Greek thought that culminated in its Christian condemnation.[87]

Nevertheless, although they express the presence of, or need for,

[86] The word πόρνος referred to the passive partner in a homosexual relationship and was a derogatory term that indicated the baseness of his motivations that lay behind his adopting the passive role in the relationship. See Davidson (1997), 167–82, 250–5 and Dover (1978), 19–23, 52, 73–81, 103–5. None of these scholars mentions this fable in their accounts of the term in Greece.

[87] A process described by Foucault (1986), 228–40.

ethical standards and sanctions, none of these fables refers to the behaviour towards a weaker or defeated opponent. The Greek terminology of shame (e.g. αἰδώς, αἰσχύνη) is extremely rare in the *Augustana* and, when it is present or the protagonist's behaviour enables its use, it is not used to articulate the often expressed Greek view that the weak and the defended should be pitied and respected.[88]

There was, however, a specific area of social relations in Greece where the latter ethical sanction was present. Supplication is not rare in the *Augustana* and its depiction in the fables might shed some additional light on the collection's ethical sanctions on the behaviour of the stronger or winner (see III.3.4, pp. 128–33 below). Proper behaviour towards a suppliant is associated with the Greek concept of αἰδώς. In fact, the imbalance of status and honour that characterized the relationship between the suppliant and the recipient of the supplication produced in the latter a feeling of constraint that led to the rejection of violence against the suppliant.[89] The sanctions that control the protagonist's behaviour are external and not internalized. The collection's framework for the handling of interpersonal relationships is formed by examples of the appropriate code of behaviour in particular cases of social interaction. The collection's ethics are dictated either through successful examples of action in favour of the stronger protagonist and they thus promote justice as the strong's interest; or they do so through examples of his failure to satisfy his interests, thus promoting justice as cautionary and prudent action. Apart from the cases in which the weak prevails, this group of fables also includes treatment of the punishment of those who exceed the normal limits of action, on the destructive consequences of passions, and on the punishment (sometimes by divine agency) of the violation and manipulation of reciprocal relations.

III.3.3 *Internalized Sanctions: Gratitude*

The concept of 'grace', 'favour' or 'gratitude' (χάρις) is strongly associated with Greek reciprocal relations.[90] The term indicates an act

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[88] E.g. Ar. *V.* 568–74; Arist. *EN* 1137a31–8a3; Chilo fr. 10.3 DK; D. 24.171; Democr. frs. 46, 107a DK; E. *Supp.* 537–46; Pl. *Lg.* 734e–5a, 757d–e; Th. III.40, IV.19. Cf. Burkert (1996), 86 f.; Dover (1974), 169–70, 190–205, 240 f.

[89] Gould (1973), 87–8.

[90] On the change of meanings that the term χάρις underwent in Greek thought towards its meaning 'gratitude' see Parker (1998), 109 f. On the religious significance

of beneficence without any expectation of immediate return on the donor's part. It is seen as an essential part of friendship, because it creates a preliminary bond that may lead to friendship. Scholarly discussion of gratitude has focused on the question whether the donor's act is self-interested (if it includes an expectation of a future return and thus the whole process can be classified as a relationship of balanced reciprocity) or whether the donor's act is disinterested, and does not include any reciprocal aspect. Most of the evidence points to the first view.[91]

The *Augustana* represents gratitude in close connection with reciprocity. In line with the collection's overall view of reciprocal relations, gratitude is described through cases in which the reciprocal relation and its obligations are violated. In fable P6, a goatherd accuses the wild goats of ingratitude (ἀχαριστία). He brought them into his cave together with his other goats; he had been feeding them more than the others; still, they escaped at the first opportunity offered to them. In the goatherd's view, their ingratitude is due to their failure to reciprocate his favour by staying in his herd. Thus, his favour was not disinterested, because he expected a reciprocal relationship to be built upon it. However, the goats justify their ingratitude on the grounds of the goatherd's faulty reciprocation towards the other goats: seeing that the goatherd reduced his reciprocal obligations (taking good care of and feeding) to his own goats at the profit of the newcomers, they refuse to enter a reciprocal relationship based on gratitude with him, because he is liable to repeat his violation against them if he finds any other newcomers in the future.

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of the term see Bremer (1998); Burkert (1996), 134–8; Parker (1998). On the various contexts in which the terms was used in Greece (e.g. social, erotic, religious, physical beauty, poetic praise) see MacLachlan (1993), esp. chs. 1, 8.

[91] On χάρις as a reciprocal relation e.g. Democr. fr. 93 DK; D. 49.1–2; Epich. fr. 30 DK; Lys. 20.31; Pl. *Phdr.* 233d–4b. Cf. Blundell (1989), ch. 2; Herman (1987), 47–8; Konstan (1997), 81–2 (he also argues against the view that connects gratitude with friendship); id. (1998), 285; MacLachlan (1993), chs. 2, 5; Parker (1998), 109; Von Reden (1995), 79 f. (on the reciprocal obligations from gifts as favours); Van Wees (1998). On χάρις being a disinterested act see Arist. *EN* 1162b36 f., 1166a1–33, 1167b17–8a27; id. *Rh.* 1385a17–19; Democr. fr. 96 DK; D. 18.269; Th. II.40. See Blundell (1989), 35 and Zanker (1998). Cf. Herman (1998) (on generosity and self-restraint being opposed to reciprocity as a citizen's proper behaviour in the Athenian democratic ethos) and Missiou (1998) (on Athenian democracy being opposed to reciprocal generosity in the handling of foreign affairs). On gratitude in the *Augustana* see Cascajero (1991), 56; Rodríguez Adrados (1978b), 56. See also P296, 299, 323; Pr. 38, 79, 90; S46.

Gratitude by the donor initiates a reciprocal relationship and the recipient's feeling depends upon the respect of reciprocal obligations. This is the case in P22 (p. 132 below) in which a fox tries to hide from her hunters and comes across an oak-tree cutter. She supplicates him and asks him for shelter. Although he agrees to help her, when the hunters approach and ask him if he has seen the fox, he tries to betray her hideout and makes signs to them, which they fail to grasp. After their departure, the fox is about to leave too, without thanking the oak-tree cutter. He complains for her behaviour, as he believes that his favour (to accept the fox's supplication and hide her) demanded reciprocation (her expressing gratitude). The fox's answer is that she owes him no gratitude (ηὐχαρίστησα ἄν σοι). He is getting none because he breached his reciprocal obligations by trying to betray her hideout. In this sense, the reciprocal relationship involved in gratitude is faulty here.[92] Furthermore, the collection often explains ingratitude as failure to reciprocate a favour (P72, 120, 175, 208). For example, the plane tree accuses the travellers of ingratitude (ἀχάριστοι) (P175); not only did they not thank it for having relaxed under its shadow on a hot summer midday, but they also called it a useless and fruitless tree, adding abuse violation to their ingratitude. There are, however, two fables in which gratitude is effective and its reciprocal obligations are thoroughly respected. Both fables comment on the value of reciprocating a favour. The first of those is the fable of "the lion and the mouse who returned a favour" (P150, λέων καὶ μῦς ἀντευεργέτης):

> While a lion was asleep, a mouse ran over its body. The lion woke up and seized him and was ready to devour him. As the mouse begged the lion to let him go, saying that if he spared him he would repay the favour one day, the lion laughed and released him. But it happened that shortly afterwards the lion was saved because of the mouse's gratitude. That is, when he was caught by some hunters and was tied to a tree with a rope, as soon as the mouse heard his groans, he showed up and gnawed through the rope and after he untied him he said "so you laughed at me back then because you did not expect to receive any return of your favour by me; but now put well in your mind that there is a certain gratitude even among mice".

[92] For an allusion to this fable by Epicurus see Max.Tyr. 32.1–2. See Van Dijk (1997), 345–7.

This fable is an example of the collection's handling of the narration in order to reach the desired ethical message. Both this fable and fable P146 ("the lion who was scared of a mouse", pp. 170–1 below) start with an identical phrase: "a mouse ran all along the body of a lion that was asleep". What differs is the lion's reaction to this act, which brings about a different course of the plot, but the message is related in both cases. While in P150 the lion grasps the mouse and this enacts a series of actions of gratitude, in P146 he does not react at all and expresses his puzzlement at the mouse's courage in running over his body. Although fable P150 centres on the issue of gratitude, both fables conclude that even those who look insignificant might possess and display inner qualities such as courage and the capacity to repay gratitude.[93]

The fable starts with a successful plea by the weaker party. It is rare in the collection for the weaker animal to persuade the stronger that holds it captive to spare its life (see III.3.2 above). What makes the difference is the argument used by the mouse. He proposes to enter into a relationship with the lion based on reciprocity; if the lion gratifies him by sparing his life, he will pay back the favour to him (σωθεὶς χάριτας αὐτῷ ἀποδώσει). The lion laughs at the impossibility of such a relationship, thinking of the mouse as too insignificant an animal to return any sort of favour, and in a good mood he sets him free.

Nevertheless, the reciprocal relationship based on gratitude still stands on the mouse's part, although the lion did not bother to think seriously about its potential benefits for him. After he repaid the favour, the mouse takes his bit of pride and esteem in the animal world by declaring that even the weak can carry the weight of the reciprocal obligations of gratitude. The same message is conveyed in P235. An ant was about to drown when a pigeon saved him. In this fable, the party in need (the ant) did not cry for help at all. This is an essential point, because it makes the pigeon's act look totally disinterested. While this act of disinterested gratitude was taking place, a fowler was about to catch the pigeon. The ant, having just been saved, reciprocated the pigeon's favour by saving her: he bit the fowler's foot, who shook his limed twigs; at this, the pigeon noticed him and flew away.

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[93] See also the much celebrated fable of Androcles and the lion in Gellius V.14.

These two fables, then, stand in contrast to the general picture of reciprocal relations in the *Augustana*. Surprisingly enough, gratitude in them is effective and, more importantly, it seems to be a disinterested act by its donor. It should be noted, however, that the lion's act in P150 can hardly be described as a purely disinterested one. The lion does not free the mouse out of altruism. By 'altruism' I mean an other-concerned practice, which is pursued by the ethical agent without *any* concern for its future reciprocation. The lion simply finds the promise of reciprocal aid too funny. He is portrayed as a strong character who is so certain of his superiority and power that he does not feel that any personal interest is at stake if he frees the mouse. His act is one of indifference and, indirectly, a repayment to a victim of his power who made him laugh.

However, the pigeon's favour in P235 is disinterested, and both fables exhibit an effective relationship based on amicable reciprocity. But, these are exceptional cases; they give a note of optimism in a pessimistic picture, adding a little hope to an unfavourable reality. Besides, it is significant that both fables praise the qualities of the weak. In this case, the collection's popular ethics soften popular dissatisfaction about reciprocal relations by indicating that failure to respect them is not universal. At the same time, the fables strengthen the self-consciousness of the socially inferior groups by demonstrating that even the weak have a moral worth (by contrast with the violation of reciprocal relationships by the strong). However, it is possible to call into question the idea that encourages a disinterested spirit in the depiction of gratitude in P235. The practical message of the fable of "the ant and the pigeon" might be seen as promoting gratitude as an act that will bring a beneficial counter-act. Consequently, the reader's or user's application of the fable may lead to a self-interested readiness to act with gratitude in the expectation of a future reciprocation. The ethical message may thus become "if you are grateful [do a beneficial act], like the pigeon, you too will one day be recompensed".

The whole discussion of self-interested reciprocal relationships in the collection's portrayal of friendship and gratitude might offer some additional material for recent discussion of the concept of altruism in the Greek view of friendship. Some have argued that the Greek concept of friendship allows scope for the notion of altruism within reciprocity. Other scholars have argued against this view, on the grounds that the ideal of altruism is a modern one influenced especially

by Kantian ethics (according to which ethical agents must treat each other as an end and not as a means) and in sharp contrast to Greek thought which located other-benefiting actions in the context of social ideals of reciprocity and solidarity. In the view of these scholars, there is no room for altruism in Greek thought, but only for mutually beneficial actions, either as balanced or generalized reciprocity, and for actions that support solidarity in general or promote solidarity and collective welfare in the democratic ethos in particular.[94]

The collection's ethical messages can be grouped under the interpretative categories of reciprocal relationships, amicable or hostile, pursuit of individual interest, of survival and practicality. In this respect, action in the *Augustana* is self-interested. There is no altruistic criterion for other-concern and solidarity, but helping others is recommended only in so far as it may eventually benefit oneself. The course of action to be chosen depends on the conditions under which action takes place. If the situation permits it, one helps the others and benefits later or, if one cannot do otherwise, one leaves them in their misfortunes and saves oneself.

III.3.4 *External Sanctions: Supplication and Respect of the Suppliants*

The act of supplication enacted a reciprocal relationship between two parties linked by an imbalance of power. The weak or defeated party who was wholly dependent upon the power and will of the strong or winning party resorted to supplication in a last attempt to change the expected unfavourable course of action. Supplication was an act that sought a reciprocal act from its recipient and can thus be placed in the category of balanced reciprocity. The suppliant declared through a series of gestures and utterances his dependence

[94] The Greek sources that are differently interpreted in favour or against both views are Arist. *EE* 1239a1–7; id. *EN* 1155b31–56a5; id. *Rh.* 1361b36–7, 1366b6–67a4; Epicur. LS 22.E–H, O (cf. 22.A–D, S); Hom *Il.* 24; Pl. *R.* 519c8–520d8. In favour of altruism as a concept within Greek reciprocal relationships: Annas (1993), chs. 10–12; Irwin (1995a), chs. 17–18; Konstan (1996); id. (1997), 1–9, 68–82; id. (1998), 279–82; Price (1989), chs. 1, 4–5; Zanker (1998). Against altruism as a concept within Greek reciprocal relationships: Gill (1995), ch. 3; id. (1998); Osborne (1994), ch. 6; Postlethwaite (1998). Cf. MacIntyre (1985), ch. 12; Williams (1985), chs. 3–5, 10. There is, however, one idea in Greek ethical thought that resembles our modern notion of altruism: the Stoics' idea of οἰκείωσις which promotes seeing human beings as such (and not just those close to you) as your own and involves concern and fellow-feeling for them. See LS 57.E–G and Gill (1998), 327.

on the stronger party, his own inferiority in terms of both physical strength and social status and his defenceless submission to the stronger party's power and will. It was an act of self-abasement by the suppliant, who accentuated the stronger's status in order to regain from him, in exchange, a favourable act and a restoration of his humiliated status.

Apart from the social content of the act, supplication also had a religious content; the suppliant invoked the protection of his defenceless plea by the gods, especially Zeus the protector of suppliants (Zeus *Hiketesios*).[95] This added an external (divine) causation to the suppliant's pleas. Nevertheless, supplication could also be rejected; Greek literature quite often described cases of failed supplication. Furthermore, in the course of time supplication gradually lost its formal process and content: it was often replaced by 'figurative' supplication, where only the verbal part of the process was present. From the fifth century B.C. onwards, figurative supplication predominates in our sources and at the same time it successively becomes more metaphorical, almost a verbal form. Its role as a binding force between individuals, based on the norms of reciprocity is gradually replaced by the collective institutions of the *polis*.[96]

The *Augustana* describes acts of supplication (P3, 22).[97] The description of the process is extremely brief, usually reduced to a single word that denotes supplication (various forms of the verb ἱκετεύω, "to supplicate"). This may be due to the collection's stylistic demands, but it may also be explained by the collection's supplications being 'figurative'. In fact, this last point is in accordance with both the collection's late dating and the almost formalistic and emptily metaphorical content that supplication has in the fables in which it occurs. I have also included in the discussion of supplication in the collection those fables in which the verb δέομαι (P4, 18, 134, 150) occurs. Although it does not have the significance and clear connotations of the verb ἱκετεύω, it does denote a relationship of dependence and a plea to the stronger party.

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[95] See Burkert (1985), 130; *RE* vol. X.A, 316–17; Yamagata (1994), 9–11.

[96] See Gould (1973) and Yamagata (1993), ch. 3 (on supplication in Homer). On supplication in connection with guest-friendship see Herman (1987), ch. 3.3. The *loci classici* for the acceptance and rejection of supplication from Greek literature are Hom. *Il.* 22.465–508; id. *Od.* 22.342–77 (acceptance), and id. *Il.* 21.64–125, 22.337–54; id. *Od.* 22.310–25 (rejection).

[97] See also *Life of Aesop* 99, 135 (G).

The most detailed description of supplication appears in the fable of "the eagle and the beetle" (P3):

> An eagle chased a hare. The hare, having no one to help him, saw a beetle, the only creature that the circumstances offered to him as a helper, and supplicated him. The beetle encouraged him, and when he saw an eagle approaching, he begged the eagle not to carry off his suppliant. The eagle, however, scorned the beetle's small size and devoured the hare before the beetle's eyes. Since that incident, the beetle was resentful and kept watching the eagle's nest and, whenever she laid eggs, it would fly up, roll the eggs out of the nest and smash them. This went on until the eagle, being driven away from every place, took refuge with Zeus—for the bird is sacred to him—and begged him to provide her a safe place to give birth. As Zeus let her lay her eggs in his lap, the beetle saw this, made a ball of dung, flew up and when he arrived at Zeus' lap he dropped it in there. Zeus wanted to shake off the dung, but as he got up he accidentally threw the eggs out. Since then it is said that eagles do not lay eggs during the time that the beetles are around.

This was a celebrated fable in antiquity. It was often alluded in a variety of writers, usually attributed to Aesop himself: the Delphians wrongly and deceitfully accused him of sacrilege against Apollo and were about to execute him, although he had sought refuge at the temple of the Muses. So he told them this fable to dissuade them. He explained it as an example in support of the suppliants' protection and of the revenge that would fall upon them in case they dragged him out of the temple and executed him.[98] This aetiological fable develops its plot around the theme of violated supplication and its punishment.[99] The hare supplicates (ἱκέτευεν) the beetle. Although his supplication is accepted, it is a dysfunctional one because the hare acts out of necessity, because there is nobody else to help him; the hare supplicates the beetle, a recipient of supplication who cannot physically guarantee protection. In fact, the hare is much bigger and stronger than its protector, an oxymoron that accentu-

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[98] See *Life of Aesop* 134–9 (G). Cf. Ar. *Lys.* 695; id. *Pax* 127–34; id. *V.* 1446–8 (and Schol.Aristoph. *V.* 1446); Lucianus *Icar.* 761; id. *Deor.Conc.* 532; id. *Pseudol.* 164; Semon. fr. 13 West; Zen. I.20 *CPG.* See also Bowie (1993), 135–6; Van Dijk (1995b); id. (1997), 149–50, 194–7, 203–10, 216–19; Karadagli (1981), 17–19; Perry (1936), 16 f.; Rodríguez Adrados (1988b). On the dung beetle in Greek thought see Davies and Kathirithamby (1986), 84–9.

[99] It also involves the broader issue that the weak can sometimes avenge the strong's unjust behaviour, on which see p. 133 below.

ates the hare's desperate condition.[100] This is possibly why the beetle urges him to take courage. The dysfunctionality of this supplication is proved when the eagle rejects the beetle's pleas (παρεκάλει) to respect his suppliant and devours the hare in front of his protector. The eagle's reason for rejecting the pleas of the beetle does not lie only in the immediate satisfaction of his interest (hunting to feed himself, see II.3.1); it lies also in his disregard of the beetle's size and strength to defend his suppliant. The worries about the dysfunctionality of the first supplication are shown to be justified.

The eagle did not take into account that every animal, even a weak one, has certain abilities, including the ability to avenge itself, a point underlined in the *epimythium*.[101] The beetle succeeds in taking revenge, even against a stronger opponent. The effectiveness of his hostile reciprocity is achieved through continuous and repetitive action and alertness. The eagle resorts to his protector, Zeus, becomes a sort of suppliant in his turn, and his pleas for shelter are accepted (κατέφυγε ... ἐδεήθη).[102] It is tempting to recall here the image of Zeus as a protector of suppliants. Zeus supports the eagle, but his role is faulty because he did not intervene when the hare's supplication was violated. Furthermore, his protection of the eagle is in fact disastrous, although involuntarily. Therefore, his role is ineffective and faulty. The eagle's resort to Zeus' protection is also dysfunctional and ineffective, because the abuser of supplication enters a relationship of dependence in his turn; the recipient of his pleas is stronger than the beetle was for the hare, but he is proved incapable of protecting the eagle. The beetle's punishment for the violation of the supplication is a Pyrrhic victory; it leaves the social institution of supplication seriously injured and downgraded, because it is proved faulty and ineffective. However, the beetle's revenge has

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[100] This oxymoron might be explained by a point made by Rodríguez Adrados. He argues that the fable of "the eagle and the beetle" is of Egyptian origin. The beetle's sacred position in Egyptian religion justifies its presentation as a recipient of supplication, even by an animal bigger than it, as the case is in the Aesopic fable. That is, the otherwise odd image of a beetle being supplicated by a hare can be interpreted as a remnant from the original Egyptian tale. See Rodríguez Adrados (1988b).

[101] "The fable teaches not to despise anyone, remembering that no one is so weak as to be unable to avenge himself when abused."

[102] See Zeus' support to the harrier eagles who cried for their nests' destruction in A. *A.* 49–59. But also see Artemis' anger against the hare-devouring eagles, ibid. 109–37.

social significance: it emphasizes that even the weakest members of a social group have their own abilities and merit. It also points out, through the eagle's sufferings, that respect of supplication is also in the interest of the stronger party.

In fable P22 the fox refuses to reciprocate the oak-tree cutter's acceptance of her supplication (ἱκέτευσε). The reason is that this supplication was faulty. Being chased by hunters, she supplicated him to hide her; at first, he accepted. But, when the hunters asked him if he had seen her, he told them that he had not (thus accomplishing his reciprocal obligations). However, he simultaneously pointed with his hand to her hideout (thus violating his reciprocal obligations). They did not notice his trick and left. Afterwards, the fox came out and refused to express her gratitude to him (ηὐχαρίστησα ἄν σοι, εἰ . . .), that is she violated her reciprocal obligations on the grounds of his violation of an accepted supplication's code of action.[103]

In two other fables (P4, 18) the pleas of the weaker party (the nightingale and the sprat respectively) towards the strong party that holds their fate (the hawk and the fisherman) are ineffective. Although the weak claim total dependence upon the strong, and also claim their insignificance as prey and their justified plea to him to spare their lives, the stronger rejects their pleas on the grounds of his individual interest. He presents it as imprudent to leave a present prey, no matter how small it is, for the hope of a future bigger gain. Thus, a relationship of dependence can be violated.

The pleas of the weaker are also dysfunctional, because sometimes the weaker party itself refuses to follow the reciprocal obligations that it had agreed on after entering into a relationship of dependence. So in fable P134 the weaker party (the dog) breaks his agreement with the wolf in favour of his personal interest (survival). The wolf seized him while he was asleep on the ground. The dog, however, succeeds with his pleas (δέομαι) in persuading the wolf to postpone devouring him. He reveals that the following day his masters are to hold a wedding feast. So, if the wolf returns after the feast, he will have a better meal out of him, for he will have already consumed the remains of the food. The wolf returns only to find the dog standing safe on the roof of the house and refusing to fulfil his promise. Following the πάθει μάθος message (see II.4.1), the dog has

[103] The fable involves the issue of gratitude (χάρις), see III.3.3.

taken precautions to avoid future danger.[104] He now refuses to reciprocate, arguing sarcastically for his need to survive. The negative depiction of the supplications and pleas of the weaker protagonist in the *Augustana* is in accordance with the collection's general presentation of reciprocal relationships as ineffective and faulty.[105]

As the study of *hubris*, inhibition and supplication has demonstrated, the behaviour of the stronger protagonists towards the weak and the defeated in the *Augustana* is not dictated by a whole-hearted application of internalized ethical sanctions. The collection promotes individual interest and the violation of amicable reciprocal relationships that are based upon dependence. In the rare cases that these sanctions are present and effective, the message is cautionary. The collection's user is not asked to obey these sanctions in the future, but to keep an eye on the possible consequences of their violation. Practicality and individual interest prevail over any generally accepted ethical concept. There is no concept of magnanimity or philanthropy, but only the reminder of the possible mishaps consequent on the stronger's behaviour. The collection supplies many stories in which the weak can harm the strong, avenge his unfair actions, cheat him, or notice his plans against them and expose him.[106] These cautionary terms must be respected by the weak.

III.3.5 *External Sanctions: Divine Punishment and Other Non-Human Forces (Fate, Chance)*

The practical and cautionary aspects of the sanctions that the collection recognizes are in accordance with its general view of life as fickle (see pp. 139–40 below). In this insecure framework for action, a useful message and an additional external sanction is the belief, often expressed in Greek thought, that every action might provoke a related counter-action. This means that the unjust may face injustice against him, sometimes identical in kind, and consequently "one

[104] His sleeping on the roof brings in mind the high/low distinction in fable P1. See pp. 86 f. above and p. 88 n. 16 above.

[105] There is an effective supplication in P39, for which see pp. 53–4 above.

[106] E.g. P3, 7, 79, 97, 142–3, 146, 157, 160, 172, 187, 231, 241. See Cascajero (1991), 38, 48–9; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.178–88; id. (1988a), 424. See P251, 255, 427. See also the theme of the cheater being revealed or cheated in IV.1.3, pp. 161–3 below. Sometimes, the weak should be spared because they can prove helpful in the future as in P150, pp. 125–6 above.

should not do to others what he does not want to happen to him". It is interesting to note how Norbert Elias describes pity for the defeated enemy in the Middle Ages as a way to avoid finding oneself in an equally defenceless situation in the future. On the other hand, his remarks on the Medieval man's pleasure in torturing, mutilating, and killing his defeated enemies reveal the inadequacy of modern attitude regarding ferocity and violence towards the weak and defeated when studying the behavioural norms of past civilizations. A detailed study of Greek attitudes towards violence in the treatment of a dependent person (e.g. someone being interrogated, a criminal, a child etc.) would have been useful considering the physical or verbal violence that is often present in the treatment of an opponent in the *Augustana*.[107]

The deterrent consequences of the knowledge of a possible future operation of the *lex talionis* or retaliatory justice (see p. 82 above), whether from human agency (as in the case of the punishment of one's enemies) or non-human, form another external sanction on the ethical agent's behaviour. Therefore, one must also study the role of religion in the collection. A considerable number of major and minor Greek deities in the collection appear as protagonists or as simple citations.[108] We also find professional groups related to religion, such as priests, seers, magicians (P36, 56, 89, 161–2, 164) and religious practices (sacrifices and offerings, prayers, festivals, worship of gods' statues, communication with the gods through omens and dreams).[109]

It has been argued that the collection is critical towards religion. The gods in the fables are mere figures without any ethical significance, they are not the superior and omnipotent forces that rule the world but they are rather notions empty of any content who simply help to develop the plot. Besides, the fables are often marked by irreverence, as men try to avoid accomplishing their vows, seers are

[107] E.g. Anaximand. fr. 1 DK; Democr. fr. 260 DK; Epich. fr. 30 DK; Hdt. I.86; Heraclit. fr. 80 DK; Hes. *Op.* 265–6, 721; Pl. *R.* 331d–e, 332b–d, 335a. Cf. Blundell (1989), 28–9; Dover (1974), 269–71; Gouldner (1973), 244–7. See Elias (1978), 191–204. Cf. Cascajero (1991), 37. Against retaliatory justice see Arist. *EN* 1132b21–3a5; Pl. *R.* 332c.

[108] P3, 30, 34, 44, 49–50, 60–1, 63, 78, 87–9, 100–9, 111, 117, 163, 166, 173–4, 178–9, 185, 198, 221–2, 239–40.

[109] P1, 5, 28, 30, 34, 47, 49–50, 61, 78, 88–9, 94, 99, 110, 125, 127, 162, 182, 222, 236.

ridiculed, and oaths are not kept. This impunity is sometimes punished (e.g. P28, 36, 239), but sometimes is not (e.g. P34, 178). The whole depiction of religion, it is thought, reflects a scepticism that originates in popular distrust for the strength of gods and religion.[110]

This is too reckless a statement to make about the collection as a whole, though it has some basis. Certain fables do criticize religious practice and one of the best examples of this is fable P34, in which a poor man, who is about to die, promises a hecatomb to the gods if they help him recover. When his wife asks him where he is going to find the money to buy a hundred animals to sacrifice to the gods, the poor man replies "do you think that I will recover, so that the gods will demand them?". This fable reflects pessimism and disbelief about the possibility of escaping death through divine intervention. Prayers for salvation to gods are a hopeless attempt that is doomed to fail. Pragmatism here stands in contrast to faith; when there is no hope, a man is justified in resorting to anything, including false vows, especially if he is poor and therefore *de facto* unable to fulfil them. It seems as if the commands of necessity and the will to survive justify the otherwise irreverent behaviour.

In a similar case, a traveller cheats Hermes in P178. He had vowed to offer to the god half of anything he would find on the rest of his journey provided that he arrived safely at his destination. He then finds a pouch; thinking it will be full of money he opens it, but to his disappointment it contains nothing but almonds and dates. He eats them and places their shells and stones on an altar, thus fulfilling his vow and cheating Hermes. He expected a different reward from the god of profit and he is thus justified in cheating. This fable could be seen as another example of a justified breach of reciprocal obligation, because the first participant in the reciprocal relationship had already broken his agreement. Nevertheless, it is not only humans involved here, but a god and a man. The fact that the fable reduces the reciprocal obligations between man and god to the rules that define those between men is an indicator of the practical and self-interested character of the ethics in the collection. However, it may be significant that the god involved is Hermes, a god famous for his tricks. The message here could be

[110] See Dumont (1989); Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.525–35. The popular anti-religious element in the collection is argued more categorically by Cascajero (1991), 40, 53 and García Gual (1978), 205–6.

that "the cheater is cheated". Besides, Hermes as the god of profit, trade, and theft often had negative connotations in popular thought.[111]

Practitioners of religion form another target. The witch in P56 (p. 117 above) is scorned for professing to be able to persuade the gods although she could not persuade the people not to condemn her. In P161 a related criticism is made of the seer who did not foresee that his house would be burgled. Additionally, P110 (p. 68 above) criticizes excessive offerings to the statues of domestic heroes, thus reflecting popular condemnation of excessive expenditure on religion.[112]

Are these fables enough to constitute an 'anti-religious' feeling or irreverence in the *Augustana*? The answer is 'no', especially when one considers the large number of fables in which religion and religious practice are described as being effective. Men and animals often pray to the gods and see their wishes fulfilled (P28, 49–50, 78, 179). The power of oracles and seers is reinstated in some fables (P36, 89, 162). For example, in P36 (pp. 161–2 below) the Delphic oracle reveals and censures the mischievous man who wanted to defame it,[113] while in P162 (pp. 138–9 below) the oracle is fulfilled despite human efforts to escape it. Divine help is often invoked when injustice cannot be punished by the figures in the fables themselves, although we do not witness its intervention (P1, 66, 159, 206).[114] This is usually done through the force of the curse (P66, 159, 206), which was thought to be divinely sanctioned.[115] It is only in a few cases that the gods punish vices (greed, P117, 166). In some other cases their intervention is limited to advice on the proper behaviour and no punishment is involved (P185, 198). It is significant, however, that we rarely witness divine intervention for the punishment of unjust or vicious behaviour. It seems that the collection, although it is conscious of the possibility and power of divine intervention and therefore is 'religious', allows interaction between the divine and the

[111] See Burkert (1985), 156–9; Vernant (1983), ch. 5.

[112] See Plu. *Sol.* 21 and Seaford (1994), 74–86, on Solon's funerary legislation against private lamentation.

[113] Compare fables P36 and 89 with the story of Aristodicos who tried unsuccessfully to prove the oracles to be false in Hdt. I.159.

[114] In P1 (pp. 86 f. above) the eagle's punishment results from the sacrilegious theft of meat from an altar. Nevertheless, Zeus' intervention in the punishment is implicit, it is not stated anywhere in the fable.

[115] See Watson (1991), esp. 39–40.

human spheres only when the predominance of the former is disrespected or violated by the latter. In other words, gods do intervene effectively in human affairs, but mainly when their status is affected by human action. Otherwise, when the gods are not directly affected by human action, their punitive power is known and invoked, but their intervention is a *desideratum*. The usual cause for effective divine intervention is when the limits between gods and the fable protagonists are not respected. Irreverence and disrespect to the divine will, as well as failure to meet divine expectations, are immediately punished by the gods (P28, 44, 61, 100, 102, 106–7, 239). So, in contrast to P34 and 178, in P28 (p. 109 above) the gods intervene and punish the man who tried to cheat them and violate his initial vows. Portrayed as a deity, the Oath reminds the perjurer of his retributive strength (P239, p. 110 above). Even when it is not clearly named, the divine element seems to be the driving force behind the dramatic conclusion of events as in fable P32:

> A murderer was chased by his victim's relatives. As he arrived at the river Nile, he encountered a wolf. Being scared, he climbed a tree that stood by the river and hid himself there. But, there he saw an adder coming towards him, and so he jumped in the river. But a crocodile waited for him there and ate him.

There is no shelter for a murderer. He may escape human punishment, but his violence will always be reciprocated in the end. However, the fact that divine intervention is not clearly stated signifies the diminished role of religion in this fable. Furthermore, the fable is in accordance with the Greek belief that the avenging deities are awake every time blood is unfairly spilt and that sooner or later they will lay their hands upon the guilty and destroy him.[116]

Greek popular thought and religion believed in the impact of forces which are outside human control, such as chance and fate. These forces are presented as active throughout the collection.[117] Chance is accepted as a force that can affect and even alter the course of things. It even appears as a deity in two fables (P61, 174).

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[116] See Van Dijk (1996), 528–9. On religious and popular belief in the power of divine unwritten laws and the deities that enforced them see Burkert (1985), chs. 4.3, 5.4.3; Dover (1974), 246–61; Yamagata (1994), chs. 4–6, 9. Fable P32 might have Egyptian origins, because it takes place at the Nile and mentions a crocodile, an animal unknown to the Greek ecosystem.

[117] Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.629–30.

Chance can bring an unexpectedly favourable situation, as in P21, in which, after the fishermen have given up any effort to catch it, the tunny throws itself to their boat and is picked up. The fable's *epimythium* points to the importance of chance: "So many times it happens that what skill does not grant is rewarded by chance".[118] It is a force that men must honour as P61 points out. A farmer discovers a piece of gold, while digging his field. He expresses his gratitude to the Earth, at which point Chance appears to him and reproaches him for being thankful to the wrong deity. However, the role of chance in human life is only auxiliary. It is human actions that are primarily responsible for the human condition (P174, pp. 174–5 below). This view is repeated in P30, which preaches effort instead of prayers to the gods (see p. 57 above).[119]

Fate also figures in the fables, at least in the idea that divinely given order will be fulfilled, come what may.[120] Thus we hear that "divine chance" (θεία τύχη) ensures that out of the two offspring an ape has, the one that is mostly taken care of eventually dies (P218).[121] Also, in fable P162 what is destined to happen and is revealed and guaranteed by a reliable oracle cannot be avoided. A woman gets an oracle that her boy will be killed by a κόραξ. Thinking that the oracle meant the raven, she takes the precaution of locking her son in the house, in order to protect him from ravens. But one day, as

[118] The tunny in fables P21 and P113 is reported to land "by mistake" in a boat or at a beach. Aeschylus in fr. 308 Radt gives interesting biological information that might explain these 'mistakes' of the tunny: it cannot see well in one eye. On the image of the tunny falling into the nets see Hdt. I.62; Lucianus *JTr* 25; Opp. *H.* 576, 597. According to Arist. *HA* 602a25 and Opp. *H.* 506–32, a pest stings the tunny and drives it crazy; as a result it throws itself in the nets. See Thompson (1947), 82, 88.

[119] Cf. Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.539–41. On the importance of luck (and fate) in Greek thought and the subsequent vulnerability of human moral excellence because of luck's intervention in human affairs see Greene (1944), chs. 2, 4–7 and Nussbaum (1986), esp. ch. 1. Cf. Adkins (1960), ch. 1; Burkert (1985), 129–30; Dover (1974), chs. 3–4; Thomson (1941), chs. 3, 9, 18; Yamagata (1994), ch. 7. See also Pr. 46, 105, 110. On the transition from a belief in divine intervention and control of human affairs to the concept of individual ethical responsibility see Seaford (1994), 205–6; Thomson (1941), ch. 15. On chance (and fate) in the *Augustana* see Cascajero (1991), 53; Rodríguez Adrados (1978b), 52. On the importance of τύχη in Greek thought see e.g. A. *Ag.* 1647; Arist. *EE* 1247a–8b7; id. *EN* 1100a10–1a13; Democr. frs. 119, 176, 269 DK; Pl. *Lg.* 709b–c; Pythag. fr. D11.23–6 DK; S. *Aj.* 485.

[120] On fate in Greek thought see e.g. Hdt. I.91, VI.75–84; S. *Ant.* 1337–8, and the Stoics' views in LS 55.O–R, 62.A–C, R–U. For modern bibliography on fate in Greek thought and in fables see the previous footnote.

[121] The same zoological observation can be found in Opp. *C.* II.608–11.

she put the door's lid up, the hooked door-handle (κόραξ) fell on her son and killed him. The misinterpretation of the meaning of κόραξ by the mother gives a more 'tragic' colour to her son's death, a dimension of personal responsibility behind her mistaken attempt to interpret the will of fate.[122] She believed that she had understood the oracle properly and felt that her intervention could save him. But, despite her extreme precautions, she failed. The fable points to the ambiguous meaning of oracles. But this is not to criticize their validity. The oracle is proved right at the end and fate is not avoided. The oracles are true; everything depends on human interpretation, which may itself lead to disaster.[123]

In general, uncertainty characterizes the world-view of the collection.[124] There are sudden changes in one's condition. The lesson is that, no matter how disagreeable things are, they may always get worse (P49, 55, 80, 86, 161, 164, 180). One cannot always be certain about the course of things because sudden and unforeseen turns occur, although they are not explicitly attributed to chance or fortune. Disappointment and distress in an unfortunate situation should not be prolonged. In P13 the fishermen think that they have caught a lot of fish, because their nets are very heavy as they are pulling them out, and are very pleased. But, in fact, they have caught a lot of stones and just a few fish. As they are moaning over their bad luck an old fisherman (his old age gives gravity to his comment) asks them to stop complaining, because, as he observes, "sorrow is joy's sister", and one often follows the other.[125]

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[122] See also the entry for 'κόραξ' in *LSJ* meaning "hooked door-handle". Cf. Adrastus' story in Hdt. I.34–43.

[123] The power of the seers to reveal the truth is also acclaimed in fables P37, 89.

[124] Doderer (1970), 109–11; Jedrkiewicz (1983); id. (1989), chs. 6, 10. Greeks believed in the fickleness of human life. This included both the ideas that sudden changes may always occur (e.g. even the mightiest might fall) and that, because of this changeability, a person's condition in life should be evaluated only after he is dead. E.g. A. *A.* 928–30; Antipho Soph. fr. 49.11–13 DK; Diogenian. IV.90, VIII.45 *CPG*; E. *Andr.* 100–2, 462–3; id. *Hec.* 489–98, 619–28; id. *Heracl.* 608–17, 863–6; id. *HF* 503–12; id. *Ph.* 1758–63; id. *Supp.* 549–57; id. *Tr.* 101–4, 474–99, 1203–6; Hdt. I.5, 32, 207, II.78, III.40, 126 f., VII.10, 46, 51, 203; Hes. *Op.* 5–7; Pl. *Phd.* 60b–c (P445); S. *Aj.* 1077–9; id. *Ant.* 1158–65, 1271–5; id. *OC* 607–15, 1451–6; id. *OT* 1186–204, 1524–30; id. *Ph.* 502–6; id. *Tr.* 131–5; Zen. I.65 *CPG*. See also P250, 263, 276, 357; Pr. 22, 99.

[125] This theme may derive from Pl. *Phd.* 60c. See Van Dijk (1997), 324 and Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.416. The sea was characterized by unpredictability in Greek thought; for example, it could bring unexpected fortune and misfor-

In general, certainty in the collection may turn into uncertainty. The hunter might become the hunted: the ass was hunting the lion who turned back and devoured his persecutor (P82); the bird-catcher was bitten by an asp while he was hunting birds (P115)[126] and the raven who had seized a snake was bitten too by his victim (P128). Even would-be hunters may find themselves running away, scared by their potential victims, such as the farmer who tried to capture a lion (P144, p. 171 below) and the boy who wanted to grasp a scorpion, but got stung by it (P199). A shelter may turn into a death trap (P25, 75–6), those you trust may betray or destroy you (e.g. P74, 176, 209, 234), while those you consider unimportant may turn out to possess great virtues (P150, 226, 231). Good fortune turns into bad (P179, 202).[127] So you should wait to see how things turn up at the end before making any judgement about a present situation. Thus, in P183 the wild ass stops praising the domestic ass for his luxurious diet once he has seen the hardship he has to go through to gain food and shelter. Appearances are often deceptive (e.g. P177, 201, see IV.1.2 below).

The *Augustana*, then, does not reject religion, but neither does it allow any priority of divine intervention as a decisive factor in human affairs. Gods do not generally intervene in human action, unless they are directly concerned. This is so because of the collection's preoccupation with the human field of action; its lessons are pragmatic and practical.[128] The ethical messages of the fables are usually deterrent examples of the sort of practical behaviour that one should avoid, or grim but realistic assessments of society's ethical dysfunctionality (ruled by ingratitude, treason, lust etc.). This is why the gods and the heavenly forces that affect human affairs do not play a major role, although their significance and existence is acknowledged, as is the uncertainty of human success.

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tune, it denoted both departure and return. See Buxton (1994), 99–103. See also fables P21, 26, 168.

[126] See Garbe (1988), 278.

[127] A related proverb says that "trying to avoid smoke, I fell into the fire", Diogenian. VIII.45 *CPG*. This view can be related to the idea that you cannot change your condition and natural abilities, see II.5 above.

[128] There is, though, an intensive divine intervention with regard to the punishment of vices, see IV.1.1 below.

III.3.6 *External Sanctions: The Power of Others*

In addition to external sanctions, the fables often describe the application of collective punishment or reproach. While the athlete in P33 (pp. 154–5 below) relates his totally fictitious achievements in front of a crowd, one of the listeners comes forward and reveals his lies. Likewise, one of the by-standers in P99 (pp. 112–3 above) is sarcastic towards the lying seller of statues. The animal audience of the camel's inappropriate dance beat her with sticks (P83). Similarly, the human audience throws stones at the cacophonous arrogant man who played and sang to the kithara (κιθαρῳδός) in P121 (pp. 153–4 below). The other bird-contestants collectively punish the cheating jackdaw (P101, pp. 104–5 above). The ravens and the jackdaws in turns punish as a group the jackdaw who betrayed his kind (P123), who is punished for the same reason in P129 (p. 76 above).

The protagonists, people or animals, are gathered in crowds and—in groups or individually—punish inappropriate behaviour physically or condemn it verbally. Inappropriate behaviour is castigated, but no argued justification is given. In sum, although no coherent and analytical picture of punishment is offered, the collection at least sketches its existence, which is sufficient for the cautionary function of these fables.

III.3.7 *Conclusions*

Justice as a concept does not appear in the *Augustana*. Justice appears only in the form of the external sanctions described. By contrast, no internalized sanctions seem to be assumed to regulate social behaviour. The behaviour promoted is usually linked with the interest of the stronger or with the pursuit of personal interest in general. Within the ethics of the collection, the norm of reciprocity has proved to be a revealing interpretative tool, with a plurality of functions. It may replace institutionalized justice and operate as a principle in interpersonal relationships; this is displayed in fables where the violation of reciprocal obligations is punished or where the protagonists themselves punish non-reciprocal behaviour. It may also underlie the collection's cautionary messages either by warning the reader about future reciprocal punishment or by recommending a counter-action as a way of handling affairs and securing future prosperity. Nevertheless, the violation of reciprocal relationships may equally go unpunished.

This occurs in the majority of fables, where amicable reciprocity proves dysfunctional and ineffective. Reciprocity as a norm does not protect the weak protagonists from the unjust and arbitrary behaviour of the strong.

In relation to the Greek views and philosophical thought, the handling of interpersonal relationships in the *Augustana* is close to Thrasymachus' view in Plato's *Republic* that justice is dictated by the self-interest of the stronger and that an unjust act is admissible if it is beneficial for the agent.[129] It also recalls the sophistic distinction between nature (φύσις) and law (νόμος), with the first promoting individual interest and the second representing the demands of communal interest. A famous expression of this is by Antiphon (fr. 44 DK), who stated that a man would do best following nature when he is alone and without witnesses and law when in the company of citizens.[130] In addition, the collection's promotion of cautious behaviour that enables the weak to survive resembles the Greek view of justice as respect for one's limits, epitomized in the expression τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν ("minding one's own affairs and not meddling in the affairs of others").[131] The collection advises the maintenance of the social hierarchy, by showing that the natural (the protagonist's natural abilities) prevails over culture (the co-operative agreements between the protagonists).

There are few indications of internalized sanctions behind the behaviour of the protagonists in the fables. However, some recent scholarship has highlighted the problematic character of the distinction between internalized and externalized sanctions. This distinction has been used extensively by Classical scholars of this century, who argued that, in earlier Greek culture especially, there was no clear recognition of the importance of moral intention. Early Greek culture was seen as predominantly interested in the results of actions. It was also seen as a shame-culture (rather than guilt-culture), in which the greatest priority was attached to avoiding public failure and the associated disgrace. Such a failure would diminish social status and claims to honour (τιμή) and ethical sanctions were external, namely what others would think or say. It was also widely supposed

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[129] Pl. *R.* 338c–9a. Cf. id. *Grg.* 483d–92e; id. *Lg.* 714c; id. *R.* 344c, 348b–d. See also Th. I.76, II.63, III.39, IV.84–111, V.89.

[130] Guthrie (1969), chs. 4–5; Kerferd (1981), ch. 10.

[131] Pl. *R.* 433a–4a, 443c–4b.

that there was a transition from a shame-culture to a guilt-culture, in which the ethical agent internalizes socially appropriate criteria for behaviour. Guilt gradually replaced shame, with the emergence in Greek thought of the notions of individual conscience and moral responsibility, the identification of justice with the morally good and desirable (τὸ ἀγαθόν) and the communal control of individual behaviour through the punitive authority of the institutions of the *polis*.[132]

However, some modern scholarship has re-examined the ancient sources and argued against the dichotomy between shame-culture and guilt-culture and between internalized and external sanctions. It has been argued that all societies, including the Greek, depend on the internalization of social norms by its members.[133] In addition, the "shame-guilt" distinction does not match the evidence used to support it, in which the pursuit of individual profit and honour is closely linked with the benefit of the society as a whole, and the motivation behind the individual's action has been regarded as both self- and other-regarding. Furthermore, the Greeks, throughout the history of their culture, have always recognized a certain degree of moral responsibility, and have also granted a certain role to non-human factors (e.g. the gods and the natural forces) in determining the outcome of human actions. Greek sanctions on ethical behaviour are better explained in terms of the dialectical relationship between shame and guilt, individual conscience and collective control of behaviour. This relationship took a specific form under the *polis* where the framework for its operation was established by the institutions for the expression and protection of communal will and interest. The distinctions that scholars used to make were strongly influenced by the moral norms of modern Western philosophy; their application to Greek ethics, it is argued, is problematic and inappropriate.[134]

The impression in the *Augustana* is that practicality and individual

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[132] See Dodds (1951), ch. 2; Adkins (1960), chs. 14–15; id. (1972), chs. 2, 5; Dover (1974), 226–42; Donlan (1980), 5–6, 42–3, 59–63; Thomson (1941), ch. 15. A related distinction is that between competitive and co-operative ethics. On this distinction and its modern refutation see II.1.1 above.

[133] Cairns (1993), 27–47.

[134] See Long (1970), 138–9; MacIntyre (1985), chs. 10–11; Gagarin (1987); Cairns (1993), chs. 0.3–4, 1.7, 2.1–3; Williams (1993), ch. 4; Gill (1995), 6–7, 20–30; Yamagata (1995), chs. 9–11. Dodds himself, however, had already noted that his views do not assume "any particular theory of cultural change" and that "many modes of behaviour characteristic of shame-cultures persisted throughout the Archaic and Classical periods". See Dodds (1951), 28.

interest count more than communal demands and sanctions. It is significant that there are no internalized sanctions behind the protagonist's behaviour; neither is there a concept of guilt, even by implication. Is this due to the simplicity of the collection's style, which prevents the use of a specific vocabulary and a detailed analysis of the issues involved? Or does it imply that the concept of guilt was absent from popular ethics? The collection's ethics are mainly "shame-ethics", focused on loss of face, and "results-ethics", not focused on intentions or conscience. However, although they focus on individual profit and practicalities, they do not ignore the claims of the community, a point that is made through examples of punishment of non-reciprocal behaviour. Nor do they ignore the ethical agent's intentions, which are an important criterion for his punishment or verbal condemnation in the group of fables in which the cheater is revealed or cheated and the passions are punished (see IV.1.1, IV.1.3 below). This seeming inconsistency suggests, because the collection represents a late stage in the history of Greek literature, that "shame-ethics" and "results-ethics" were not replaced by "guilt-ethics" and "intention-ethics", but the latter survived in 'popular' Greek thought, which is represented by the fables. It also suggests that the opposition between individual profit and communal ethics should not be overstated. Both are recognized as important criteria behind action in the 'pragmatic' ethics of the *Augustana*. This is closer to the revisionist view of modern scholarship described above (p. 143) than to the older interpretation of the history of Greek ethics. However, these comments on the *Augustana* do not allow us to reach any general conclusions on Greek ethical theory. Borrowing the definition of ethical beliefs by Bernard Williams, the collection's ethical messages are 'intuitions', "spontaneous convictions, moderately reflective but not yet theorized".[135] This book aims only to present the explicit ethical content of the fables for comparison with other evidence from Greek ethics.

The messages of the fables on interpersonal relationships reflect, for the most part, the power of the stronger as a means of manipulating social relations. They take a negative view of social change and warn against the possible failures in the user's ethical life. The collection's portrayal of violated interpersonal relationships is in line

[135] Williams (1985), 93–4.

with the conclusions of the second chapter of this study, because it also offers advice on individual success and on compromising with one's social condition, when one is not strong or clever enough to alter it. A closer examination of the ethical concepts that compose the collection's framework for action, the virtues that are recommended and the vices that are censored, forms the content of the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV

THE FABLE AS A FORM OF ETHICAL REASONING

Chapters II and III have outlined the collection's framework for action. The interpretation of the patterns of behaviour that are promoted or criticized is based on the categories of conflict and survival, and of reciprocity. Yet the collection often interprets the protagonist's success or failure on the basis of his inner qualities. Therefore, in order to get a complete picture of the behavioural patterns that are promoted or rejected in the collection, we should also describe the inner qualities that often characterize the figures of the fables and lead them to act in a specific way. The reason for using the general category of inner qualities rather than the distinction between virtues and vices (ἀρεταί and κακίαι) is that the collection's conceptual framework is too deficient to enable such a distinction.[1] The idea of 'virtues' and 'vices', as elaborated in Greek theory, acquired a more precisely defined ethical and psychological status than we can attribute to the positive and negative qualities of the fables. The practical and casuistic aspects of the collection's ethics (see I.3.2 above) do not demand the use of a framework of virtues and vices. Therefore, a categorization of inner qualities into those with positive and those with negative consequences is more in line with the collection's ethical thinking.

None the less, as becomes clear from this chapter, there is some overlap between the traits of the qualities commended or criticized in the fables and the virtues and vices of Greek ethical philosophy (see IV.2 below). It can be argued, then, that virtues and vices are present in the *Augustana* as good and bad qualities (their characterization depending upon their consequences for the figure in the fable). These qualities also have some inner structure: they are often described

[1] Although the ancient testimonies on fable do often speak of its usefulness in the moral education of a young person (see p. 18 n. 57 and p. 22 nn. 69–70 above), only one of them (Philostr. *Im.* 1.3) clearly states that the Aesopic fables do criticize vices: "[Αἴσωπος] πλεονεξίαν τε γὰρ ἐπικόπτει καὶ ὕβριν ἐλαύνει καὶ ἀπάτην". See VD G43.

as dispositions of the character (see IV.1.2 below), they involve reasoning ("first-order" reasoning) and some degree of deliberation and thus leave scope for personal responsibility (see IV.1.5 below). The popular and practical content of the collection's ethical messages explains the limitation in its ethical reasoning (see IV.2 below).

IV.1 *The Inner Qualities in the* Augustana

IV.1.1 *Inner Qualities with Disastrous Effects*

This category includes those inner qualities that have disastrous effects for the protagonists and are thus criticized in the collection. They partly coincide with the patterns of behaviour that Greek thought characterized as vices. These inner qualities are characterized in the collection by excessive behaviour which fails to respect the limits for action (see II.5) and by their practical ineffectiveness. The collection focuses its criticism on love of wealth, greed, gluttony, idleness, and arrogance.[2]

The mistrust and damage that money brings into amicable reciprocal relationships have been discussed earlier (III.2.3 above). The criticism of love of wealth and profit is not specified in terms of the monetary economy. The *Augustana* generally describes wealth and profit in connection with the disastrous consequences for those who pursue it and associates them in particular with greed.[3] The more one has, the more one wants to get. Greed is connected with excess; the greedy cannot keep a good measure. The collection describes the greedy person as having no control over his passion for additional profit and thus not knowing when to stop pursuing it. In sum, the greedy performs excessive and imprudent acts with disastrous results.

For example, in P87 Hermes rewards a pious worshipper by giving him a goose that lays golden eggs. The man wants all the profit he can get out of the animal at once, so, instead of waiting for its daily delivery of golden eggs, he slays it expecting to discover gold inside it. In the end, he loses both the animal he killed and its daily

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[2] See Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.630–5.

[3] Cascajero (1991), 54; Rodríguez Adrados (1978b), 53.

gift. The fable starts with the description of the effectiveness of religious reciprocity, for the devoted worshipper is recompensed by Hermes' gift.[4] However, the man's desire for quick and extra profit deters him from limiting himself to a steady profit over time (οὐκ ἀναμείνας τὴν κατὰ μικρὸν ὠφέλειαν). He intervenes in the operation of the divine gift's function and tries to change it to augment his profit, because he assumed (ὑπολαβών) that the body that feeds and lays such a precious metal must also be composed of this metal. His actions are hasty and imprudent, leaving no scope for any forethought (οὐδὲν μελλήσας). His thoughtless expectations are soon proved faulty (ὧν προσεδόκησε σφαλῆναι). The fable's message is that the one who goes for more than has been assigned to him, not only fails, but even loses what he had before. The fable opposes gold to flesh, the symbolic to the real: gold is a metal, with a symbolic value, which is the result of convention and agreement among people, while flesh is equivalent to life and has a real value. In the end, the loss of the latter is more costly than that of the former, for life is irreplaceable. The fable also indicates the disastrous effects of human attempts to explain and meddle with miraculous objects of divine origins. The story itself does not explicitly present the man's behaviour as 'greedy'. It simply stresses the destructive consequences of imprudent action.[5]

Fable P58 presents basically the same plot with some modifications. Here a widow has a hen that lays an egg per day. She decides to overfeed the hen in order to make it lay twice a day. The result is that the hen grows so fat that it can no longer lay any eggs. The message is again the calamitous effect of greed. The message may gain in gravity considering that the woman is a widow and, having no husband to support her financially, the hen's egg every day may have been one of her few means of life.

Fables P133 and P148 point to the same view: he who goes for more than he has in the end loses everything. In the first story, a dog is crossing a river carrying a piece of meat in its mouth. Seeing

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[4] On Hermes association with wealth see pp. 111, 136 above.

[5] A view strongly supported by the fable's *epimythium*, which concludes that "so it often happens that the greedy, because of their longing for more, throw away even what they have at hand" (οὕτω πολλάκις οἱ πλεονέκται δι' ἐπιθυμίαν πλειόνων καὶ τὰ ἐν χερσὶν ὄντα προΐενται). This opposition between the real and the conventional also appears in P225 (pp. 151–2 below). One of its most celebrated versions from ancient literature is found in the story of Midas. See Ov. *Met.* 2.90 f.

its refracted reflection on the water, it thinks that there is another dog carrying a bigger piece of meat. It leaves the piece it carries in order to go for the bigger one, but in the end both the real and the reflected pieces are taken away by the stream.[6] In the second story, a lion leaves the hare he has seized and is about to eat in order to chase a deer he sees standing by. He also ends up losing both his first possession and his potential profit. The disastrous effects of the fable protagonists' abandonment of a present good for the sake of greater future profit is another way of attesting the importance of immediate action instead of the uncertainty of hopes for the future (II.3.1 above). Greed refers not only to the longing for extra profit but also to the desire to acquire someone else's possession. The fable's disapproval of such behaviour as a result of the vice of greed forms part of the general message that one should compromise (see II.5 above). In P117 (p. 73 above) the reason for the camel's punishment is that she is not satisfied with her natural qualities (being big in size and strength) but she wants more (περισσοτέρων ἐπιθυμεῖ)—what the *epimythium* describes as her πλεονεξία.

This form of greed is more explicitly outlined and censored in fable P166:

> The ant that we see today was once a man, and although he engaged in agriculture, he did not confine himself to his own work, but kept wanting the work of the other farmers and stealing the products of his neighbours. But Zeus got angry at his greed and metamorphosed him into the insect that we call an ant. Nevertheless, although he changed his form, he did not change his character; because he still goes around the fields gathering the wheat and barley of others and storing it for himself.

For the Greeks the ant symbolized the labourer *par excellence*; its mode of life was seen as one of constant toil with the recompense of a future abundance of goods.[7] It is interesting that the present fable confers a different interpretation upon this laborious behaviour and casts the ant as the archetype of unjust labour: what characterizes this insect is dissatisfaction with his lot (τοῖς ἰδίοις πόνοις οὐκ ἠρκεῖτο)

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[6] Once again, the *epimythium* specifies the protagonist as 'greedy' (πλεονέκτης). On P133 see Rodríguez Adrados (1965b), 10. See also Democr. fr. 224 DK studied in Van Dijk (1997), 319–21.

[7] Arist. *HA* 488a10–23, 622b19–27, 623b13–14; Theoc. 17.107. See also P112 (pp. 69–70 above).

and constant labour that covets (ἐποφθαλμιῶν) and robs (ὑφαιρούμενος) other people's fortunes.[8] The ant's conduct is termed 'greed' (πλεονεξία). He stores goods (ἀποθησαυρίζει) and augments his fortune. But he does so by stealing his neighbours' goods, thus making capital out of their labour without their consent. Therefore, the acts that result from greed threaten the socio-economic balance of the social group (the farmers). One must have only what one has worked for or has been wholeheartedly given. A vice, such as greed, constitutes lack of measure; the ant cannot content himself with what he has (οὐκ ἠρκεῖτο). This is part of the ant's character or disposition (διάθεσις); it remains inside him and continues driving his actions despite his transformation by Zeus (ὁ δὲ καὶ τὴν μορφὴν ἀλλάξας τὴν διάθεσιν οὐ μετεβάλετο).[9]

The desire for wealth and profit is associated with wickedness of character, as in fable P173, where the unjust desire for profit is punished by Hermes. A woodcutter weeps by a river for having lost his axe there. Trying to test his honesty the god plunges in the river and draws out for him first a golden and then a silver axe. The man denies ownership of both axes, until Hermes draws out the man's axe, which he gives to him together with the other two, thus rewarding his fairness (δικαιοσύνη). Another woodcutter hears the story, is jealous (ἐποφθαλμιάσας) of what the first man has gained and wants the same. Again, as in the previous fable, a characteristic of the greedy man is that he wants to gain things that have not been allotted to him and that he is not satisfied with his own lot (ἐβουλήθη καὶ αὐτὸς τῶν ἴσων περιγενέσθαι, see pp. 76–7 n. 82 above). He goes to the river, throws his axe into it and starts weeping for its loss. But when Hermes repeats his test and draws out the golden axe, the greedy man claims its ownership. Greed forces him to lie; he is described as speaking "out of haste motivated by greed" (ὑπὸ τοῦ κέρδους ὑποφθάς). So the god punishes him by withholding both the golden and the man's own axe. Profit as a reward from a just act (as for the first man's honesty) is welcome, but profit through deceit is disapproved of and punished.

[8] In contrast to the general view, Plato describes the ant's collecting instinct negatively, as love of money (φιλοχρηματία) in *R.* 553c, which is reminiscent of its portrayal in the present fable.

[9] This motif also appears in the *epimythium*, where the ant is described as "wicked by nature" (φύσει πονηρός): "the fable shows that those who are wicked by nature, even if they are severely punished, do not change their ways".

The gifts of wealth are rejected by Hercules in fable P111 ("Hercules and Plutus"). His argument for doing so is that while he was among men he saw wealth being associated mostly with the wicked (τοῖς πονηροῖς). Furthermore, even for those who welcome wealth, their joy at its acquisition is accompanied by fears. The avaricious man cannot stand spending his wealth and lives in constant fear of losing it. This common idea in Greek thought[10] appears in the *epimythium* of fable P71. The fable portrays the fears that a cowardly avaricious man (δειλὸς φιλάργυρος) expresses in his monologue after he found a golden lion. His fondness of money (φιλοχρηματία) urges him to take the treasure to his home; it is a longing (πόθος) that he cannot resist. But the fears that accompany the acquisition of wealth are voiced through the man's terror at the sight of the lion, although a gold one. The result for the avaricious man's state of mind is confusion, puzzlement (οὐκ οἶδα, ἐκβέβλημαι τῶν φρενῶν καὶ τὶ πράττειν οὐκ ἔχω, ἡ ἐμὴ ψυχὴ . . . ἑαυτῇ πολεμεῖ).

The fable of "the avaricious man" (φιλάργυρος, P225) further demonstrates the negative workings of this vice. An avaricious man decides to sell all his property and with the money he gets he buys an ingot of gold. His wealth, accumulated in the form of the precious metal that keeps its value, he buries in a secret location that only he knows. Avarice is equivalent to exclusiveness of possession and the refusal to share wealth by using it in communal frameworks (e.g. the market, helping friends, paying taxes etc.). The avaricious man visits the location all the time to check if his treasure is still there (διετέλει συνεχῶς ἐρχόμενος καὶ ἐπισκεπτόμενος). The reader, then, witnesses the passion taking control of the man and leading him to an abnormal life of secrecy and fear. Someone observes his moves and steals the ingot. When the avaricious man finds out, he reacts in an excessive way, as if in mourning: he weeps, tears out his hair and he is in extreme pain (ἔκλαιέ τε καὶ τὰς τρίχας ἔτιλλεν . . . ὑπεραλγοῦντα). A passer-by consoles him thus: "do not despair, friend, but take a stone, bury it in the same spot and imagine that the gold is lying there; because even when it was there you did not make any use of it". These words imply that wealth (here in its most precious form, gold) has only the value of being used.[11] It gains value

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[10] E.g. Ar. *Pl.* 202–7; Arist. *EN* 1121b25–33; Pl. *Ep.* 317d; id. *Lg.* 742d f.; *Phd.* 82c. See also Dover (1974), 110–12.

[11] Also stated at the *epimythium*. A similar, but more elaborated and complex, story is narrated by Antiphon fr. 54 DK. See Van Dijk (1997), 313–17.

only when used to facilitate its owner's life. Avarice limits its victims to simple possession and accumulation of wealth and forbids them from making any beneficial use of it; it only disturbs their souls.

Idleness is also reproached in two fables. The idle beetle who did not work during the summer is punished by lack of provisions when winter comes in P112 (pp. 69–70 above), while the laborious and prudent ant is recompensed by plenitude of supplies (remember, however, the more negative view of the laborious ant in P166, pp. 149–50 above). In P237 both idleness and greed are condemned: a man refuses to buy an ass, because he suspects him of being idle and voracious (ἀργότατος καὶ ἀδηφάγος).

Gluttony (λιχνεία) is another vice that is criticized in the collection. Like wealth and profit, it is also characterized by lack of measure and careful reasoning and has disastrous effects for the protagonists. This passion for excessive food consumption blinds the gluttonous person and does not allow any thought about the consequences of his actions. This is obvious in fable P24, where the fox is punished for her gluttony and imprudence (pp. 50–1 above). Likewise, the poor child who is allowed to eat from the sacrificial meat in P47, cannot stop eating the animal innards and drinking wine, probably being deprived from such delicacies due to his family's financial situation. The result of his lack of measure in consuming food is that his stomach gets swollen and he is in terrible pain. In the collection, extreme consumption brings extreme consequences. The less terrible of them are bodily pains. But the short pleasure of consumption might be fatal. The fable protagonists occasionally die because of their gluttony. The flies in P80 find some honey spilled in a cellar and start eating it. They cannot leave, being seduced by its sweetness. So their feet are stuck in the honey and they drown. As they die, they give the fable's message: "how miserable we are, for we die because of a brief pleasure". The point that life is too much of a price to pay for any pleasure, which is always brief, is repeated in fable P86. Here, a thrush cannot stop eating myrtle-berries because of their sweetness.[12] Driven by her passion she stays on the myrtle, without thinking that a fowler might see her and have enough time to target her and kill her, which is exactly what happens. As she dies, she too states the severity of the consequences of

[12] The image is realistic, because thrushes nest in myrtles. See Thompson (1936), 149.

her passion: "how wretched I am, for I lose my life because of the food's sweetness". Food might be sweet but life itself remains the sweetest of goods.

However, P167 ("the fly") stands in contrast to the previous fables. Here, a fly is trapped—similarly to the flies in P80—by food. She has fallen in a pot full of meat soup and is about to die. But her last words are "I have eaten and drunk and had a bath; even if I die, I do not care". The message seems to be in support of hedonism despite the cost, although the *epimythium* gives a more specified application, namely that people endure death more easily when it is not accompanied by pain. But the fly's last words may also be interpreted as an attempt by her to distort the true cause of her misfortune (her imprudent consumption), turning black into white, and refusing to put the blame on herself (on self-deception and refusal of responsibility see p. 68 above). Yet P167 remains exceptional in the *Augustana*, where the general message is that imprudent consumption of food and drink has disastrous effects.

Another group of vices that are criticized in the collection includes those that are associated with placing an excessive value on oneself. The protagonists of the fable are frequently portrayed as thinking too much of themselves; they are boastful and arrogant and they end up being punished either by ridicule or corporal punishment.[13] The key words that characterize such behaviour are boastfulness (ἀλαζονεία, P14, 33, 151, 202), vanity (κενοδοξία, P88, 165), conceit (ἐπαίρομαι, P121).[14] The collection's general message is that whoever takes pride in himself will inevitably fall in a more or less fatal way.

The vanity of a kithara-player is ridiculed and punished in P121:

> A kithara player without any talent was constantly singing in a room with plastered walls, and because of the echo of his voice he thought that he had an extremely good voice. And he was so excited by his voice, that he decided that he should go and perform in a theatre. However, when he went on stage and sang very badly, he was driven out of it by the audience throwing stones at him.

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[13] P14, 82, 88, 121, 123–4, 137, 151, 165, 182, 202. See Cascajero (1991), 39; Rodríguez Adrados (1979–87), I.189–93.

[14] Also ἀναπτερωθείς ('excited', P82, 182), καταθρασυνόμενος ("to behave boldly against", P82), ὑπερφρονήσας ("to look down upon", P123), κομπαστής ('braggart', P33), φρυάττομαι ("to be haughty", P202). On the related issue of punishment of hubristic behaviour see pp. 119–20 above.

The fable makes it clear that the kithara player (κιθαρῳδός) has no natural talent (ἀφυής). But the distortion of the sound leads him to form the false opinion (ᾠήθη) that he has.[15] He is culpable for his arrogance (ἐπαρθείς), which is due to his ignorance of his true abilities. When he is tested, however, in front of an audience, the imbalance between his subjective view of himself and reality is revealed and he is punished.[16] His punishment is also interesting as providing information about audience reactions in Greece.[17]

When words are put into practice, the boastful man's lies and his true abilities are revealed, as in P33. An athlete is continuously reproached by his fellow-citizens for his unmanliness (ἀνανδρία). Unable to stand their criticism, he emigrates. When he returns, after many years, he claims to have achieved athletic glory during his absence, especially for an extremely long jump he performed at Rhodes. He even alleges that he can call witnesses of his deeds if asked. However, the boastful (ἀλαζονευόμενος) athlete is suspected by his fellow-citizens of lying about his past. They probably cannot believe in this transformation from an unmanly athlete to an exceptional one, especially since he claims that no Olympic champion has ever managed such a jump as his. So a bystander comments ironically: "but if what you say is true, then you need no witnesses; Because here is Rhodes and the chance to repeat your jump" (αὐτοῦ

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[15] The house (οἶκος) is κεκονιαμένος. *LSJ* translates the verb κονιάω as "to plaster with lime or stucco". See entry in *LSJ* for Greek references. But why is the detail of the house's plastered walls so important to be mentioned in the fable, despite the collection's generally brief and unadorned style? My guess, based on modern acoustics rather than on Greek sources, is that a plastered or painted wall affects sounds; it absorbs and filters them, in comparison to a wall with bare stones or bricks, which reverberates the sound and intensifies it. Therefore, the kithara player's opinion on his singing abilities was affected by the plastered walls. This reduces his culpability, but does not eliminate it, because it was still his own decision to face an audience. It is also interesting to note that walls plastered with lime are still present in Greece, especially in the countryside. Their function combines aesthetic and hygienic reasons (the lime sterilizes the surfaces).

[16] Note the limitation of the fable's message at the *epimythium* into a very specific application, which might hint at the use of this fable, and fables in general, in schools of rhetoric (see pp. 22–3 above): "so too certain orators give the impression of being important in the schools, but when they are tested in public affairs, they prove to be incompetent".

[17] See e.g. Ar. *Ach.* 37–9; Pl. *R.* 492b–c. Compare P124, where the raven's ignorance of his true singing abilities and his desire to demonstrate that he has a good voice (παραστῆσαι . . . θέλων ὅτι καὶ φωνὴν ἔχει), although he does not, is punished.

γὰρ Ῥόδος καὶ πήδημα).[18] The ironic challenge by the bystander is in accordance with the collection's spirit, where it is action that counts and not words (p. 57 above) as a way of revealing the cheater (pp. 161–3 below).

The ape who takes pride in his relationship to the human species in P14 is also ridiculed for his false claims.[19] As he and a fox walk across a cemetery he starts weeping at the sight of his forefathers (as he claimed). The fox chastises his false self-esteem (which is described as 'arrogance' in the fable's *epimythium*, καταλαζονεύομαι), saying: "you can lie as much as you like, because none of them will rise and contradict you". Likewise, the jackdaw in P123 (p. 76 above) is thrashed and exiled by the ravens and the other jackdaws as a result of his haughtiness (ὑπερφρονήσας). The domestic pigeon's pride (ἐφρυάττετο, ἀλαζονευομένη) at the abundance of her offspring is chastised by the crow in P202, who reminds her that the more chicks she breeds the more slaves (at the hands of man) she brings to the world.[20] Therefore, one should not take pride in oneself without having realistically examined one's social position. Punishment might as well be fatal, as happened to the generals of the mice in P165 (p. 104 above), who wanted to differ from the other mice and were devoured because of their vainglory (κενοδοξία).

The ass is devoured in P82 as a result of his haughty (ἀναπτερωθείς) belief that the lion was scared of him and he could chase it (p. 75 above). In P182 he is more lucky, because he is only thrashed by his master:

> Someone loaded a statue on an ass and drove him to the city. As many people met them and bowed before the statue, the ass thought that they were bowing to him, and so he took pride at that and started braying and did not want to move any further. His driver figured out what was happening and as he was beating him with his club he remarked: "you idiot, was that the last thing left to happen, for men to bow at you, an ass?".

A modern reader might laugh at the picture of an ass braying while the faithful worship the statue he carries. The ancient audience might

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[18] See Schuhl (1967). The fable has survived as an expression in modern Greek: ἰδοὺ ἡ Ῥόδος, ἰδού καί τό πήδημα. The Aesopic origins, though, have been forgotten.

[19] Cf. P73, pp. 168–9 below.

[20] The pigeons' prolific increase was pointed out by the Greeks: Thompson (1936), 240.

have found this fable funny too. The ass's pride (ἀναπτερωθείς) and its severe punishment are the sources of humour in this story. Laughter is produced by the inversion of opposites. In the hierarchy of veneration, a statue (probably of a god, for people bow at its sight) stands high as a visual representation. The ass, on the other hand, stands at the other end, being the humblest animal, a symbol of toil and servitude. The men, who stand lower than a statue but higher than an ass, rightly express their respect to the statue, but the hierarchy is comically subverted by the ass's misunderstanding of their act. Such subversion is unacceptable and must be punished. The fable shows the disastrous consequences of an action driven by overestimation of one's true capacities and disrespect of one's social status (see II.5 above).

The ass is also mocked by the lion in P151 for being arrogant. The two of them are hunting some wild goats who have found refuge in a cave; the ass scares them out of the cave with his braying, while the lion catches them as they are escaping out of the cave.[21] The arrogant ass (branded as such at the *epimythium*, ἀλαζονευόμενος) thinks highly of his bravery. The lion puts him in his place and chastises his arrogance by saying: "but be sure that even I would have been scared of you, if I did not know that you are an ass". The last phrase brings about the fable's message. That is, an ass will always be an ass, never able to raise his status; he has no right to pride and he should never exceed the limits of his social position.[22]

In the *Augustana*, the ass exemplifies the protagonist who is dissatisfied with his lot and attempts to alter it, ending up in complete failure, sometimes a fatal one.[23] He embodies the arrogant, vain character, who is jealous of the condition of others.[24] Because the ethics of the fables are in general cautionary about any attempt to deviate from one's social status, he has to be punished (see II.5 above). The motivation for his imprudent actions often comes from envy and jealousy.[25]

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[21] Similarly, the braying of the Persian asses scares off the Scythian horses in Hdt. IV.129.

[22] The fable is also another example of the view that ignorance of one's character and strength creates fear, as in P195, pp. 62–3 above.

[23] P44, 82, 91, 151, 179–80, 182–5, 188.

[24] On the animal's stereotyped qualities see Luria (1934).

[25] φθόνος, ζῆλος: P91, 100, 117, 125, 163, 173, 184; for the key terms for jealousy and its punishment see pp. 76–7 n. 82 above.

IV.1.2 *The Dispositions of the Figures of the Fables*

There is no discussion in the *Augustana* of whether the inner qualities that are described in the collection are natural dispositions of the character or are acquired throughout life. Such a discussion would have been incompatible with the fable's stylistic demands and its analytic limitations (see I.3.2, p. 42 above). Yet certain fables indicate that these qualities are regarded as *a priori* more probable in the protagonist's nature.[26]

Certain aetiological fables stress the above point. The collection's preference for aetiologies is explained by the unquestioned aspect of the justifications that an aetiology offers. The fable avoids a deep analysis of the development of a quality in its protagonist by placing its origins in a remote past and under divine responsibility which can be neither criticized nor explained. Three of these aetiological fables refer to the creation of man (P103, 108, 240). In P103 Zeus orders Hermes to pour falsehood in the artisans. By a miscalculation, the god pours more falsehood in the shoemakers than in the other artisans. Artisans, then, and shoemakers above all, are by nature liars, the proof for this going back to their original creation. In P108 Zeus orders Hermes to pour intelligence in men. Hermes makes equal portions and pours one in each man. The comic and sarcastic overtones of this fable bear on tall men, as the god once again (as in P103) makes a mistake. He did not take account of the differences in size of the various human moulds that Zeus had created and so it happened that his equal portions of intelligence filled the moulds of short men, while they were not enough to fill those of tall men. Therefore, short people are by nature more clever than tall. This view persists in modern Greek popular thought, especially in the expression ψηλός και βλάκας (tall and fool), despite its lack of basis in fact. If Greek aesthetic standards favoured the tall (as, for example, in Arist. *EN* 1123b7–8), it is interesting to note that the fable's message is opposed to the Greek aesthetic ideal.[27]

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[26] This is not to argue in favour of a standardization of the collection's animal protagonists, against which see I.3.1, pp. 28–30 above. The message that the vicious person does not change refers to the protagonist of the particular fable. The animals who are portrayed, more or less explicitly, as vicious by nature, do not possess the same ethical qualities in every fable.

[27] Aesop himself was short and in general renowned for his ugliness. See, for example, Baker (1969); Hilpert (1992). The theme of short stature being counter-

Finally, in P240 Prometheus creates mankind under Zeus' orders. However, after his creation, man was outnumbered by the wild animals and was put in danger. So Zeus orders Prometheus to dismantle some animals and remould them as men.[28] The result is that the men who originate from the latter are human in form but bestial in mind. The inner part of man is opposed to the outer and its qualities are explained as natural. The aetiology implies the unchangeability of ethical character.[29] The inner qualities of the protagonist cannot change. Both the weasel in P50 and the ant in P166 have their appearance transformed, but their ethical quality remains unaltered (see pp. 78, 149–50 above). Likewise, the fox's social status is elevated in P107, but he cannot alter his behaviour to match it (see pp. 77–8 above).[30] The unchangeability of inner qualities reinforces the collection's condemnation of social mobility and its encouragement of conformity and maintenance of the existing social order. Animals must remain animals and will never elevate their status to that of humans. And those men who are criticized for their character (e.g. the artisans)—and have an equivalent social status—are rightly criticized, because their qualities are natural and unchangeable.

The constancy of natural qualities underlies the opposition between bodily and mental qualities, of the external to the internal, an opposition that favours the latter. Mental capacities are more important criteria of value than physical beauty. Physical appearance is judged in terms of utility, and beauty that does not guarantee the protagonist's survival is criticized and considered useless.[31] In P74, for example, the deer is proud of the beauty of her antlers, but deplores her feet for being thin. One day, while she is chased by a lion, her feet help her escape, but her antlers are entangled in a tree's branches

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balanced by inner excellence can be found in Greek thought, for example in Aesop's *Life* and in the portrait of the general in Archilochus fr. 114 West. On the contrast between physical deformity and spiritual beauty see, for example, Luzzatto (1988); Papademetriou (1997), ch. 1; Schauer and Merkle (1992).

[28] Cf. the aetiological fable in Call. *Iamb.* 2 (fr. 192 Pfeiffer) on Zeus giving the power of speech to men and removing it from animals, and the myth of man's creation by Prometheus in Pl. *Prt.* 320c–3a. See also Van Dijk (1997), 230–7, 669–70.

[29] On this fable see Nestle (1937). On comparisons between human and animal characters see the catalogue of the women in Semonides fr. 7 West, on which see also Van Dijk (1997), 674–5 and the literature mentioned there.

[30] On the theme that the inner qualities are natural and cannot change see from the rest of the Aesopic corpus P267, 351, 446, 448, 463; Pr. 6, 56.

[31] Cascajero (1991), 39, 51–2; Rodríguez Adrados (1978b), 54–5.

and so fatally trapped her. She should have judged the parts of her body by their protecting qualities and not in aesthetic terms, which have no place in the collection's framework of survival. Physical beauty, then, must be considered in terms of utility.[32]

A major contrast in the collection is that between bodily and mental qualities.[33] This contrast is obvious in P219, in which the birds want to elect a king. They disapprove of the peacock's beautiful feathers on the grounds that physical beauty does not guarantee their survival; if the eagle chases them, how is the peacock going to protect them? Similarly, in P12 a fox and a leopard argue over their beauty. The leopard mentions her motley skin as a proof of her beauty, but the fox replies that she is more beautiful, because she has a motley soul, not simply a skin. The fox was often characterized in Greek thought as motley (ποικίλη), an adjective that described her abilities, as a cunning animal, to follow a variety of courses of action adjusting them to the circumstances in order to achieve her goals.[34]

Physical appearance is often deceptive, a point accentuated by many fables. The general message is that things are not always what they seem and therefore appearances are untrustworthy. A group of fables (see III.3.3, pp. 123 f.; III.3.4, pp. 128 f. above) demonstrate this discrepancy between appearance and the inner self. In these fables the protagonists are small in size, but they exhibit superb inner qualities, such as gratitude and inner strength. Analogously, a human figure might contain an animal soul (see p. 158 above); the small in size are big in heart and wits; the beautiful is often vacuous, and so on. Even your own eyes might cheat you and distort what you see: the dog is beguiled by her reflection on the water and thus drops the piece of meat that she is carrying in order to get its reflection (P133), while the pigeon in P201 mistakes a picture of a fountain for the real thing and crashes herself on it. Therefore, careful forethought is needed before entering into action based on appearances.

Distance also plays a distorting role: what seems great from far away diminishes in greatness when seen from close, as in P177. A group of travellers see some driftwood floating on the sea at a

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[32] See also P369.

[33] A frequent contrast in popular ethics. See Pearson (1962), 53–4.

[34] See e.g. Alc. fr. D11 *PLF*; Pl. *R.* 365c, and Detienne and Vernant (1993), 47–52.

distance and mistake it for a big ship. As it comes closer to sight, they think it is just a small one. When, finally, they come at close distance, they realize their misconception. The fable guards against hasty conclusions especially when they result from tangible criteria.[35] In P141 the frog's croak surprises the lion who thinks that such a big sound must come from a huge animal. When he finally sees the frog and realizes how small he is he squeezes him under his feet saying that "nobody should be upset by hearing before seeing" (μηδένα ἀκοὴ ταραττέτω πρὸ τῆς θέας).

The fables, however, trust appearances as a criterion for estimating the character and worth of the vicious. The point here is that the wicked person's intentions are sometimes betrayed by his appearance; a related point is that as soon as the wicked one is seen he is recognized as such, his physical appearance being identified with his character. In P221 Zeus has his wedding feast and all the animals bring him presents. The snake joins the party, slithering and carrying a rose in its mouth. As soon as Zeus sees it (ἰδών), he rejects any presents from its mouth. The wicked one is recognized and denounced;[36] his character is so obvious that even a blind man can sense it, as in P37 where a blind man passes his hands over a wolf cub and concludes that it is a predatory animal.[37] Aesthetic criteria for character are also evaluated in the group of fables where the trickster is revealed (pp. 161–3 below). In these fables, the trickster is often recognized by his would-be victims and his plans are exposed and fail. The weak should trust their senses and not let themselves be deceived by the wicked one's words.[38]

IV.1.3 *Inner Qualities with Ambivalent Effects: Cunning and Persuasion*

Before the inner qualities with positive consequences are described we must consider a mental quality that is ambiguously evaluated in

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[35] The theme and the example of a piece of wood that floats on the sea, but not the fable, also occur in the *Life of Aesop* 125 (G). See Van Dijk (1996), 521.

[36] On the snake's reputation in Greek thought as insidious see Garbe (1988); Pugliarello (1973), 111–25; Sancassano (1996).

[37] On the blindness of seers and related bibliography see Bowie (1993), 271–2. See also, e.g. E. *Ba.* 210–11; S. *OC* 1522 f.; id. *OT* 412 f.

[38] On the issues both of the worthiness and the untrustworthiness of appearances, see, from the rest of the Aesopic corpus, P369, 453; Pr. 7, 35; *Life of Aesop* 2, 26, 88 (G).

the collection—cunning. Cunning and eloquence—as a way for the tricky protagonist to persuade the other party and fulfil his plans—are described in the *Augustana* sometimes with positive and sometimes with disastrous effects.[39] The collection neither wholly appreciates nor criticizes cunning and eloquence as a means of cheating an opponent. It underlines their utility, but at the same time points out the negative consequences when a devious plan fails. The message is rather that, in order for it to be effective, a cunning plan must be well thought out, considering all the possible mishaps, and must also be carefully carried through.[40]

One of the commonest themes in the *Augustana* is that the trickster's plans are revealed and he is either verbally rebuked or physically punished.[41] The cheater is often cheated, when he finds someone smarter than himself who grasps his true, wicked intentions and defeats him, sometimes using the trickster's own weapon, a trick for a trick. The cunning party, then, falls into the trap that he had been setting for others. In the less disastrous case (for him), the trickster is only caught and told off, as in P7, where a cat hears that some birds in a farm are sick; so she enters a farm disguised as a doctor and asks them about the condition of their health. They reply that they will be fine if she leaves the farm. The cat's disguise fails, because sometimes wicked ones are recognized no matter how well they disguise themselves. As the fable's *epimythium* comments: "so wicked men (οἱ πονηροί) are noticed by prudent ones (οἱ φρόνιμοι), even if they pretend to be useful". Another example of the trickster's exposure is in the fable of "the mischievous man" (P36). The man wanted to prove the Delphic oracles false. So he held a sparrow in his palm and asked the seer if what he was holding was alive or dead, his plan being to strangle the bird or let it go depending on the seer's answer. His wicked trick is perceived by the Delphic

[39] This is interesting in view of the fables' use in rhetoric (see pp. 16–8 above). Eloquence and persuasion were of major importance for the success of a rhetoric speech and they are also very important in the *Augustana* for the success of the protagonist's plans. It is possible, then, that their importance in the collection is not coincidental, but is linked with the fables' use in rhetoric, both in speeches and in the lessons that were taught in the schools of rhetoric. That is, the collection underlined the value of eloquence that had been taught to the pupils of these schools.

[40] See Jedrkiewicz (1989), 380–1. On the ambiguous status of cunning see from the rest of the Aesopic corpus P252, 258, 279, 333, 426; *Life of Aesop* 3 (G).

[41] P7, 14, 17, 20, 22, 28, 33, 36–7, 41, 57, 65, 67, 79, 89, 101, 114, 125, 129, 142–3, 152, 154, 157, 160, 188, 194, 196, 206, 221, 241.

seer (συνεὶς αὐτοῦ τὴν κακοτεχνίαν) who tells him that "it is in your own power whether what you hold is alive or dead". Other fables too end up with the trickster being revealed and rebuked (P22, 65, 67, 79, 89, 125, 188, 221).

Another price that the revealed tricksters pay is that their potential victims, having perceived their true intentions, escape them. The potential victims observe the environment carefully, grasp the trickster's trap and escape, telling him off, for they were proved smarter than him. Prudent thought saves them (e.g. P142–3, 154, 157, 160, 241). In P143 a lion wanted to eat a bull, but being unable to do so by mere strength, for the bull was too big and strong, he decides to seize him by using deceit (ἐβουλήθη δόλῳ αὐτοῦ περιγενέσθαι). He invites him to dine on lamb, but the bull is cautious enough to observe that the pots were big and empty and to guess that he would serve as the meal. So he leaves, declaring to the lion that he perceived his plans: "because I see that the preparations are not for a lamb, but for a bull". Likewise, in P157 a wolf cannot reach a goat who is sitting up on a cliff; so he tries to persuade her to climb down to his place, where there is plenty of food for her. The goat detects his plans, and answers "you do not invite me to offer me pasture, but because you are hungry". The cicada in P241 escapes the fox's trap. She wants to eat the cicada, but cannot reach it because it stands singing on a tall tree.[42] So she devises (ἐπενόησεν) the following trick: she asks it to climb down from the tree and sing to her at a close distance. But the cicada replies: "you fool yourself if you expect me to climb down. I guard myself against foxes, because I once saw a cicada's wings in the excrement of a fox". One must be cautious, observant, and mistrustful of words.

Prudence, then, is essential for survival against the opponent's trickery. See, for example, P142:

> A lion who had grown old and could not get his food by using his strength decided that he should get it by using his wit. So he went to a cave, laid down there and pretended to be sick; and so he seized and devoured those animals that came to visit him. After many animals had been devoured, a fox who had figured out his trick, went

[42] The *high-low* distinction appears in both fables and enacts the particular plots (P157, 241). The protagonists are situated in such a way that they cannot come in touch with each other. Because physical contact is impossible, the wolf and the fox respectively are thus forced to resort to trick. On the *high-low* distinction see pp. 87–9 above.

> there and, standing at a distance from the cave, asked him how he was. After the lion answered "not well" and asked her the reason why she did not enter the cave, she replied: "I would have entered, if I had not seen many tracks going in, but none coming out".

The distinction that underlies this fable is that between physical and mental strength (see II.1.2, p. 48 above). The lion's physical enfeeblement forces him to resort to a cunning plan (ἐπίνοια, προσεποιεῖτο). And he does pretty well, because he takes advantage of the animals' simplicity and respect for the rules of good relationships, until he finds someone smarter than him, the fox who personified cunning in Greek thought (see p. 159 above); she perceives his trick (τὸ τέχνασμα αὐτοῦ συνεῖσα) and unmasks him.[43] Survival, then, also involves overcoming an opponent in cunning and being prudent, as the *epimythium* rightly points out.[44]

Cunning and trickery, however, can also be successful. Trickery sometimes guarantees survival, as in fable P9. There, a fox has fallen into a well and cannot climb out. A thirsty billy-goat approaches the well and asks her if the water is good. She praises the water's qualities and so persuades him to come down the well and drink. The billy-goat thoughtlessly agrees (ἀμελετήτως), but ends up wondering how he could get out himself. The fox again persuades him to stand against the well's wall, so that she can climb on his horns and get out, and she promises that afterwards she will pull him up. However, after she climbs out she starts moving away, leaving him in the well. The billy-goat accuses her of breaking their agreement (μεμφομένου αὐτὴν ὡς τὰς ὁμολογίας παραβαίνουσαν), but the fox replies "oh, if you had as many brains as you have hairs in your beard, you would not have climbed down before thinking how you would climb up".

The fox's plan succeeds because of the billy-goat's trust in her and his imprudent behaviour; he rushes to the well without any forethought, he readily assists her in her escape, and he is blamed by her for his thoughtlessness (ἀμελετήτως, ἑτοίμως ὑπηρετήσαντος, εἰ . . . φρένας εἶχες, πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἄνοδον ἐσκέψω). His imprudence is worsened by the fact that he was cheated twice. The fox's deceit might constitute a breach of their agreement for mutual help, as the billy-goat

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[43] See also the image of the cunning Odysseus checking the direction of Ajax's traces in S. *Aj.* 4–7. For Greek allusions to this fable (Pl. *Alc.1* 123a) see Van Dijk (1997), 330–2.

[44] "So prudent men escape dangers by foreseeing them through signs."

comments, but survival in the collection matters more than amicable relationships (see pp. 93–5 above), and if deceit guarantees it, it is a most welcome means. The devious plan, though, must be carefully carried through, in order to be unperceived: the fox skillfully hides her despair when she first sees the billy-goat, gives him the reply that his thirst wants to hear and covers her intentions under the cloak of mutual rescue. A master at work.

In P153 (p. 106 above) the wolves' deceit (δόλος) succeeds where their physical strength failed. In P140 a lion wants to marry a girl. Her father is resistant to see such an unnatural union, but he cannot contradict the lion's will because of its strength. So he thinks up a plan (ἐπενόησεν): he persuades the lion to tear off his claws and teeth, so that it will not scare his daughter. The lion is beguiled and follows the plan. As the lion is no longer dangerous, the father chases it away with a club.[45]

When skilfully performed, trickery turns into a weapon of the physically weak protagonists against their physically strong opponents. In P97 a kid (ἔριφος) resorts to trickery and survives. He was left behind the flock and was about to be devoured by a wolf. So, as his final wish, he persuades the wolf to play the pipe to him so that he can dance for a last time. The wolf starts playing, but soon the sheepdogs are driven to the spot by the sound of the pipe and they chase the wolf. Trickery here is an effective way to survive in a situation of physical imbalance. The kid quickly forms a plan, under extremely pressing conditions, and disguises it with the claim that a future victim's last wish should be fulfilled. This claim is acceptable in human ethical terms, but might seem strange in the animal world. Yet its presence is justified by the animals' role in fables as representatives of human life. However, for the trick to succeed the opponent's gullibility is equally essential. The kid's plea could easily have been rejected by the wolf, in favour of his immediate interest in satisfying his hunger (see II.3.1 above). Nevertheless, he goes beyond his natural framework of action and pays the price for it. The fable demonstrates the dangers of going away from the 'flock', i.e. the social group, and the disastrous effects of trying to do what one is not naturally suited for. As the wolf declares in his last self-contemplating

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[45] The oldest prose version of this fable is found in D.S. 19.25.5–6. See Van Dijk (1997), 280–3; Lens Tuero (1985).

phrase: "I deserve what happened to me; because being a butcher (μακελλάριος) I ought not to have imitated (μιμεῖσθαι) a pipe-player (αὐλητής)". This phrase is repeated almost *verbatim* in fable P187 which includes a related message:

> An ass who was grazing in a pasture, when he saw a wolf attacking him, pretended to be lame. When the wolf approached him and asked the reason for being lame, he replied that while he was crossing a hedge he stepped on a thorn, and advised the wolf to pull it out before eating him, as to avoid piercing himself while eating. As the wolf was persuaded and was lifting the ass's foot, while he had focused his attention on the hoof, the ass kicked him in the mouth and smashed his teeth. And the suffering wolf commented: "I suffered justly; why, although my father taught me the art of cookery, did I undertake medicine?".

The fable again indicates the disastrous consequences of exceeding one's natural field of action and shows the importance of maintaining one's social status and role. The *epimythium* also stresses this point: it is reasonable that someone will suffer if he tries to do something that does not suit him (οἱ τοῖς μηδὲν προσήκουσιν ἐπιχειροῦντες εἰκότως δυστυχοῦσιν). The wolf's natural role is that of a predator and not of a curer. It is significant that in both the above fables, the punished person delivers a comment against his transgression of his natural limits, while he could have commented, for example, on the need to distrust a future victim's words or on the importance of immediate action. The choice of these particular final phrases intensifies the importance of social stability.

Yet an equally important factor for the fable's outcome is the ass's trick: he pretends successfully to be limping, arouses the wolf's curiosity and interrupts his predatory desires as long as is necessary to pursue his plan. He manages to bring his opponent close to his only physical defensive weapon, his feet, and thus gains the upper hand in their physical confrontation, which ends with the wolf being deprived of his main weapon, his teeth.

Eloquence and persuasion are of major importance for the success or failure of trickery. Words are the main means of enacting a plan, as the cunning party tries to lure its future victim and fulfil its aims. They are also the main way to punish a trickster, namely by rebuking him.[46] Speech is an effective way to criticize as in P8:

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[46] From the rest of the Aesopic corpus see P311, 355, 439; Pr. 10, 83, 85.

> Once Aesop the maker of fables being at leisure entered a shipyard. As the shipbuilders mocked him and provoked him to reply, Aesop narrated the old story about the creation of chaos and water and how Zeus, wanting the element of earth to appear, exhorted the earth to sip the sea in three stages. The earth started, and after her first sip the mountains came out, and after the second she laid the plains bare; "but if she decides to sip the sea for a third time, your art will become useless".[47]

Aesop is a creator of stories, a λογοποιός (see p. 2 n. 7 above), therefore—being a manipulator of words by trade—he should be in a better position in a contest of words than the workers in the dockyard; and he demonstrates his eloquence by narrating a story which he skillfully concludes in a caustic comment against those who jeered him. The reason for their jeers is not indicated, but it might have been his legendary ugliness and deformity.[48] Eloquence proves its power to censure, in particular as an effective weapon for the disfranchised to defend themselves. Like the cheater who is often exposed by someone smarter than him, so he who mocks might meet his master.

Yet the commonest function of speech in the collection is as a means of persuasion that guarantees the success of trickery. The fable's figures lie in order to pursue their plans. Being a form of cunning, the deceiving speech has ambiguous consequences in the *Augustana*: it can be effective or ineffective, according to the liar's skills or the listener's cleverness. Telling lies and manipulating words is a wholly legitimate and profitable means of fulfilling one's aims.[49] A particular case of manipulating words is the breach of an agreement when the agreement is opposed to one's personal interest. These fables display the dependence of promises upon personal criteria (see III.2.1–3 above). Personal interest matters most in the collection and, therefore, lies are absolutely acceptable in so far as they are effective.

In P81 (p. 103 above) the fox lies to the ape and thus moves him into her trap. It is not deceit that is censured, but the gullibility of the ape who fell victim to her lies. Telling lies often guarantees survival for the physically weak. The bat lies and escapes death in P172 (p. 62 above); the ass in P187 lies about being lame and persuades

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[47] See Martínez-Vásquez (1984). Aristotle (*Mete.* 356b13–15) also narrates this fable. See Van Dijk (1997), 351–3.

[48] See e.g. Papademetriou (1997), ch. 1. See also pp. 157–8 n. 27 above.

[49] P9, 34, 81, 97, 124, 134, 153, 172, 178, 187, 193.

the wolf to fall for his trick (p. 165 above). But lies can also be effective and acceptable as a way for the physically strong ones to accomplish their plans. For example, it is the wolves' skill in speech that persuades the lambs: the lambs are fooled by the wolves' feigned unwillingness to be their enemies and their false promise for peace if they betray the sheepdogs to them (P153, p. 106 above).[50] However, if lies are effective on this occasion, it often happens that lies fail because the liar—like the cheater—is revealed and consequently punished.[51] See, for example, fable P210:

> A shepherd who pastured his flock far from a village kept on making the following practical joke; he used to call the villagers for help, saying that wolves had attacked his sheep. But after the villagers had been alarmed and hurried out for a second and a third time, only to return [*to the village*] being laughed at [*by the shepherd*], in the end it happened that wolves really did attack the flock. While he was cut off from his flock and was crying for help, the villagers, assuming that he was joking as usual, took no notice; and so it happened that, to his misfortune, he lost his sheep.

The fable draws its message from the contrast between imagination and reality, falsehood and truth. The shepherd performs a practical joke, a child's play (παιδιά) and laughs at its success (μετὰ γέλωτος). He jokes with things that one should not make fun of and he repeatedly does so. His joke turns into a custom that characterizes his behaviour in the eyes of the villagers. Custom has disastrous consequences in the collection in general (II.3.2) and it does so here: the villagers do not help him when the real danger comes (ὑπολαβόντες αὐτὸν παίζειν κατὰ τὸ ἔθος, οὐδὲν ἐφρόντισαν). When he is in real danger (τῇ ἀληθείᾳ), he is punished by the opinion (ὑπολαβόντες) that has been formed about him as a practical joker. Truth and reality clash with falsehood and opinion. Besides, the shepherd played a joke on social solidarity (people helping each other in danger), so he is punished by being deprived of it when he needs it most, by his own fault. Not only are repeated lies disastrous, but even a single lie has to be plausible enough to be believed; otherwise, the liar is exposed to criticism. The crocodile in P20 boasts that his ancestors

[50] Note also the failure of speech as a way of dissuading the physically stronger figures from killing them, when their argument is confronted with the strong's alimentary interests (e.g. P3–4, 16, 18, 26, 155). See p. 56 above.

[51] P5, 14, 17, 20, 22, 33, 36, 41, 65, 67, 73, 114, 142–3, 154, 157, 160, 173, 210, 241.

had been gymnasiarchs. A crocodile as a director of a gymnasium is so obvious a lie that it causes the fox's sarcastic comment: "but even if you had not told me so, you appear by your skin to have exercised too much".[52] A similar story is found in P14 (p. 155 above), where an ape is openly called a liar by a fox, for maintaining that his ancestors were humans (see also P5, 17, 33).

In P73, however, the punishment for lying is death:

> People who travel by sea have the custom of taking with them Maltese dogs and apes for amusement during the journey. So too a man who was going on a voyage took an ape with him. But when they were off Sounion—this is a cape of Athens—it happened that a violent storm started. The ship capsized and everyone jumped overboard, and the ape did the same. But a dolphin saw him, and thinking he was a man, swam under him and carried him away. When the dolphin reached Piraeus, the port of Athens, he asked the ape if he was of Athenian descent. After the ape replied that he was and that in fact his parents were distinguished Athenians, the dolphin then asked him if he knew Piraeus well, and he, assuming that the dolphin was referring to a man, answered that he did, and he was his friend and in fact a close one. And the dolphin, angered by his mendacity, threw him in the water and drowned him.

The fable contains references to myth and possible reflections of Greek daily life. It includes a relatively detailed illustration of the travellers' reported custom of taking animals with them for amusement, probably because ship voyages in ancient times must have been lengthy. The ape was used in Greece in various spectacles to amuse the audience with his imitations of human movements, so the particular traveller's choice seems quite justified. The presentation of Greek capes as a cause for shipwrecks (due to the strong winds that arise there) is another reference to Greek travelling experience. It also seems as if this fable was addressed to an audience that was not familiar with Attica, because the fabulist feels the need to explain what Piraeus and Sounion are.[53] To those readers who were famil-

[52] The joke lies in the metaphorical association of the roughness of the crocodile's skin to the roughness of an athlete's skin. On the disfigurement of athletes, esp. pankratiasts and boxers, see Poliakoff (1987), chs. 1, 3, 5. On this fable see Opelt (1982).

[53] On the ape's mimicry and use as a spectacle in Greece see García Gual (1972); Lilja (1980), 33; Luria (1929); MacDermott (1935). One of the most famous shipwrecks caused by a wind at a cape was the one of the Persian fleet at Athos,

iar with Greek mythology, this fable may also have alluded to the image of dolphins rescuing and taking ashore gods or mortals, such as Dionysus and Arion, and to rituals connected with this attribute of the dolphin (e.g. at the Isthmian games).[54] If such an allusion exists, then it adds both to the ape's falsehood and to the fairness of his punishment; dolphins are supposed to save the lives of humans, and the most eminent of them, or gods, not apes. The whole process of rescue, then, is dysfunctional from its very beginning and the negative outcome, compared to successful rescue by dolphins in myth, seems justified as the whole story is already a deviation from the rule.

It is the dolphin's mistake to take (οἰόμενος) the ape for a human; the Greeks had noticed the similarities in form and movement between man and ape.[55] But the ape is also responsible for his eventual misfortune because he lies about his origins. The liar is punished and the fable stresses that the ape is both a persistent and an exaggerating liar. He lies twice and he lies badly. He is not content with a simple lie, but he adds the details of his honourable ancestry and his good relationship with his friend Piraeus. He applies a concept from human social life, that of having close friends (φίλον αὐτοῦ εἶναι καὶ συνήθη), to animal life, thus transgressing the boundaries between the animal and the human world. However, the fact that he is not human and, therefore, ignorant of the convention that people also give names to places, leads him to confuse the place with a person. The magnitude of his lies and the transgression of his social position are such that their punishment cannot be limited to simple reproof (as in P14, p. 155 above), but demands severe measures. The dolphin is indignant with his lying (ἀγανακτήσας κατὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ ψευδολογίας) and drowns him. His behaviour is a breach of limits with regard to truth, knowledge, social position, and, in accordance to the collection's spirit, any deviation from the limits for action must be punished (see II.5 above).

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see Hdt. VI.44. The place of origin of the Μελιταῖος dog is doubtful. It might be Malta, as in Str. VI.2. But it might also be the island Melite, off the Dalmatian coast, see Plin. *Nat.* 3.26. It was a small expensive dog, see Arist. *HA* 612b10–11; id. *Pr.* 892a20–1; Str. VI.2; Thphr. *Char.* 21.9.

[54] See Burkert (1983), 196–204; Thompson (1947), 54–5.

[55] See García Gual (1972); Lilja (1980); Luria (1929); MacDermott (1935).

Thus, the *Augustana* reports both the positive and the negative effects of trickery and falsehood. Its messages are practical and cautionary. They present them both as effective ways to succeed and survive, but only provided that the protagonist is competent and prudent enough to practise them successfully. Otherwise, their consequences are disastrous. As the latter is more often the case (e.g. P7, 14, 17, 20, 22, 28, 33, 36–7, 41), the collection's messages can be interpreted as another way of promoting the maintenance of one's social status and role. A weak person must be very skilful in order to succeed in his trickery; therefore, it would be better for him to avoid it.

IV.1.4 *Inner Qualities with Positive Effects*

The collection's positive inner qualities are mainly inner strength and the qualities associated with prudent thought and action.[56] Inner strength is not described with the terminology associated with it in Greek thought (e.g. ἀνδρεία, τλημοσύνη) and there is no detailed discussion of it as a virtue.[57] The collection portrays it solely as an inner quality that is necessary in the field of the fable figures' daily strife for success and survival. Its value is practical. There are two types of portrayal: the first involves a group of fables where a physically weak figure demonstrates inner strength. The message here is that size is not a trustworthy criterion for a person's moral worth or, in other words, that appearances are often deceptive (p. 159 above). See, for example, fable P146:[58]

> While a lion was asleep, a mouse ran along his body. The lion woke up and was rolling round in every direction looking to see him who had got on top of him. A fox saw him and rebuked him for being afraid of a mouse though he was a lion. The lion replied: "I was not afraid of the mouse, but I was astonished that someone dared to run on the body of a sleeping lion."

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[56] On the appreciation of diligence see II.4.2 above. On the notion of justice in the collection see III.3.1 above.

[57] Due to the fable's literary conventions animals are portrayed as courageous, contrary to the view in Plato's *La.* 96e–7a that animals cannot be termed courageous because they cannot reason on what is fearsome and what danger is worth facing; instead, they are fearless and foolish. On the issue of the mental and moral qualities of animals in general see Sorabji (1993).

[58] See also P3 (pp. 130–2 above), 150 (pp. 125–6 above), 235 (pp. 126–7 above).

The lion is amazed (ἐθαύμασα) by the daring of the mouse (ἐτόλμησεν). He makes clear that he feels no fear of the mouse, as the fox suggested (ἐφοβήθη, οὐ . . . ηὐλαβήθην). Their imbalance of physical strength enables him to feel no physical threat from the mouse. The real cause of his amazement is the lesson of the mouse's action that the criteria for success in confrontation are not limited to superiority in physical strength, and that every opponent has certain qualities, and must therefore be taken seriously, despite his size or social status.[59] The mouse had the inner strength to walk over the sleeping lion. The lion learns this practical lesson without suffering any harm. Yet sometimes the physically strong pay a heavy price for not paying attention to the qualities of the weak (e.g. P3, pp. 130–2 above).

The other way of presenting inner strength is through criticism of its opposite, cowardice. In two fables, P132 and P144, the protagonist decides to confront a physically stronger party, only to flee in fear and be ridiculed. In P132 a dog chases a lion, but when the lion roars he retreats in fear (φοβηθείς). The fox rebukes him, observing that he should not have chased the lion, when he could not even stand his roar. In other words, it takes inner strength to confront the physically stronger, but the dog lacked it. The other coward who is ridiculed is the farmer in P144, who attempted to trap a lion which had entered his farm. In the end, he lets the lion go, being afraid (φοβηθείς) of its power. Similarly to the fox in the previous fable, the farmer's wife criticizes her husband for attempting to confront a lion without having the inner qualities to face it. In both fables, then, inner strength is judged by reference to cowardice and lack of physical strength. Those who do not possess inner strength should avoid physical confrontation with someone strong. The lion is used in both fables as the polar opposite to the coward protagonist, because of its traditional role as a symbol of superiority in fighting.

Nevertheless, even the coward by nature must not be desperate because of his inability to fight. There will always be someone more faint-hearted than him, as is shown by the fable of "the hares and the frogs" (P138). The hares decide to commit suicide, being conscious

[59] The fable's *epimythium* has a similar message: "the fable teaches that prudent men must not despise even mediocre matters" (ὁ λόγος διδάσκει δεῖν τοὺς φρονίμους τῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδὲ τῶν μετρίων πραγμάτων καταφρονεῖν).

of their cowardice (δειλία) and their inability to confront their predators.[60] They are ready to jump from a cliff, when they see the frogs (who lived in a lake at the bottom of the cliff) diving at the sound of the hares' feet. So the hares cancel their suicidal plan, because they realize that there do exist other animals more cowardly than them (δειλότερα) and even afraid of them. The fable's message is one of hope for the disfranchised in terms of physical and inner strength. Inner strength is a matter of viewpoint: its scale can also be viewed downwards. Even for those lacking it, there is comfort at the thought that there exist others less strong than them. Furthermore, this message advises you to compromise with your social position, on the grounds that there are others in a worse situation than you are.[61]

Inner strength, however, is of minor importance in the collection. Its presentation is limited. The predominant inner qualities with positive consequences in the *Augustana* are those connected with the intellectual ability to foresee danger and to succeed in unfavourable circumstances. The values that the collection promotes in this respect are self-restraint, moderation and stability of character, prudence and foresight. Self-restraint is promoted mainly through the fables that demonstrate the disastrous results for those protagonists who disrespect their limits for action. There are also certain fables that demonstrate the need for stability and duration in behaviour, and the need for moderation in general.[62]

A good example of these qualities is found in P226:

> The tortoise and the hare were arguing over who was the fastest. Therefore, they arranged a time and place [*for a contest*] and left. The hare being confident of his natural swiftness was careless about the race and so he lay down by the road and slept. But the tortoise being conscious of her slowness kept on running, until she overtook the sleeping hare and arrived first to win.

There are two reasons for the tortoise's victory. The first is the hare's overconfidence and his imprudence. He trusts his natural ability of speed (διὰ τὴν φυσικὴν ὠκύτητα) and is so confident of his victory that he does not care for the race (ἀμελήσας). His negligence and self-confidence are punished, because continuity and endurance, the

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[60] On the hares' cowardice see Van Dijk (1997), 322.
[61] See also P259 and Van Dijk (1996), 525. Cf. II.2 above.
[62] P13, 35, 59, 78, 110, 136, 226, 229, 242.

qualities that the tortoise possesses, triumph over the hare's behaviour.[63] The tortoise's inner qualities are the other reason for her success; her inner superiority reverses her natural handicap. In contrast to the hare's faulty reasoning about the race, the tortoise is conscious of her natural abilities (συνειδυῖα ἑαυτῇ τὴν βραδύτητα). In her case self-knowledge leads to immediate action, instead of the hare's delay in action. She runs continuously (οὐ διέλιπε τρέχουσα). Her continuous run is contrasted to the hare's lack of action as she surpasses her sleeping opponent. She did not pause in her effort, but endured the hardship and won. Stability in the protagonist's behaviour is also demanded in P35, 136, and 242, in which the protagonist's instability of behaviour is contrasted to the need for stable behaviour as a prerequisite to start an amicable relationship (p. 92 above). Besides, the unpredictability of the future demands control of the reactions to present situations: for example, the fishermen in fable P13 are advised to control their present reactions, which are beyond measure (οὐ μετρίως), because at any time fortune may change to misfortune and vice versa (p. 139 above).

Prudent action involves forethought, preparation, and careful examination and reasoning about the circumstances in which action must take place and is in this sense an 'inner' quality. Most fables suggest that one should reason carefully before acting.[64] It is sometimes the case that the thoughtless protagonist shelters and nourishes his own enemy (P192, 209, 234). The shepherd in P209 rears wolf cubs, thinking that they would guard his herd.[65] To his misfortune, when they grow up, the wolves follow their predatory instincts and kill his sheep.[66] The story is similar in P234, where a shepherd puts the herd under the protection of a wolf, whom he thought to be tame. In the end, his herd is also devoured. Imprudent action is often punished physically or verbally.[67] For example, the dogs in P135 attempt to drink all the river's water in order to reach and eat some hides

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[63] A message indicated also by the *epimythium*: "the fable shows that on many occasions effort wins over a careless nature" (ὁ λόγος δηλοῖ ὅτι πολλάκις φύσιν ἀμελοῦσαν πόνος ἐνίκησεν).

[64] E.g. P9, 24, 48, 135, 144, 176, 180, 192, 201, 209, 234. See also P253, 315, 437, 464, and Pr. 47, 67, 77 from the rest of the corpus.

[65] On the wolf's kinship to the dog see Buxton (1987).

[66] Note the similarities with the image of the lion cub who exhibits its true nature in A. *A*. 717–36, on which see Van Dijk (1997), 171–6, 220–5; Knox (1952); Nappa (1994). Cf. Rodríguez Adrados (1965a).

[67] Cascajero (1991), 54–5.

that were floating on the other side. As a result, they burst because of the large quantities of water that they consumed (on the negative consequences of unmeasured consumption see pp. 152–3 above). Likewise, the ape is ridiculed for his imprudence (ἀμελήτως) by the fox in P81 (p. 103 above), and the fox exploits the billy-goat's imprudence in P9 (pp. 163–4 above).

Provision against future calamities saves the ant, while its lack destroys the beetle in P112 (pp. 69–70 above). The boar in P224 also notes the importance of provision:

> A boar was standing by a tree sharpening his tusks on it. A fox asked him the reason why although neither a hunter nor any danger were present he sharpened his tusks. The boar replied: "but I do not do so in vain; because in case danger takes me by surprise, then I will not have to waste time sharpening, but instead I will have my tusks ready for use".

In times of danger effort might prove extremely beneficial. The boar in this fable demonstrates a message that underlies the collection, namely that constant alertness, forethought on the consequences of an action, preparation and lack of trust in present fortune are necessary for survival. In P43, the prudent frog foresees the future misfortune and saves himself and his companion from them:

> Two frogs were wandering trying to find a place to stay, after their lake had gone dry. When they arrived at a well, one of the frogs carelessly proposed that they jump in it. But the other frog said: "if the water here dries up too, how are we going to climb out?".

The careful reasoning of the second frog corrects the careless advice of the first (συνεβούλευσεν ἀμελητί). Prudence includes thinking about the results of one's actions despite the momentary satisfaction of one's needs: the first frog was imprudent because he wanted to satisfy his desire to find a new lodging quickly. His companion's practical wisdom saved him. In P39, the swallow perceives (αἰσθομένη) the threat from bird-hunters. Her ability to foresee the future danger is a form of intelligence (σύνεσις) that saves her, while the other birds who laughed as she was sharing her thoughts with them and advised them (συνεβούλευσεν) against the human threat are hunted down (see pp. 53–4 above). People should blame their imprudence for their sufferings and not any other factor, chance for instance. In P174 Chance advises the traveller, who had thoughtlessly fallen asleep beside a well and was in danger of falling in it, to accept responsi-

bility for his imprudence: "Oh, you! If you had fallen, you would have blamed me and not your thoughtlessness (τὴν σεαυτοῦ ἀβουλίαν)".

However, the qualities considered all constitute 'inner' qualities in some sense. To explore this more fully, we should also consider if the collection highlights individual responsibility for action, especially imprudent action with disastrous effects. We should also examine if there are any distinctions drawn in the fables' conceptual vocabulary between different degrees of knowledge before and after action.

IV.1.5 *Responsibility and Cognitive Indications Behind the Protagonist's Actions*

With regard to the first question, the fables frequently underline the voluntary character of actions. This is marked by the use of various forms of verbs that mean "to be willing", "to long for", "to wish" (βούλομαι, ἐπιθυμῶ, ἐθέλω). They indicate the inner process behind the protagonist's actions, which are described as the results of his own free choice. Therefore, because his acts resulted from individual volition, the protagonist is responsible for their outcomes. Sometimes his volition leads to positive results.[68] But the majority of fables that include markers of voluntariness have negative results, namely the protagonist's physical or verbal punishment.[69] Therefore, although there are examples of successful volition, it seems that the collection prefers to underline individual will—and consequently responsibility—as underlying a disastrous act. This is probably so, because in this way the fable's cautionary lesson from a failed action and the description of what constitutes a wrong course of action are more explicitly accentuated. The fable's protagonists are thus portrayed as fully conscious and responsible ethical agents; their punishment is justifiable and their actions are the products of willful but imprudent deliberation. So the fable's message not only accentuates individual responsibility, but it also emphasizes the negative consequences of imprudence: the animals who are punished for their actions, are responsible agents.[70]

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[68] P42, 57, 84, 95, 137, 151, 212, 220, 227, 242.

[69] P2, 16, 68, 83, 88–9, 115, 117, 124–5, 143–4, 155, 165, 173, 182, 206–7, 230, 232, 241.

[70] Divine action is the result of divine will in P8, 28, 50, 88–9, 101, 107, 185.

As for the second question, about the vocabulary for knowledge, there is a variety of verbs in the fables that have a cognitive significance as well as a grading of various degrees of cognition, from mere perception to knowledge. Certain of these verbs are used in the collection with the meaning "to perceive" and "to be informed". They indicate observation that does not involve independent reasoning but is enough for the protagonist to draw a conclusion on the course of action to be followed.[71] In the collection, the verb γιγνώσκω can mean "to decide" or "to know". In its first meaning, it indicates both a reasoned choice of a course of action based on interpretation of the situation.[72] Its other meaning belongs to another group of verbs which indicate secure knowledge, which is produced by careful reasoning and is verified by the facts.[73]

These verbs can be contrasted with other verbs which indicate a subjective and wrong opinion, resulting from mistaken and imprudent reasoning. Their deductions are contradicted by the facts and their results are disastrous for the protagonist.[74] The collection's vocabulary marks various grades of cognition. However, this vocabulary is not used very often in the fables. There are many reasons for the collection's lack of emphasis on cognitive vocabulary. First, the fable's style is economical and focuses on the formulation of the narrative chain at the expense of cognitive states. Secondly, the differentiation of the cognitive vocabulary might be implicit. For example, the self-contemplative phrases that the defeated party utters at the end of a fable (see p. 77 above) carry the authority of secure knowledge through a negative experience, without any need for verbal precision. When the defeated party recognizes his culpability and thus dictates the fable's message the phrase used is usually "Oh, poor me, for . . .". There is no need to add "I know for sure now that . . ."; it is obvious that the defeated party has learned its lesson. The fable itself displays first-order reasoning, which is limited to the specific

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[71] "to perceive": αἰσθάνομαι P39, 66, 159, 182, 195; "to be informed": μανθάνω P40, 173, 225; "to recognize": γνωρίζω P129, 173; "to detect": νοῶ P225, 233, 241.

[72] P17, 53, 55, 79, 121, 138, 142, 153.

[73] "to know": οἶδα P71, 127, 151, 237, 239; "to realize": σύνοιδα P44, 101, 142, 195; "to know": γιγνώσκω P1, 25, 50, 79, 88, 95, 107, 136–8.

[74] Meaning "to suppose": οἴομαι P74, 93, 120–1, 129, 141, 158, 169, 177–8, 180, 209; "to hold", "to assume": νομίζω P11, 13, 33, 199; "to assume": ὑπολαμβάνω P58, 87–8, 133, 165, 177, 182, 185, 201, 210, 241; "to assume": νοῶ P59, 234, 241.

circumstances of the story. The reflection involved in the second-order reasoning falls to the *epimythium* and the reader, who can turn the collection's exemplary stories into knowledge of the appropriate sort of behaviour (see II.1.2 above).

IV.2 *Conclusions*

How should we locate the collection's portrayal of inner qualities in relation to the socio-historical development of such qualities? Scholars have offered general accounts of the development of Greek thinking about the virtues, especially of self-restraint and moderation, from the Archaic period onwards and of their appropriation by the various social strata in Greek society. Moderation, self-restraint, and prudent thought were highly appreciated in Archaic Greece (starting from the elegies of Theognis and Solon), their importance being encoded in the mottoes inscribed on the entrance to the Delphic temple of Apollo, advising self-knowledge and respect of the limits for action and condemning excessive action (μηδὲν ἄγαν, γνῶθι σεαυτόν).[75]

It is supposed that the rise of a middle class and the related disturbance of the economic and social hierarchy of the Archaic society resulted in these virtues acquiring a class-significance, a process that can be traced from the sixth century onwards in the poems of Solon and Theognis. The aristocratic groups lost their political prevalence based on birth and wealth, while the economic and social rise of the middle class caused political turmoil, which in many cities culminated in the creation of democratic political systems. The effects for inner qualities were, on the one hand, their usurpation by the aristocrats as a means of moral differentiation between them and the *demos*, because they could no longer differentiate themselves on economic and political grounds. The aristocrats stressed their higher moral status and their mental excellence; their argument was that their superiority of beauty and virtue (καλὸς κἀγαθός) was hereditary and thus they were naturally virtuous, while the *demos* was characterized by foolishness. The *demos*, on the other hand, stressed the value of the good citizen and criticized wealth, greed, and arrogance

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[75] See Donlan (1980), ch. 1; North (1966), 1–21; Ober (1989), ch. 2.

as threats to political and ethical life. As the political conflict turned into a moral one, it seems that the conceptual effect was the emergence from the fifth century of the virtue of σωφροσύνη, which advised self-restraint and knowledge of the limits set for individual action by the ethical agent's own capacities and the communal interests, and formed the basis for prudent action and selection of the proper course of action. It expressed the need for social cohesion and control of personal interest, exemplified in the cautionary advice that any act may bring exactly the opposite results from those that the ethical agent wishes and that only self-restraint protects him from life's uncertainty; so *sophrosyne* became a key notion in Greek thought from then onwards.[76] Systematic philosophical thought, from Socrates and Plato onwards, embraced the virtues as part of its programme for ethical life, emphasizing their intellectual aspect, for instance in the form of the control of appetites and desires by reason, and the role of deliberation as the basis for moral excellence and happiness. Broadly speaking, all human beings were held to be, in principle, equally capable of moral excellence and thus the idea that excellence was based on nobility of birth gradually lost its currency from the fifth—fourth centuries onwards. The universality of the capacity for developing ethical virtue is emphasized especially by Socrates and the Stoics and, with more qualifications, by Plato and Aristotle.[77]

Considered in relation to this framework of ideas, the *Augustana* exhibits popular views on inner qualities, the term 'popular' here signifying views that were widespread and which may also have expressed the ideology of the lower social strata. The collection condemns wealth and greed;[78] it criticizes appearances as the basis of knowledge and ethical judgement; it shows the physically weak as having positive inner qualities and often displays the inappropriate conduct of the physically strong. The collection lacks a philosophical approach to ethical life (see pp. 41–2 above), and it also ignores certain political institutions (see p. 102 above). Its evaluation of inner qualities is focused on results, because the collection appraises these

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[76] Adkins (1972), 37 f.; Bryant (1996), ch. 3; Donlan (1980), chs. 2–4; North (1966), 32–122; Ober (1989), chs. 5–6; Pearson (1962), ch. 2; Starr (1992), chs. 1–2.

[77] See further Annas (1993), chs. 1–2; Dihle (1982), 45–55; Donlan (1980), chs. 2–5; Dover (1974), ch. 3; MacIntyre (1985), chs. 10–13; North (1966), ch. 1; Starr (1992), ch. 2; Thomson (1941), 350 f.; id. (1955), 232–3.

[78] For a socio-historical presentation of ideas about wealth in Greek thought and a comparison with the collection's views see III.2.3 above.

qualities on the basis of their effectiveness for personal success and survival. The practical character of the collection's ethical messages seems to be related to 'class', for it offers guidelines to the lower strata of Greek society for use in social life. The prevalent message is that of the importance of prudent thought and behaviour before and during the action.

The collection's views on inner qualities represent standard views in Greek thought. Therefore any attempt to locate the collection's ethics in a specific period on the basis of its views on inner qualities is impossible. These views reflect general and widespread views on virtues and vices. For example, the condemnation of vices and of the destructive results of excessive behaviour was commonplace in Greek thought. Gluttony, arrogance, vanity, love of wealth, and greed were widely regarded as disastrous, as they are in the collection. Deceit and lies were also criticized; however, despite their immorality, they were often valued in so far as their consequences were beneficial to the person concerned and his social group. The power of eloquence and persuasion was acknowledged by the Greeks, together with the danger of it being manipulated in favour of individual interest.[79]

The *Augustana* portrays wealth as a destructive factor both individually and socially (see III.2.3). Greek thought was also generally sceptical about the value of wealth. Love of wealth (φιλοχρηματία) was condemned. Rich people were thought to be soft due to their luxurious mode of living and incapable of controlling their desire for more wealth, in contrast to the poor who could endure misfortunes

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[79] Against the various vices, the destructive consequences from passions and deceit see e.g. Antipho Soph. fr. 59 DK; Ar. *Nu.* 1002–4; Arist. *EN* 1108a21–2, 1127a13–b32; Democr. frs. 44, 71–2, 191, 207 DK; Hdt. I.106, I.212, VII.18, IX.82; Heraclit. fr. 112 DK; Pl. *Grg.* 507a–c, 525a; id. *Hp.Mi.* 371a; id. *Lg.* 716a; id. *Phlb.* 11b–c, 31e–3b, 34d–40c; id. *Phdr.* 238a–b; id. *Prt.* 353c–4a, 462c–3b, 464c–5a; id. *R.* 354b, 519b, 608b; id. *Ti.* 64d; Plb. III.57.7; Stoics LS 65.T–U; S. *Ph.* 96–100; id. *Tr.* 453–4; Th. VI.11; X. *Hier.* I.19; id. *Mem.* I.2.25; id. *Oec.* I.21–3. Against falsehood and deceit: e.g. Arist. *EN* 1127a13–b32; Democr. fr. 112 DK; E. *Andr.* 445–52; Philol. fr. 11 DK; Pl. *Grg.* 464c–5a; id. *Phdr.* 240b; id. *Sph.* 222e; Sol. fr. 10 DK. On the power of eloquence and persuasion: e.g. Democr. fr. 51 DK; E. *Hipp.* 486–9; id. *Tr.* 966–8; Gorg. frs. 3, 11.8–14 DK; Nausiph. fr. 2.14–18 DK; Parm. fr. 2 DK; Pl. *Grg.* 452e–5a, 456b–7b; id. *Phdr.* 271d; S. *Ph.* 90–1, 100–3. In favour of lies in so far as they bring personal profit: e.g. Hdt. III.72; Pl. *Hp.Mi.* 366a–7b, 371e–2d (cheating as a form of intelligence); S. *Ph.* 79–85, 108–9. On Greek thought on cunning and falsehood and the value of eloquence in political life see Detienne and Vernant (1993); Gill and Wiseman (1993), esp. the contributions in chs. 1–4; Guthrie (1969), ch. 7; Ober (1989), ch. 4.

and were self-sufficient in their needs and desires. As a result, wealth was often considered to be a handicap to the virtuous life. Besides, making profit often entailed resorting to unjust means. Greek thought censored wealth that had been unjustly gained, but valued wealth when it was spent on the common welfare. From the fifth century onwards, Greek thought notes the ambivalent power of money, depending whether it was spent for individual or communal interest.[80]

The collection's ambivalent attitude towards appearance as a criterion for truth was also present in Greek thought, especially philosophical, which combined the appreciation and the censure of sensory information as a basis for cognitive truth. One line of thought credited only reason with truth and rejected any sensory material as inadequate, while the other line favoured empiricism based on the truthfulness of the senses, in so far as sensory data was verified by experience.[81] As regards moderation, prudence, inner strength, forethought, they were generally appreciated in Greek thought. The praise of their effectiveness for action in the *Augustana* again represents commonly held views.[82]

However, a great deal of Greek thought on inner qualities is absent from the collection. The description of inner qualities in the collec-

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[80] E.g. Ar. *Ec.* 424, 567, 608; id. *Pl.* 30–1, 49–50, 165–7, 193–7, 237–8, 559–70, 754–5; Arist. *Pol.* 1252b27–9; Democr. fr. 78 DK; E. *El.* 941–4; Hes. *Op.* 320–6; Pl. *Hipparch.* 225a–6e; id. *Ep.* III.317b; id. *Lg.* 679b–c, 742a–5b, 869e–70a; id. *R.* 421d–2a, 555c–d, 556b–d; [Pl.] *Erx.* 395d–406a; S. *Ant.* 295; Thal. fr. 10 DK. Against love of money (φιλοχρηματία): e.g. Arist. *Pol.* 1270a11–19; id. *Top.* 145b24–6; Pl. *Ep.* VII.335a; id. *Lg.* 747b–c; id. *Phd.* 82c; id. *R.* 390d, 391c, 485e–6b, 549b–51a, 553c. Cf. Bowie (1993), 284–91; David (1984), 15–17; Davidson (1997), 206–8; Donlan (1980), chs. 2–3; Dover (1974), 170–5; Ober (1989), ch. 5; Spinelli (1991); Thomson (1941), 351–3.

[81] Against appearances: e.g. Democr. frs. 9, 11 DK; E. *Hel.* 576–84; Pl. *Tht.* 151e–64b; Stoics LS 41; Xenoph. fr. A.49 DK. In favour of appearances: e.g. Diogenian. V.15, VII.94 *CPG*; Epicureans LS 16–17; Sol. fr. 10 DK. The issue was particularly addressed by the Hellenistic philosophers, see Long (1974), ch. 3.

[82] On inner strength (courage): e.g. Arist. *EE* 1228a26–30a36; id. *EN* 1115a6–7b22; Pl. *La.* 191d–9c; id. *Lg.* 633c–d; id. *R.* 429a–30b. Moderation, control of passions, observation of due measure: e.g. Arist. *EN* 1104a11–27, 1106b36–7a8; id. *Pol.* 1265a29 f.; Democr. frs. 70, 86, 102, 191, 219, 224, 231, 233, 284, 286 DK; E. *Hipp.* 261–6; id. *Med.* 125–30; id. *Ph.* 535–48; id. *Supp.* 862–6; Epicur. LS 21.F; Heraclit. fr. 94 DK; Pl. *Amat.* 134a–d; id. *Lg.* 691c–d, 744d–e; id. *Prt.* 356e–7b; Sol. fr. 10 DK. Prudence, self-restraint, practical wisdom (σωφροσύνη, φρόνησις): e.g. Ar. *Ra.* 1482–90; Arist. *EN* 1117b23–9b18, 1141b2–4a9; id. *Pr.* 949a24–50a19; Democr. frs. 40, 42, 54, 65–6, 76, 210–11 DK; Epicur. LS 21.B, F–G; Hdt. III.36; Heraclit. frs. 112, 116 DK; Pl. *Alc.1* 133c–4d; id. *Amat.* 138a–b; id. *Chrm.* 164d–e; id. *Grg.* 492a–b, 506c–7b; id. *Phd.* 68c; id. *Phlb.* 45d–e; id. *R.* 389d–e, 431b–2a, 442c–d, 583c–6e; Pythag. fr. 6.4–6 DK; S. *El.* 1015–16; Xenoph. fr. 2.3–4 DK; Zen. I.67, II.90 *CPG*.

tion is terminologically deficient, as the key terms associated with virtues and vices in Greek thought are either rare or totally absent.[83] The fables do not often feel the need to define a specific mode of behaviour, but rather focus on action and the consequences that result from it. As regards the description of inner qualities in action, this lacks many of the aspects of Greek philosophical thought on them. For example, there are indications of the cognitive and voluntary preconditions for virtuous action. Actions are often described as the products of free will and reasoning. But ethical action as a product of reasoning and will is defective in the collection. These preconditions for action in Greek ethical thought are not stressed or analysed.[84]

This is so, in part because ethical thought in the fables themselves is limited to first-order reasoning (see II.1.2 above). The protagonists are interested in a means-end type of action; their action and ethical thinking focuses on the particular circumstances and the ways to produce the desired outcome. The protagonists of the fable do not reason about their ethical life as a whole, as Greek philosophical thought proposed;[85] The practicality of the collection's ethics limits ethical thinking to pointing out the importance of prudent action. Vices are described by reference to their disastrous consequences; they are characterized as excessive acts that lack observance of due measure. The prevalent idea in Greek ethical philosophy that passions and desires should be controlled by reason is only indicated through the protagonist's failed and imprudent action.[86]

The prudential and practical aspect of the collection's ethics must

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[83] The four cardinal virtues in Greek thought were justice, self-restraint, practical wisdom, and courage (δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη, σοφία—φρόνησις, ἀνδρεία). See, for example, Arist. *EN* 1103a4–7; Pl. *La.* 198a; id. *Lg.* 631b–d; id. *Men.* 74a; id. *Prt.* 329c–30a, 333b, 349d; Stoics LS 58A. Philosophers occasionally extended this catalogue, adding more virtues to it, such as piety, magnanimity, endurance (ὁσιότης, μεγαλοψυχία, τλημοσύνη). Aristotle gives an extensive catalogue of the virtues in *EN* 1107a28–8b10. For definitions of virtue (ἀρετή) and vice (κακία) see Arist. *EN* 1106b36–7a8; id. *EE* 1220a4–15; id. *Rh.* 1383b19–4a9; Pl. *R.* 444d–e.

[84] On the cognitive aspect of virtuous action see Annas (1993), ch. 2. On action resulting from the ethical agent's free will see Dihle (1982), ch. 2. On the figures' free will in the *Augustana* see Nøjgaard (1964–7), I.73–5.

[85] See Annas (1993), chs. 1–2. Such a reasoning would be practically impossible, because of the collection's fragmentary form (i.e. there is no continuous text, but each fable is independent from the others). See Skillen (1992), 171.

[86] See, for example, Arist. *EN* 1106b36–7a8, 1191a1–20; Democr. frs. 210–11 DK; Epicur. LS 21.B, F–G; Pl. *Lg.* 732e–3b; id. *R.* 558d–9a, 571b–6b, 583c–8a. Cf. Annas (1993), chs. 2, 16; Kahn (1985); Long (1974), chs. 2, 5.

also be examined in relation to the broader discussion of modern scholarship on the content of prudence in Greek ethical theories. Greek ethical theories were teleological in the sense that the ethical agent was supposed to aim at a final good, a τέλος, usually conceived as happiness (εὐδαιμονία). Ethical life is thus directed at happiness, which could be achieved by the practice of the virtues. But the agent can only carry out this progress to happiness by reference to the understanding of what happiness and the final good are. One key debate among modern scholars starts from this very point: is the standpoint of Greek ethics fundamentally other-oriented or self-oriented? Does it advise the individual to achieve perfection within a communal or individualistic framework? Or is prudential thought directed only at the achievement of the agent's own happiness regardless of any communal concerns?[87]

At first, it seems that the collection's ethics support the last view. The fables of the *Augustana* praise or blame their protagonists' behaviour depending on whether they planned their action and acted reasonably in the particular circumstances. The protagonist's behaviour is judged by the results of his actions; the fables are interested in the consequences that action has for the protagonist regardless of its implications for others. Prudence in the collection suggests carrying through successfully such self-interested behaviour, because he is naturally endowed with certain abilities that guarantee success, such as cunning and physical strength or because circumstances allow such behaviour. But the fables also advise those who are not capable of practising self-interested action to respect their natural limits for action and the claims of others (see II.5, III.3.6 above). Prudent thought in the collection can be summarized as the protagonist asking himself "do I have what it takes to succeed in these circumstances?"; his answer will determine the course of action to be followed.

More generally, the goals commended in the fables are not framed in terms of ethical perfection or the virtuous life. The good in the collection is conceived as success and survival; therefore, its ethics are pragmatic and practical and not idealistic.[88] They promote a

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[87] On this issue see Annas (1993), chs. 1–2; id. (1995); Rowe (1993); Gill (1995), chs. 3–5; Irwin (1995a); id. (1995b).

[88] Chambry (1927), xl–xli. Cf. Van Dijk (1997), 74–5 on the 'usefulness' of fables in ancient theory.

cautionary rather than positive or active ethical life. It seems plausible to think that Greek popular ethics, which are represented in the *Augustana*, should have a practical rather than idealistic character. For the lower strata in Greek society ethical life had a more pragmatic aspect than for the better off. The lower classes had to face material hardships and they experienced social life as a daily struggle, being subject to an imbalance in political and economic power in their relationship with the dominant social groups. The fables offered them a corpus of exemplary cautionary lessons on practical ethics.

Nevertheless, the important point in a study of the ethics of the *Augustana* is not which Greek philosophical issues are or are not present, but rather the fact that the collection does contain ethics and thus can be used in our study of Greek ethical thought. In the fables there is ethical reasoning and psychology, though of a "first-order" kind (see II.1.2, III.3.7, IV.1.2, IV.1.5). Ethical norms are presented and promoted, though by implication, through the consequences that action has for the figures of the fables (e.g. as regards reciprocal relations; see chs. II–III). There is also a certain conception of virtues and vices (IV.1). The collection's ethics lack, on the other hand, "second-order" reasoning, analytical discourse, and the idea of a philosophical life as the context for the application of their messages. These absences are explained by the popular and practical character of the fable's message (e.g. I.3.2). It can be argued, then, that Greek fable, at least in the *Augustana*, though it was not 'philosophy', was indeed 'philosophical', in that it communicated messages on human behaviour, messages which reflect widespread views in Greek thought. This point is close to Hegel's remarks on the limited scope that the fables have as regards ethical reflection (pp. 32–3 above). We may also note MacIntyre's comment that "moral discourse while it may use fables and parables as aids to the halting moral imagination ought in its serious adult moments to abandon the narrative mode for a more discursive style and genre [i.e. the philosophical dialogue]".[89] However, a complete study of Greek thought should not simply distinguish between the stages and texts of the 'child' and the 'adult', but should also take into consideration those texts which are testimonies of the beliefs, values, and ethical principles that circulated among the ordinary people in Greek society. I hope that my

[89] MacIntyre (1985), 130.

research has shown that the *Augustana* is an important source for such a study. To take the research presented here further, one would need to make a detailed study of the messages that are preserved in the *epimythia* in the *Augustana* and other collections and also of the use of fables in other literary contexts, outside the collections. This is a *desideratum* for future study of the ethics of the Greek fable.[90]

[90] The recent contribution by Van Dijk (1997) is an essential start to this project. Yet his thorough analysis of Greek fables in other literary contexts, focuses on their use as part of an argument rather than on their content. However, a comparative analysis of the ideas in the fables that he presents and those from the collections would be a very important next step in scholarship on the Greek fable.

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